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Choosing an international legal regime: How much justice would you trade for peace? 
Candace H. Blake-Amarante 
 
My thesis focuses on the problem of civil wars, which are marked by high levels of violence and 
an extreme inability to bargain for peace. The literature on bargaining failure in civil wars has 
identified several reasons to explain this situation: asymmetric information, problem of credible 
commitment, and issue indivisibility. These studies, however, neglect to consider the 
legal/institutional environment where bargaining occurs. In contrast, I argue that this is a crucial 
factor in determining whether or not bargaining might be successful. In my thesis, I start off by 
formalizing the situation of conflict: this consists of two interdependent games, a War Game and 
a Bargaining Game, whose specifications incorporates the distinguishing features of civil wars: 
the nature of the actors involved, the way they fight (i.e. fighting without committing crimes and 
fighting by committing crimes), the type of government (democratic, non-democratic), etc. The 
key observation is that the full specification of these games (i.e., action available, payoffs, etc) 
depends on the legal regime in place. The study of how the War/Bargaining game varies with the 
legal regime in place allows one to compare the different regimes with respect to their ability of 
achieving the goals of peace and/or justice. I, then, apply these ideas to compare the relative 
performance of international criminal tribunals designed according to the principles of state 
sovereignty, human/cosmopolitan rights, and domestic tort litigation. A novel result is that the 




presence of asymmetric information in civil wars. I give an example of a situation where the 
domestic tort litigation model outperforms the other legal models, thus lending support to a 
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Nobody knew how she ended up in New York City. The authorities found her aimlessly 
wandering the streets. What they were able to gather was that she was from Sierra Leone, and 
given her incoherence and a ghastly slash across her stomach, she was probably a victim of the 
war. Her name was Haja Kalle. 
Somehow or another, several victims of the civil war in Sierra Leone found their way to New 
York City. Several were illegal immigrants and were, therefore, incarcerated. In 2001, I joined 
Nah We Yone (It [Sierra Leone] belongs to us), an organization that helped victims of war and 
refugees from Sierra Leone by providing support through legal counsel, translators, medical and 
psychological assistance, shelter, etc. Haja Kalle was one of Nah We Yone’s clients. The 
organization got her admitted to a hospital. I do not recall the condition that she had. All I 
remember was that no one could get the full story of what had happened to her during the war. 
Members of Nah We Yone took turns visiting her at the hospital. Eventually, my turn came up, 
and I went to see her.  
I tried to speak to her in my broken, heavily American accented Krio. Fortunately, she 
understood me. She looked tired, listless, and bored. I found out that she did not have access to 
any form of distraction like television at the hospital, because she did not have the means to pay 
for it. I grabbed a twenty dollar bill from my purse and handed it to her. She took the bill, stared 
at it and screamed. She buried her face in her hands and began to cry. In between sobs, she lifted 




pay, dem rebel dem, deng go pay.” Although I am unable to speak Krio well, I understand it 
perfectly. “They will pay,” she said, “those rebels will pay.” 
After a couple of months in the hospital, her condition improved. On one of my other visits, I 
saw her up and about taking walks with a nurse guiding her. Nah We Yone managed to contact 
her family in Sierra Leone. Needless to say, she was thrilled to hear their voices and to know that 
they had survived the war. A few days after the phone conversation with her family, Haja Kalle 
passed away. I paid her a last visit at her funeral in a mosque in New York City. She has become 
yet another number in the growing statistic of non-combatant casualties of civil wars.  
 From 1945 to 1999, there have been 127 civil wars as opposed to 25 interstate wars.1 
Civil wars2 have caused the death of more than 16.2 million people, five times more the toll of 
interstate wars.3 Most of these causalities are non-combatants, which makes it all the more 
pressing to thoroughly explore mechanisms that can potentially bring these conflicts to an end.4 
Why are civil wars characterized by such high levels of violence? Some of the reasons can be 
traced to the nature of the actors involved and the means and methods of warfare they employ 
during civil wars. 
 In interstate wars, the main actors are usually states, who fight each other conventionally 
using heavy weaponry such as field artillery and armor. Military confrontation is direct and 
across well-defined front lines. In conventional type warfare, the main target is military 
objectives, in other words, the aim of this type of warfare is to kill, disable, and capture military 
personnel, and to destroy and disable or capture military equipment.5 
 Instead in civil wars, the main actors are usually rebel groups and government forces. 




the government has legitimacy, sovereignty, allies, and access to resources.6 This military 
imbalance “compels rebels to resort to unconventional and unlawful means and methods of 
warfare as the only way to redress the military imbalance they face”.7 Thus, rebel groups often 
refuse to directly engage the government forces and, instead, target non-military objectives, such 
as the destruction of civilian assets which entail killing and injuring non-combatants and/or 
destroying or damaging means of production.8 In turn, to confront the rebels, government forces 
themselves resort to unconventional and unlawful methods of warfare as often this is the best 
counter-strategy to those employed by the rebels. This results in additional killing of civilians.9 
Furthermore, the problem of informational asymmetry, which is present in any conflict, is 
exacerbated in civil wars by the recourse to unconventional methods of warfare. According to 
the literature on bargaining and war, engaging in direct battle (conventional warfare) often 
reveals information regarding the strength, capabilities, and resolve of each faction.10 This 
information allows each actor to assess correctly the value of going to war, and ultimately leads 
opposing parties to make mutually acceptable offers at the bargaining table. In contrast, indirect 
methods of warfare (unconventional warfare) prevent opponents from accurately assessing 
information: parties tend to overestimate their chances of winning the war and are, therefore, less 
willing to make concessions. Ultimately, this leads to bargaining failure and war often continues 
in the most brutal way. In sum, the nature of the actors involved, their incentives to resort to 
unconventional means and methods of warfare, and the consequent persistence of information 
asymmetry are the main reason for the high levels of violence observed in civil wars.  
1. International Criminal Tribunals 
 
 To redress the violence perpetrated during civil wars, in the 1990s the international 




international tribunals to prosecute those most responsible for committing atrocities during war. 
In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the Allies created International Military Tribunals (IMT) at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo to prosecute Axis state and military leaders most responsible for 
violations of international law, specifically for crimes against peace and war crimes. IMT’s 
primarily had jurisdiction over laws dealing with state to state relations during the war 
(humanitarian laws).12 
In 1992, the international criminal tribunal approach re-emerged to redress violations of 
international law but this time in the context of the conflict that was taking place in the former 
Yugoslavia. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established and imposed the ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with the intended goal to 
establish justice and to some extent peace by punishing those parties most responsible for 
violating humanitarian and human rights law. The ICTY had jurisdiction over genocide and 
crimes against humanity and could prosecute complicit heads of state, other government officials 
as well as non-state actors for crimes perpetrated against the civilian population. 
 After the creation of the ICTY, a similar approach was used to deal with the high level of 
atrocities taking place in other civil wars around the world. In 1994, upon the request of the 
Rwandan government, the UNSC created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda to bring the most responsible perpetrators of 
genocide to account. In 2002, after sixty states ratified the Rome Statute, a permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC) came into force to assist states in investigating and 
prosecuting violators of international criminal law. Signatories of the Rome Statute also agreed 
to adhere to the statute to prevent themselves from violating humanitarian and human rights of 




Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur (Sudan), Central African Republic, Kenya, 
Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali.13 
Following the creation of the ICC, another wave of tribunals has come about: the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, the Kosovo court system established under the auspices of the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, United Nations Serious Crimes Unit under 
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, and more recently the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.14 These courts are 
typically referred to as “hybrid” courts because of “their legal status applicable law, composition 
and organizational structure had to be negotiated and agreed upon between the parties [state and 
the international drafters]”.15 That is, rather than the international community determining at the 
aggregate level how justice should be pursued in one single legal model, each country 
determines how justice is pursued in the negotiation process between individual states and 
diplomats and lawyers of the UN Secretariat. 
 In all cases, the underlying political/ideological/legal views have imposed heavy 
constraints on the courts’ operations, hence on the international community’s attempt to obtain 
peace. For instance, the adherence to certain principles of international criminal law has often 
hindered the ability of achieving peace. In particular, the core principle of (international) 
criminal law of the duty to prosecute (war) crimes has often favored the achievement of justice at 
the expense of peace. 
 These observations along with the high numbers of civilian casualties in civil wars 
suggest that one should probably rethink this point of view. Rather than taking as a given a 




should fix the goal of achieving peace and design tribunals in order to maximize the chance of 
achieving this goal. The present thesis can be viewed as an attempt in this direction. In this 
thesis, I will explore the problem of designing an international criminal tribunal from a strategic 
point of view. Specifically, I will examine whether or not an international criminal tribunal can 
provide warring parties with the right incentives to end violence and successfully negotiate for 
peace.16  
It is important to note that the determination of the “optimal” tribunal design will always 
depend on the underlying structural conditions of the conflict, international humanitarian and 
human rights laws, and the characteristics of the parties involved, etc. Moreover, contrary to 
popular belief, the determination of the optimal court design does not reduce to simply endowing 
the court with sufficiently high enforcement power. In fact, both the historical evidence in 
Chapter IV (the case of Yugoslavia) and the theoretical analysis of Chapter V show that 
endowing a court with sufficiently high enforcement power might as well lead (other things 
being equal) to catastrophic outcomes (i.e. the Srebrenica massacres discussed in Chapter IV). 
 
2. Incentives, Information Transmission, and Tribunal Design 
 
The theoretical edifice of this thesis consists of three levels of increasing conceptual 
complexity. At the first level, I introduce the basic idea that international criminal tribunals can 
be viewed as devices which impose costs and provide rewards for the warring parties. By doing 
so, they may alter the profitability of the various options available to warring parties and change 




not there exists a feasible system of costs/rewards which would induce the desired outcome of 
peace. 
  The basic idea is refined at the second level with the recognition that the determination of 
which systems of costs/rewards are feasible depends, in an essential way, on the underlying 
political and legal environment. This shifts the thesis’ focus from the determination of the 
optimal system of costs/rewards to the determination of the optimal political/legal environment 
according to which tribunals are designed. This idea is further developed at the third level where 
the question becomes whether or not the choice of the political/legal environment may lead to 
successfully alter those circumstances leading to bargaining failure.  
In any conflict one of the main reasons for bargaining failure is the presence of 
asymmetric information17 and that this is all the more true in civil wars for reasons discussed 
above. One of the main results of this thesis, and perhaps the least intuitive, is that different legal 
regimes favor information transmission across the parties involved in a conflict to a different 
extent. That is, while certain regimes may exacerbate the problem of asymmetric information, 
thus leading to continued warfare, others might sensibly reduce the problem and increase the 
likelihood of successful negotiations. Thus, the present work leads to the novel conclusion that 
the ability of reducing asymmetric information is an important and perhaps decisive factor in 
determining the optimal legal regime. 
 
3. D’Amato’s proposal  
During the war in the former Yugoslavia, when it was decided that a court would be 




international lawyer Anthony D’Amato immediately understood that to achieve a long-term 
peace in the former Yugoslavia would be impossible. In 1994, at the height of hostilities and 
numerous attempts at peace negotiations, D’Amato, wrote a telling article, “Peace vs. 
Accountability in Bosnia,” cautioning the international community not to issue indictments for 
complicit leaders in tandem with ongoing peace talks.18 An instructive debate ensued.19  
D’Amato maintained that once leaders had been indicted, it would have been more profitable for 
those leaders to take their chances and keep fighting rather than agreeing to cease hostilities and 
subject themselves to punishment. D’Amato realized that the measures proposed by the 
international community posed an incentive problem: even with the threat of punishment, the 
system provided no incentives for the warring parties to cease hostilities. In order to remedy this 
situation, D’Amato proposed a model of an International Criminal Tribunal based on the 
principles of the domestic tort litigation model (DTL). This is based on the notion that culpable 
parties would not be prosecuted once they settle inter se.20 The rationale for this model is that 
“exact justice” can be attained among individuals in conflicting situations without necessarily 
involving a court. That is, the DTL model creates the right incentive for opposing parties to 
bargain for a mutually beneficial agreement in order to avoid that either one of the parties call 
the court. In D’Amato’s view, it is almost a definition that a system inspired by these principles 
would remove the incentive problem described above. 
 Noticeably, D’Amato’s proposal of using the DTL model for the international 
management of civil wars implies a far reaching extension of the classical DTL model as: (1) the 
DTL would operate in an international setting rather than a domestic one, and (2) the DTL would 
operate in a criminal setting rather than a civil one.  Yet, the basic logic would be the same: just 




nutshell, a party’s threat of calling the court determines what the other party would obtain if it 
refuses to negotiate, and this would set the grounds for a successful bargaining process.
 Extending the domain of applicability of the DTL model to the international management 
of civil wars raises several types of concerns. The most common, perhaps, is of a moral nature as 
one of the outcomes of the DTL model is that perpetrators might go unpunished. Unlike civil 
law, where parties are encouraged to settle disputes before resorting to legal procedures, in 
criminal law it is generally held that the state has an obligation to punish perpetrators in the 
interest of deterring future transgressions like murder. This idea finds its application in an 
international setting with the principle of Human Rights (HR) law. In such a setting, the 
international community claims the right to prosecute heinous crimes for the sake of deterring 
the commission of future crimes.  Thus, the general idea is that analogies can be drawn between 
domestic criminal law and international HR law but not between civil law and international HR 
law. This criticism, however, does not seem especially sound. First, recent history shows that 
states have often given up their obligation to punish perpetrators for certain crimes in order to 
achieve goals that appeared more advantageous. For instance, the International Criminal Court 
refused to indict members of the Ugandan government for committing crimes during the civil 
war on the basis that they were going to assist in the apprehension of more culpable criminals 
primarily from the Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (see Chapter IV).21  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, a system that by punishing perpetrators leads to more 
atrocities would be associated to severe moral concerns as well. In the Yugoslavian war, the 
application of the idea of the “duty to prosecute” led to, or at least did not prevent, the genocide 
of Srebrenica (see Chapter IV), a fact that leads one to wonder, as did D’Amato, whether or not 




 Another concern regarding the applicability of the DTL model to the international 
management of civil wars stems from the (international) legal status of the parties involved in the 
conflict. The parties in a domestic civil dispute have the same legal rights. Typically, this is not 
the case in International Criminal Law.  Under the current international legal system, while 
rebels do have the right to petition an international court, the process is not as automatic or direct 
as the states right to petition a court. For instance, state parties to the Rome Statute creating the 
ICC can directly refer cases to the Court under Article 14, but rebel groups do not enjoy the same 
status as states or the same right of referral and would have to resort to other mechanisms to 
persuade the Prosecutor to investigate crimes committed by states or to persuade the Security 
Council to refer such cases to the Court. Given the modus operandi of the DTL model, one might 
fear that these asymmetries in the status of disputing parties might severely limit the 
effectiveness of the DTL model in the international setting. This is a serious concern, which I 
will address in subsequent chapters, in particular Chapter III. 
 
4. The approach of the thesis 
 
 In this thesis, I will explore the validity of D’Amato’s idea. More generally, my aim is 
that of introducing a formal setting where the performance of alternative legal regimes – such as 
the State Sovereignty (SS) model, the Human Rights (HR) model, the Cosmopolitan Rights (CR) 
model and the DTL model -- could be evaluated on the basis of their ability to alter combatants’ 
incentives from fighting to bargaining for peace. 
 My approach can be summarized as follows. I will start off by formalizing the situation 




will focus on the case of two players, the rebel group (R) and the government (G). The extension 
to more than two players is briefly considered in Chapter VI. The players’ payoffs in the 
war/bargaining game are determined by the underlying structural conditions of the conflict, such 
as the military capabilities of each player, the types of resources available to them, and their 
resolve. 22 The war/bargaining game can be viewed as a stylized model of any conflict.  From 
this stylized model of war, by incorporating, in the form of assumptions, the empirical 
regularities identified by the literature on violence during civil war and the bargaining failure 
during civil war, I will obtain a model of civil war. Since these regularities pertain to civil wars, 
it follows then that my results do not necessarily extend to other types of war.  
Once a formal model of civil war is established, I can then inquire into how different 
legal regimes affect the conflict.  The key observation for this inquiry is that the type of legal 
system in place affects the war/bargaining game because it affects the options available to the 
combatants as well as their payoffs. Moreover, different legal regimes affect the war/bargaining 
game in different ways. In order to briefly illustrate this point, let us consider the following 
example. We have seen (section 1.2) that a court might be seen as a device that imposes 
costs/rewards on conflicting parties. For this to be true it is necessary that the court be allowed to 
act by the rules of each specific legal regime. Now, consider two possible legal regimes, A and 
B, which differ because the rebels are recognized as an international legal subject in A but not in 
B. Thus, in legal regime A, the rebels have the right to call an international criminal tribunal if 
their opponent commits crimes. Formally, the game played in A differs from the game played in 
B because a player in A has an action (“call the court”) which is not available in B. The presence 
of this action in A alters the players’ incentives (with respect to legal regime B) as follows: the 




international court will impose a cost (a punishment) on the government if it chooses such action. 
Thus, at least in certain cases, the government might be less inclined to commit crimes in A than 
in B.  
In fact, the effect of the legal system on the war/bargaining game may be more subtle 
than what the example suggests. In Chapter V, we shall see that information transmission from 
one party to another is more likely to occur under certain types of regimes. As information 
transmission reduces the asymmetry in the parties’ information, it then follows that successful 
bargaining is more likely to be obtained under these regimes. Specifically, in Chapter V, I will 
give an example where the DTL system outperforms the HR system exactly because it favors 
information transmission between warring parties. I will use this example to provide the rationale 
for two different phases of the war in Yugoslavia. The first phase that I consider is the one 
immediately preceding and ending with the massacres at Srebrenica in July 1995. When referring 
to this phase my example lends support to D’Amato’s thesis that the DTL system should have 
been chosen over the HR system. I must stress, however, that the reason is more complex than 
what D’Amato envisioned,  as the  inability to successfully bargain was due not only to the costs 
imposed by the HR system (as D’Amato observed), but also, and more importantly, by the lack 
of information transmission, which is caused by the HR system. The second phase that I consider 
comprises of the events that took place starting from 1994 and ending in November 1995 with 
the Dayton Peace Accords.  In 1994, the US intervened to form an alliance between the Croats 
and Bosnians (Croat-Muslim Federation). Following the formation of the alliance, a strike took 
place, “Operation Storm,” in August 1995 whereby the Croats and Muslims retook Krajina and 
twenty percent of Bosnia back from the Serbs. I will present evidence that will allow me to claim 




all the events taking place during this phase -the formation of the Croat-Bosnian alliance, 
Operation Storm, the role of the US as well as the successful peace negotiations at Dayton -have 
a natural and straightforward interpretation within the context of my example. In particular, we 
shall see that with the US acting as an enforcer (in the DTL sense), Operation Storm delivered 
the amount of information necessary to reach the Dayton Peace Accord. 
 
5. Organization of the thesis 
 
The thesis unfolds as follows. In Chapter II, Civil Wars and Jurisdictions: Formalizing 
the Problem, I start off by discussing the literature on violence during civil wars and bargaining 
for peace in civil wars. Then, I incorporate the findings of this literature into a war/bargaining 
game with asymmetric information, which formalizes civil wars. Finally, I introduce a court into 
the picture and give a brief sketch of how the court is likely to change the war/bargaining game. 
For the purpose of this chapter, I just present a general idea of how courts can change the nature 
of the game and the bargaining process. I will provide a more thorough evaluation of how courts 
affect the war and bargaining game under each legal regime in Chapter V.  
In Chapter III, Legal and Political Views, I look at the legal and political underpinnings 
of international criminal tribunals that have emerged as a result of the egregious acts of violence 
during civil wars. I present the political and legal views that correspond to the different 
principles of state sovereignty, human rights/global cosmopolitan law, and domestic tort 
litigation, which underlie the various international legal regimes. I start off by tracing the 
evolution of state sovereignty from the beginning to the modern day conception. I describe how 




state sovereignty, to a more permissive one, which contains several elements inspired by the 
ideas of human rights and cosmopolitan rights. Furthermore, I discuss the political and legal 
underpinnings of the domestic tort litigation model and make preliminary considerations as to 
how it would fare as an alternative international legal regime to redress the violence perpetrated 
during civil wars.   
Chapter IV, Legal Regimes, sees how the different ideological views described in Chapter 
III translate into substantially different legal regimes. The common thread running through these 
regimes is the overall goals of securing peace and justice. One of the main objectives of this 
chapter is to consider whether these two goals can be pursued in tandem or are incompatible as 
D’Amato’s claims. He argued that while justice was a commendable goal to pursue it was 
inconceivable to obtain in practice. I explore this claim by first considering debates between two 
camps: 1) those who believe there is a duty to prosecute in order to fulfill the goals of justice and 
peace, and 2) those who do not believe that international law would impose such duties on a state 
in precarious situations like civil wars and focus instead on ways to secure peace.  I examine 
specific design features of each legal regime coming from the human rights perspective, namely 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the state sovereignty 
perspective, namely the International Criminal Court (ICC), a hybrid court model, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and a “possible” legal regime based on the principles of the 
domestic tort litigation model (DTL) to determine whether or not such design features account 
for both the goals of justice and peace. To ascertain whether each regime can or have actually 
obtained peace and/or justice, I look at specific case studies: for the ICTY, I analyze the war in 
the former Yugoslavia; for the ICC, I analyze the war in the Uganda; for the hybrid court model, 




Yugoslavia and show that a de facto DTL was at work and that it led to a peaceful outcome 
(Dayton Accords).  
Using the war/bargaining game of Chapter II, in Chapter V, Optimal Court Design: A 
Comparative Analysis, I undertake the formal study of how different legal regimes affect the 
parties’ ability to successfully bargain for peace. The logic underlying this study is as follows. 
The literature on civil wars has identified a number of issues that prevent parties to successfully 
bargain for peace. I ask whether or not it is possible to design a legal regime that could eliminate 
these issues or at least substantially mitigate their effects. The main message of this chapter is 
that this can be accomplished. I apply these ideas to compare the relative performance of the 
legal regimes previously considered: SS, HR/CR and DTL. A novel and non-trivial result of this 
chapter is that the DTL system reduces (relative to the other systems) the problem associated 
with the presence of asymmetric information as the DTL favors information transmission from 
one party to another. Thus, successful negotiations, hence peace, are more likely to occur under 
the DTL than under other regimes. As discussed in section 1.4, I will argue that a de facto DTL 
was indeed at work during the second phase of the war in the former Yugoslavia, and I will show 
that my theoretical analysis provides a rationale for the events that took place in that phase.  
Chapter VI concludes. I begin with a summary of the thesis and then briefly sketch the 
direction of future research I intend to pursue. Stemming from the model generated from this 
thesis there are three extensions I would like to study: The first (section 1: Multiple players and 
the Public Interest Variable), consists of adding more players to the game. Additional players 
may be needed, for instance, if there is more than one rebel group. A case of special interest 
obtains when the additional player is the civilian population. A delicate problem of 




could represent the civilian population, but the civilian interest may not be aligned with their 
interests. It may be the case that the latter prefers an immediate end to the war, while the former 
may want to pursue justice. In such a case, does the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC or the UNSC 
duty to prosecute such crimes override the rights/desires of the civilians? Following these 
observations, one should probably distinguish the case where the interests of the Chief 
Prosecutor or UNSC are aligned with the civilian population from those where the interests are at 
odds. Most likely, the outcomes would be very different. 
 The second extension is considered under the heading Time and Dynamic Jurisdiction. 
This extension is based on the observations that the effectiveness of a court’s design depends on 
the structural conditions of the conflict and that these conditions change over time. In this 
context, I suggest that the design of a court should not be regarded as a rigid object but rather as 
a flexible one that optimally responds to the changes in the underlying structural conditions. I 
sketch a brief example illustrating this point. 
Finally, as a third possible extension (section 3, Credibility), I notice that the emphasis I 
have placed on choosing legal regimes may have interesting implications on the classic problem 
of ascertaining the credibility of courts’ threats. In fact, I observe that the choice of legal regime 
automatically limits the set of threats that might be credible. Moreover, threats might be credible 







Civil Wars and Jurisdictions: Formalizing the Problem 
 
 In this chapter, I describe how to undertake the formal study of civil wars. In Section 1, I 
begin by reviewing the literature on type of warfare and violence in civil war. In Section 2, I 
introduce a war game and a bargaining game with incomplete information which constitute a 
stylized representation of any armed conflict. The war game and bargaining game are 
interdependent in that the players’ decisions in one game depend on the possible outcomes in the 
other game. From this general model, I obtain a model that specifically applies to civil wars by 
incorporating, in the form of assumptions, the findings of the literature discussed in Section 1. In 
Section 3, I introduce a court in the picture. This is viewed as a device that imposes costs on 
certain actions in the war game. As such, a court has the capability of changing the outcomes of 
the war/bargaining game. In particular, it can affect the relative profitability of bargaining with 
respect to going to war. This lays the foundation for determining (given some parameter of the 
game such as the underlying conditions of war, the types of players, etc.) the optimal court 
design with respect to the goals (peace, justice, etc.) one wants to pursue. In Section 4, I outline a 
dynamic version of this model in order to account for the temporal dimension of the war. Issues 
such as the credible commitment problem can be fully addressed within this framework. The 
considerations of Section 3 about the role as well as the potential of a court can readily extend to 






1. Nature of Civil Wars 
 
 What makes civil wars a distinct case is the amount of violence directed against the 
civilian population.24 Kalyvas argues that “[t]he relation between warfare and violence is not a 
trivial issue because most victims of civil war are civilians rather than soldiers”.25  Similarly, 
Humphreys and Weinstein observe that “civil wars are commonly associated with significant 
suffering particularly for non-combatant populations…as warring factions target non-combatants 
through campaigns of violence”.26 This begs the question of why civil wars are more violent 
towards the civilian population than other types of war. It is generally held that the reason for the 
high level of violence is the structural asymmetry among combatants which is present in civil 
wars. While the government has legitimacy, sovereignty, allies, and access to resources, rebel 
groups do not and are usually at a military disadvantage relative to government forces. This 
structural asymmetry not only exacerbates some of the issues which appear in any type of war, 
but also gives rise to altogether new phenomena. 
 We shall see that the literature on warfare in civil wars has isolated at least two important 
regularities. First, the structural asymmetry between combatants leads rebel groups to choose 
unconventional methods of warfare, and this is so independent of the combatants’ relative 
strength from a military standpoint. Second, directly targeting civilians is a strategy that is 
commonly adopted in civil wars both by the government and rebel groups. Once again, this is 
independent of combatants’ relative strength. 
 As in any conflict, one of the main issues in civil wars is the lack of information about 
the opponents’ strength. Several scholars observe that this type of uncertainty combined with the 




unconventional methods of warfare (namely, indirect military engagement usually targeting non-
military objectives i.e. civilians).27 In turn, this results into acts of war which are less informative 
about parties’ strength, thus exacerbating the problem of asymmetric information.28 Kalyvas 
maintains that “…a focus on warfare is essential in understanding how civil wars endogenously 
affect the strategies and identities of the political actors as well as the individuals involved in 
wars”.29 In most conventional interstate wars, both players have the technological wherewithal to 
potentially disarm each other.30 In contrast, civil wars are characterized as conflicts with inferior 
opponents (typically rebels), who lack technologically advanced weapons. Despite the lack of 
military technological wherewithal, rebel groups that fight unconventionally, particularly those 
groups that employ guerilla tactics, “…can … inflict significant military and political costs on an 
opponent, even when the opponent is capable of fielding vastly superior conventional forces”.31 
In such situations, the rebels know that they are not fighting to disarm the government, but rather 
to impose significant costs on the government. These wars frequently turn into wars of attrition, 
where insurgents seek to win by imposing unbearable costs on their opponents.32 
 It is generally assumed that the government is the stronger party from a military 
standpoint. Fearon and Laitin find that this is not always the case. One of their main findings is 
precisely that “financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render 
insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing or inept and corrupt 
counterinsurgency practicing”.33 Under these circumstances, the rebels know that the 
government is weak and decide to go to war against it. Even in this case, however, the rebels 
would resort to unconventional methods. If the rebels were going to confront the government in 
battlefield combat (in other words, in conventional combat), then the government, despite its 




legitimate, sovereign state with access to allies and resources. Instead, by fighting 
unconventionally, the rebels would take advantage of the government’s weakness. In fact, due 
precisely to its lack of resources, the government would be unable to determine the identity and 
the location of the rebels, which is relevant information to determine their movements and to 
encourage direct engagement with them. In sum, due to the government’s weakness and overall 
inability of acquiring information about its rebel counterpart, unconventional warfare would 
prevail even in this situation. 
 A recent literature has identified another channel through which the structural asymmetry 
between the government and the rebel group leads to unconventional warfare. In conventional 
wars, civilian fatalities usually occur as a result of indirect collateral damage rather than as a 
direct result of combat.34 In contrast, from a military standpoint, targeting civilians in civil war 
appears as an effective strategy to redress the imbalance of military power. Hultman argues that 
rebels use violence strategically to compensate for failing military performance. When the rebel 
group loses battles to the government, it is at risk of being disarmed and has no leverage at the 
bargaining table.35 In contrast, rebels, who have strong resolve to fight despite their weakened 
stance, may find it effective to raise the government’s cost of fighting as this might make 
continued warfare unappealing for the government. Hultman argues that killing civilians is one 
such strategy by which rebels can impose extra costs: by attacking civilians, the rebels create a 
state of fear that makes social control and military efficiency more difficult for the government.36 
Ultimately, targeting civilians does not improve the rebels’ capacity to disarm or defeat the 
government, but it increases the government’s cost of winning.37 This is an effective strategy in 




outside option in the bargaining game below) and makes the government more willing to make 
concessions. 
 The recourse to targeting civilians is not limited to those situations where rebels are at a 
military disadvantage relative to the government. In 1999, during the civil war in Sierra Leone, 
the rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), invaded Freetown, the capital of Sierra 
Leone. Prior to the attack on Freetown, the RUF defeated the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) in 
several military battles in the outskirts of Freetown, a testament to its military fortitude. Despite 
its unabated strength, the RUF still felt the need to resort to mass violence against the civilian 
population. This proved to be an effective strategy as it drew the attention of the international 
community, which forced the Government of Sierra Leone to make substantial concessions to the 
RUF in the Lomé Peace Agreement. 38 
Valentino et. al. observe that targeting civilians might be an effective strategy for the 
government as well. When guerrilla insurgencies pose a military threat, the government is likely 
to respond by massively killing the rebel civilian support base. This is an effective military 
strategy since defeating well-organized guerrilla army in direct battle is extremely difficult in 
civil war settings. 
Morelli et. al. argue that targeting the civilian population support base of the rebels by 
either mass killing or displacement, might be an indicator of a strong government.39 In fact, these 
authors argue that mass killings perpetrated by the government are to be expected in the presence 
of large natural resources, significant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, and low 
productivity of labor in other sectors. In the case of Sudan, they observe that these conditions 




been challenging it over scarce natural resources and marginalization issues. Morelli et. al. along 
with Straus claim that these “killings were clearly strategic, [since it is] ‘directed by the state, 
targeted at a particular ethnic population, and intended to destroy that ethnic population in 
substantial part’ ”.40  
In sum, the distinguishing feature of civil wars is the high level of violence perpetrated 
against the civilian population. The source of this violence is the structural asymmetry existing 
between combatants: the state/government and the rebel/insurgent group(s). On the one hand, 
rebels are at a military/institutional disadvantage relative to the government, and redress this 
imbalance by resorting to unconventional means and methods of warfare; typically, this entails 
military strategies that do not necessarily aim to disarm their military counterparts, but rather aim 
at only imposing costs on them. One of these strategies consists of directly targeting the civilian 
population. On the other hand, governments (irrespective of their strength) often  resort to 
unconventional means and methods of warfare that entail targeting the civilian population, either 
because this is the best strategy against an opponent that fights unconventionally, or simply 
because this is the most profitable strategy from the government’s viewpoint. 
 
2. A formal model of civil wars 
 
 In this section, I formalize civil wars. I begin by introducing a war/bargaining game with 
incomplete information. This is a stylized representation of any war model.  From this I will 
obtain a model of civil wars by incorporating, in the form of assumptions, the findings of the 




The actors involved in a civil war are the government, G, and one or more rebel groups. 
For simplicity, I will assume that there is only one of these groups and will denote it by R. The 
set of decisions available to G and R as well as the potential outcomes associated with these 
decisions are modeled as a game. It is convenient to think of such a game as being constituted by 
two interrelated parts, W and B, each is a game in and of itself. The first part, W, is a war game. 
A war game is a contest where two players engage in military combat where each tries to wield 
force or disarm the other.41 Typically, this is a game of incomplete information: each party 
knows its own military capabilities, resolve, etc. but has only partial information about the other 
party’s military capabilities, resolve, etc. Needless to say, the uncertainty surrounding the 
opponent’s strength is one of the main factors determining whether or not the parties would go to 
war. The asymmetry in parties’ information has another important consequence: when we think 
of wars and negotiations as a process that takes place over time, acts of war as well as bargaining 
offers convey information about parties’ capabilities and resolve.42 Thus, these actions are also 
“signals” that induce each party to revise its own beliefs about the other party, and consequently 
to revise its chosen course of action. For now, I will focus on a static description. I will get back 
to the dynamic issues in Sections 4 and 5.  
 The second part of the game B, is a bargaining game. A bargaining game marks the 
period before a war actually takes place or before the combat reaches a decisive outcome. Parties 
can prevent war if they bargain at the onset of war, or if they fail to agree on a settlement, they 
go to war. Parties can end the war if they can both agree to some terms of a negotiated 
settlement. If the war ends in a negotiated settlement then both parties must prefer the terms of 




 As I observed, the war game W, and the bargaining game, B, are interrelated. The 
players’ decision in one game depends on the possible outcomes in the “other” game. On the one 
hand, expected military outcomes of military battle affect the possible bargains that G and R 
would agree to.44 On the other hand, when G and R fail to agree at the negotiation table, one of 
the options available to them is to go to war. We can think of this as corresponding to the players 
“exiting” the bargaining game and “entering” the war game. More formally, the players’ outside 
option in the bargaining game, B, are the players’ expected outcomes in the war game, W. 45   
This general description applies to any type of armed conflict. In Section 1, we have seen 
that the literature on civil wars has identified a number of features that distinguish civil wars 
from other types of conflicts. Once these are incorporated in the form of assumptions into the 
formal game, one obtains a formal model of civil wars. Essentially, one has to account for the 
fact that, in civil wars, there is one party, G, who holds power that the other aims at overtaking, 
and that the asymmetry in the contenders’ status produces an incentive for the parties to resort to 
unconventional methods of warfare. 
 
2.1 The War Game 
2.1.1. The players’ actions 
 In wars fought conventionally, both parties confront each other militarily by using heavy 
weaponry such as field artillery and armor. Military confrontation is direct and across well-
defined frontlines and takes the form of set battles, trench warfare, and town sieges.46 This 
implies that when conventional type warfare is employed the main target is military objectives, 
in other words, the aim of this type of warfare is to “kill, disable, or capture military personnel, 




 In contrast, we have seen that one of the characteristic features of civil wars is the resort 
to unconventional means and methods of warfare such as guerilla or irregular warfare. The 
weaker group, usually R, refuses to directly engage the stronger group G.48 “[G]uerrilla tactics 
seek to avoid decisive set-piece battles in favor of prolonged campaigns focusing on hit and run 
attacks, assassinations, terror bombing, sabotage, and other operations designed to increase an 
opponents’ political, military, and economic costs as opposed to defeating the opposing military 
forces directly”.49 In particular, targets are often non-military objectives, i.e. the destruction of 
civilian assets, which entail killing and injuring non-combatants and/or destroying or damaging 
material items, such as means of production.50 Thus, in order to describe the war game in a civil 
war context, we must, at the very least, account for the players’ option of choosing either 
conventional methods of warfare or unconventional ones. Of course, a large variety of warring 
strategies is typically available to opposing parties in an actual conflict. I will make a drastic 
simplification which is, nonetheless, justified in view of the main focus of this thesis. In my 
stylized description of the war game, I will endow each player with only two possible actions: 
fight conventionally and fight unconventionally. These actions should be thought of as a coarse 
classification of the strategies available to combatants in actual conflicts. For my purposes, this is 
the relevant classification. As outlined above, the strategies in the first group (conventional 
methods) do not entail violations of international humanitarian or human rights law51, while 
strategies in the second group (unconventional methods) do. Thus, the way wars are fought 
(conventionally or unconventionally) is a crucial factor with regard to the problem of 






2.1.2 The Payoffs associated to the Actions  
 As a general matter, the payoffs associated with the players’ choice of how to conduct 
warfare are determined by the underlying structural conditions of war. These include a wide 
range of factors such as 1) type of civil war: religious, ethnic, nationalist, war of greed, war for 
control; 2) type of government: nascent democracies, full-fledged democracies, oligarchies, 
monarchies, bureaucratic strength, etc.; 3) military capabilities of each player: weak, strong, fight 
using conventional or unconventional (guerrilla) methods of warfare; 4) timing of war, onset 
duration, aftermath; 5) territory; 6) poverty level; 7) population support base (large or small 
etc.).52 As I said, for the purpose of focusing on what is more relevant to my thesis, I will make 
the dramatic assumption that the strategies of each player can be grouped into two broad 
categories “fight conventionally” and “fight unconventionally”. The underlying conditions of the 
war are then reflected in the payoffs corresponding to the various combinations of these actions. 
 For instance, in the special case of a game with complete information, where parties are 
aware of not only their own strength and resolve but also that of the other players; G and R have 
two actions available to them, αc= fight conventionally, or βu = fight unconventionally. The 
war game would then look like a 2x2 bi-matrix game, where G chooses “rows,” R “columns” 









                            αc                            βu 
 
G        αc 
            βu 
 
Example 1: 
A possible specification of the players’ payoff is as follows: 
R 
                            αc                            βu 
 
G        αc 
            βu 
 
In this example, the strategy βu (=fighting unconventionally) is a dominant strategy for both 
players. Hence (βu, βu) is the unique Nash Equilibrium of the game. 
x1,y1 x2,y2 
x3,y3 x4,y4 
9, 15 5, 25 




Usually a party does not have perfect knowledge of the other party’s strength and resolve. 
Thus, the game with complete information has to be replaced by one with incomplete 
information, whereby each party knows that the conflict is not described by a single bi-matrix 
game but rather by a collection of those, each corresponding to the possible “types” of 
opponents. Moreover, the party assigns to each such game a certain probability of being the 
correct one. For instance, suppose that G thinks that R can be either “weak” or “strong” with 
equal probabilities. Then, G would envision two bi-matrix war games, one corresponding to R 
being “weak” and one corresponding to R being “strong,”  and assigns probability ½ that each 





 αc βu 
αc x11,y11 x12,y12 
βu x13,y13 x14,y14 
 
  
 αc βu 
αc x21,y21 x22,y22 
βu x23,y23 x24,y24 
 
 
I have denoted by Rw, the “weak” type of R and by Rs, its “strong” type. Clearly this description 
has to be paired with a similar one that expresses the point of view of R. These two descriptions 
can be represented compactly by means of the following table. We can imagine that the games 




players’ type). Then G is informed of the row where the true game lies (i.e. G knows its own 
type) and R is informed about the column where the true game lies (i.e. R knows its own type). 
The specification of the players’ beliefs completes the description. 
 








 αc βu 
αc x11,y11 x12,y12 
βu x13,y13 x14,y14 
 
  
 αc βu 
αc x21,y21 x22,y22 
βu x23,y23 x24,y24 
 
    
GS 
 
 αc βu 
αc x31,y31 x32,y32 
βu x33,y33 x34,y34 
 
  
 αc βu 
αc x41,y41 x42,y42 






I have stressed several times that the main distinguishing features of civil wars is the asymmetry 
in the combatants status, and that this translates into the fact that unconventional warfare is more 
likely to occur in civil wars than in international wars. To account for this, we must then make an 
assumption expressing that in civil wars there is an incentive for parties to choose 
unconventional warfare over conventional warfare. For the sake of simplicity, I will make this 
incentive quite strong and assume that in each bi-matrix war game, fight unconventionally is a 
dominant strategy for each player. In particular, this implies that in each bi-matrix game 
(considered in isolation) the pair (fight unconventionally, fight unconventionally) is a Nash 
Equilibrium. In fact, this assumption is stronger than what is needed. For instance, all of the 
conclusions of this thesis would go through under the milder assumption that fight 
unconventionally is a dominant strategy only for R and that fight unconventionally is a “best 
response” for G to R fighting unconventionally.  In fact, this is the assumption commonly 
accepted in the literature: when R fights unconventionally G has no choice but to resort to 
unconventional methods of warfare because conventional military tactics are inappropriate to 
combat enemy forces who seek to avoid direct confrontation.53 Further “weakenings” are 
possible but only at the price of a more cumbersome exposition. 
 
2.2 The Bargaining Game 
 
 The second part of the game, B, is a bargaining game. In the formal representation of the 
bargaining game, the players are still G and R, and the actions available to them consist of the 
possible proposals that they can make about the division of a pie. This represents the worth of the 




allowed in the model, that the two parties value the pie differently. If they divide the pie in a 
manner that is mutually beneficial, then they will opt to bargain, if not they will fight. The 
important feature of this bargaining game B is the specification of what happens if the players 
fail to agree, that is the specification of the players’ outside option. 
 As stated above, each party’s outside option is their expected outcome in the war game. 
Since each party has private information about its strength and resolve, this expectation is not 
known to the other party. Thus, the bargaining game is also a game with incomplete information.  
In actual situations, a party’s inability to correctly determine the other party’s outside option is a 
major factor leading to bargaining failure. I will discuss these issues in more detail in the next 
section. 
2.2.1 Reasons for bargaining failure 
 The central puzzle in the literature on bargaining for peace during civil war is why can’t 
parties find a division of the pie that is less costly than war? In a seminal paper explaining the 
rational causes of war, Fearon defined this problem as the inefficiency puzzle.54 He argued that 
there are three sources leading to this outcome: private information, commitment problem, and 
issue indivisibility. As I observed above, typically both parties in a conflict have private 
information about their strength and resolve. As a consequence, both the war game and the 
bargaining game are games with incomplete information. I have also stated that both acts of war 
and bargaining offers can be viewed as signals in that they convey information about the parties’ 
capabilities and resolve. A sizable literature has focused both on the implications of the presence 




 Private information is discussed in terms of the information a party has over its 
capabilities and resolve and the benefits it receives by withholding or misrepresenting this 
information. It is argued that war occurs because information is withheld, which creates 
uncertainty about each parties capabilities and resolve. Information can also be used to suppress 
or exaggerate each party’s capabilities and resolve in order to pursue better settlement deals. 
Blainey (1973), Fearon (1995), Wagner (2000), and Reiter (2003) argue that there is a consistent 
bias in the way parties estimate each other’s outside option in the bargaining game: they tend to 
overestimate their strength and/or resolve and underestimate that of their adversary.55 This 
results in bargaining proposals that are never mutually beneficial, and leaves war as the only 
outcome. A corollary to their claim is that information acquisition would improve the chance of 
peace. How the information is acquired and what can be gleaned from it is an issue of much 
debate in the literature. Morrow argues that disputants learn from the outcomes of the negotiation 
process.56 Wagner, on the other hand, believes that war is but a continuation of the bargaining 
process and that parties are more likely to learn from battlefield outcomes. Like Wagner, Smith 
and Stam argue that battlefield outcomes in general convey more information.57 Filson and 
Werner (2002) attribute importance to both battlefield outcomes and what goes on at the 
negotiation table. 
 Another strand of the literature attributes the failure of negotiations to what is referred to 
as the “credible commitment problem”: bargainers cannot credibly commit to an agreement over 
time for fear of shifts in relative power. Any potential change in the distribution of power among 
bargainers in the future can lead to bargaining failure: if a weaker bargainer expects to be the 
stronger in the future, the weak needs to promise the strong not to exploit it when it becomes the 




impede not only the possibility of designing self-enforcing agreements but also prospects for 
bargainers to commit to any type of agreement that would prevent or end war. 
 It is generally argued, however, that the inability to credibly commit to an agreement is a 
feature of situations characterized by the presence of anarchy at the international level. In fact, 
the credible commitment problem is dramatically mitigated with the presence of a third party 
enforcer. Even in highly unbalanced contests, a third party can intervene to help enforce the 
terms of the agreement by a) verifying and monitoring compliance, b) providing security for 
combatants as they transition to civilian life, and c) reducing the incentives to cheat.59 Studies 
have also shown that civil wars are more likely to end in a negotiated settlement if third party 
peacekeepers assist in implementing the agreement. 
 Because of these reasons, the problem of credible commitment will not be a major issue 
in this thesis, which is exclusively concerned with situations involving a third party enforcer (a 
court). I will get back, however, to the problem of credible commitment several times, later in 
this chapter (when talking about dynamics in Section 5) and when talking about the domestic tort 
litigation model. In that context, I will complement the findings of Walter, Doyle and Sambanis, 
Fearon, Hartzell and Hoodie, and Fortna by observing that under the domestic tort litigation 
regime one might obtain the same outcomes but in a possibly different way.60 This would 
involve a third party that is only a potential enforcer but that, in fact, does not necessarily 






3. Introducing a court 
 
 Thus far, I have been discussing the nature of the war/bargaining game in civil wars 
under anarchy, that is when no agency or supra-state entity can credibly threaten to punish a 
state/party for using force to settle disputes. Under the state of anarchy, the qualification of 
whether or not crimes against humanity are committed during warfare is irrelevant since there is 
no court capable of punishing the parties. When the court enters the picture, however, this 
qualification becomes important because such acts constitute international crimes and, as such, 
are punishable by a court. It is easy to formalize the role of a court: it can be seen as a 
mechanism that sanctions players in the war game, W, for the use of certain actions. For 
instance, in the games described above, a court can impose a cost for playing the action, “fight 
by committing international crimes”. Clearly, different laws and courts would impact the war 
game differently, both from a qualitative viewpoint and a quantitative one. They would do so by 
sanctioning different actions or by sanctioning the same actions on different measures/scales. I 
will come back to this point in Chapter 5. For now, it is important to stress that a court, no matter 
its type is a mechanism that alters the payoffs achievable in game W. 
 
Example 1 (continued) 
 In section 2.1.2, we saw an example of a war game with complete information, whose 
only NE was for both parties to fight unconventionally. In order to highlight the impact a court 
might have on the way a war is fought, let us think of it as a mechanism that imposes a cost of 30 





                            αc                            βu 
 
G        αc 
            βu 
 
Now G no longer has a dominant strategy. R still has a dominant strategy which now is                             
αc (fight conventionally) rather than βu. Hence, the only NE is now (βu, αc), that is G fights 
unconventionally while R fights conventionally. As the example makes clear, the crucial point is 
not that the court changes the players’ payoffs, but rather the fact that the court has the ability of 
altering the relative profitability of the various actions. As such, it has the ability of altering the 
outcomes of the game. 
 In the previous section, I stressed that the war game and the bargaining game are 
interdependent in that the outside option in the bargaining game is precisely the parties’ expected 
outcome of the war game. Hence, we can conclude that by altering the outcomes in the war 
game, a court is going to alter the parties’ outside option in the bargaining game. This leads to 
the following observation that will play a crucial role throughout the thesis: the ability of 
imposing costs on certain actions in the war game, W, ultimately translates into the ability of 
altering the relative profitability of bargaining with respect to going to war. 
9, 15 5, -5 





 In order to see how the introduction of a court may alter the relative profitability of 
bargaining with respect to
 
going to war, let us consider the following example. Suppose that, in 
principle, each player may be one of two types, weak or strong. Suppose also that it is common 
knowledge that G is strong (Gs). R is also strong (Rs) but this information is not available to G, 
who attributes equal probability to R being either weak or strong. In a situation of anarchy, the 
payoffs from the war game are shown in the tables below, where the table on the left corresponds 
to the situation where both players are strong, and the table on the right to the situation where G 





 αc βu 
αc 15,10 0, 25 
βu 25,-10 15,20 
 
  
 αc βu 
αc 30, 5 10,10 
βu 40,-20 35,-10 
 
 
Thus R knows that the potential conflict is described by the table on the left, while G is uncertain 
as to which of the two descriptions apply. To complete this description assume that both parties 





In this situation, (βu, βu) is the only NE in each of the two tables; the expected value of 
going to war for G is ½ x 15 +½ x 30 = 22.5, while the value for R is 20. We then conclude that 
at the bargaining table, R will not accept any offer below 20, and that G will not agree to give 
any concession higher than 17.5. Hence there is no bargaining range, bargaining will be 
unsuccessful and both parties will decide to go to war. 
 Let us now see how a court may alter this outcome. Just like we did before, suppose that 
a court enters the above picture in the form of a device that imposes a cost of 20 on the parties 






 αc βu 
αc 15,10 0, 5 
βu 5,-10 -5,0 
 
  
 αc βu 
αc 30, 5 10,-10 
βu 20,-20 15, -30 
 
 
                           
                 
Now, in the game on the left (considered in isolation) αc is a dominant strategy for G. It follows 




on the right, αc is a dominant strategy for R and (αc, αc) is the only NE of the game. From this, 
we can conclude that in the game of incomplete information, the expected value of going to war 
for G is ½ x 15+½ x 30=22.5 while for R is 10. Now, we have a bargaining range: R is willing to 
accept any offer above 10, and G is willing to go up to 17.5.  
The example gives us a rough idea of what a court can do in terms of altering the probability 
of bargaining relative to war. In general given a court’s specification, its effectiveness depends 
both on the underlying conditions of the conflict (as expressed by the players’ payoff in the 
game) and on the players’ private information (as expressed by the players’ beliefs in the game 
of incomplete information). In Chapter V, in the context of a richer model, I will show that 
different court designs might affect these dimensions differently. As a consequence, depending 
on the situation under study, certain designs may prove more effective than others. 
 
4. Timing and the Dynamic Game 
 
 Thus far, I have given a very crude description of the war/bargaining game. In order to 
give a more thorough description, one must begin by acknowledging that war/bargaining games 
occur over time, that is one must factor in the temporal dimension of the war. The most 
important consequence associated with this extension is the recognition that, as acknowledged by 
Goemans, Wagner, Werner and Filson, Reiter, every action, be it a negotiation proposal or an act 
of war, also plays the role of a signal transmitted from one player to the other about the player’s 




dynamic version of the game, one must explicitly take these signals into account as well as the 
way players use them to update their beliefs. 





                              Figure 2.1 
                                                           A “big block” 
 
Note that the dynamic war/bargaining game conceptually consists of the repetition over time of 
the “big block,” with the chain coming to an end if negotiations are successful (the case of a 
player being “defeated” in the war can be modeled as a successful negotiation where the other 
player takes it all). Two qualifications are in order. First, at the beginning of each “big block,” 
the players hold certain beliefs about each other’s strength. As noted, these beliefs will be 
updated during the negotiation phase as well as following acts of war. Thus, in particular, players 
will enter each big block with different beliefs as they update their information. Second, the 
value of those parameters that I have been referring to as the underlying structural conditions of 
the war change as a consequence of acts of war and negotiations. Hence, the underlying 
structural conditions of the war will be different from one big block to another. In sum, a 
complete analysis of the full dynamic game would consist in determining what happens in a 
generic “big block” and of keeping track of the evolution of the players’ beliefs as well as the 















The main goal of the present thesis is to address the question of what is the optimal court 
design (in terms of pursuing given objectives, for instance peace) at a given point in time, that is 
given the players’ beliefs and the underlying conditions of the war. Because of this, I will only 
need to focus on analyzing the “big block,” and I will do so in Chapter V. One should think of 
the contribution of the present thesis as follows. Given an ongoing conflict under consideration, 
at a certain point in time, one would gather data about the players’ beliefs and the underlying 
costs of war. Then, inputting these data in the model of Chapter V, one would determine the 
optimal court design given these data. Of course, because of the dynamic aspect of the conflict, it 
is possible that a design that is optimal at a certain time would no longer be optimal at another 
time/date where the beliefs and the other conditions have changed. The ideas of Chapter V, 
however, would still provide the ability of determining the new optimal design given the new 
data. 
 
5. Dynamics, commitment and “Dynamic Jurisdictions” 
 
 In section 2.2.1, we encountered what is known as the credible commitment problem, that 
is the problem that a party would renege on a negotiated settlement in light of new structural 
conditions that are more favorable to it. This is a problem that is inherently dynamic. We can 
visualize it by using the “big blocks” of the previous section. Consider two big blocks associated 
with different dates, to and t1, with to > t1. Suppose that, given the structural conditions at to, the 
parties find it profitable to sign a peace agreement. Suppose now that at t1 these conditions have 
changed, not necessarily as a consequence of the actions taken by the players at to. For instance, 




international balance of power. It is then possible that in correspondence of the new situation one 
or both parties would no longer find the peace agreement profitable. In this case, they would 
either sign a new agreement or decide to go to war. 
   Conceptually, one could fully analyze this type of problem by further enriching the 
description of the dynamic game outlined in the previous section. Essentially, this would be done 
as follows. Going from one big block to the next, one recognizes that the underlying structural 
conditions may change not only as a consequence of the players’ actions but also as a 
consequence of external factors such as those mentioned above. In order to keep track of all 
these potential changes, one can picture different big blocks, one for each set of possible future 
structural conditions. It is possible, and perfectly in line with the literature discussed in this 
chapter, that different players would have different expectations as to which conditions 
(equivalently, which big block) will prevail in the future. In this dynamic game, a strategy for a 
player is a rule specifying how players behave in response to the underlying structural 
conditions. Equilibrium strategies would then specify not only the players’ behavior today but 
also their future behavior, which depends on the conditions that will realize. In this way, the 
notion of equilibrium expresses the property that prescribed strategies are optimal from the 
players’ viewpoint not only in today’s situation, but also in all possible future situations. Thus, 
this takes care of all the dynamic issues including that of credible commitment. In particular, any 
peace agreement drawn up at a given time will incorporate rules and guidelines on how to deal 
with future changes so as to prevent the problem of credible commitment. In game theory 
“lingo,” a model of this sort would fall under the heading of stochastic games with incomplete 




likely that the assumptions necessary to solve even a simple example would be so unrealistic to 
make the exercise futile. 
 In the previous section, I said that the main goal of this thesis is to study and determine 
the optimal court design as a function of the underlying structural conditions of war. Essentially 
for each possible big block, one would like to determine the optimal court. Conceptually, this 
study has an immediate extension to the full dynamic setting. In fact, it allows one to “attach” to 
each potential future big block the optimal court. In this setting, a player, when envisioning 
potential future changes in the structural conditions, would know that the court’s design could 
change in response to the new conditions, and would take this into account when deciding its 
course of action(s). While I am going to leave this extension for future research, a few 
considerations on its policy implications are important, nonetheless. I have already noted that 
different structural conditions may lead to different optimal court designs. This opens up the 
possibility that, moving from a date to another, the court’s design has to change in response to 
new conditions. Thus, the extension of this thesis’ ideas to a dynamic setting leads us to shift 
from an idea of static jurisdiction to dynamic jurisdiction, where the jurisdiction itself adapts in 
response to changes in the structural conditions.63 I will venture to give a brief example of this 
point. 
 After several years of war between the Ugandan government and the rebel group, the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Ugandan parliament passed an Amnesty law, which granted 
immunity from prosecution to all rebels including leaders who renounced, abandoned the 
rebellion, and surrendered their arms.  At first the Amnesty Act seemed to be effective, the LRA 
terror tactics diminished and mainly lower level rebels surrendered. A couple years later, the 




“anti-terrorist” coalition led by the United States and signed the Anti-Terrorist Act, which 
classified several rebel movements as “terrorists” and allowed the government to re-arrest former 
rebels who had been pardoned under the Amnesty Act.64 This led to a resurgence of violence 
against the rebel group and the civilian population. With the rebels being classified as terrorists, 
the state sovereignty model is fully in place, and we can conclude that the only way (if any) of 
restraining the government from committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against the 
rebels and their civilian support base would be to introduce a court design based on the principles 
of human rights.  
 In contrast, in Chapter V, I will give an example where a court designed according to the 
principles of the domestic tort litigation model outperforms a human rights court model. By 
combining these examples, we can envision situations where the idea of a dynamic jurisdiction 
might produce court designs that are different at different stages of ongoing war, ranging, for 
example, from domestic tort litigation oriented models (possibly in the early stages of a war) to 












Legal and Political Views 
 
In Chapter II, I showed that the introduction of a court in a civil war setting may 
substantially alter the parties’ incentives. In particular, I showed that, in principle, a court may 
alter the relative profitability of bargaining with respect to going to war. In this and the next 
chapters, I am going to dig deeper into the potential role played by a court in a civil war setting 
by exploring different court’s designs. This study constitutes the core of this thesis, and will 
come to full fruition in Chapter V. There, I will show that different court designs may have a 
very different impact on the parties’ incentives: depending on the underlying structural 
conditions, while a certain design might prove very effective in leading parties to bargain for 
peace another design might prove completely ineffective. In this chapter, I begin by reviewing 
the political and legal views underlying the various court designs. I look specifically at the 
concepts of state sovereignty (SS), human rights (HR), cosmopolitan rights (CR), and the 
domestic tort litigation (DTL). I do so not only to see how these principles lead to differently 
designed courts but also to historically trace the emergence of international courts as an essential 
international mechanism to manage warfare and redress violence perpetrated against the civilian 
population during civil war. Formally speaking, we will see that different principles lead to 
variations in the specific parameters of each court model and hence to different conclusions 
regarding the courts’ ability of achieving the goal of peace (see Chapter V).  
 
 In Section 1, I present the political and legal views that correspond to the principles of 




cosmopolitan rights, and the domestic tort litigation, respectively. A theme that unfolds 
throughout the chapter is the evolution of the concept of state sovereignty from a very strict 
interpretation, which I classify as pure state sovereignty, to a more permissive one, which 
contains several elements inspired by the ideas of human rights and cosmopolitan rights. 
Inevitably, this will produce a certain amount of overlap across the various sections. It will be 
important, nevertheless, to keep the various principles separate for the purposes of modeling 
them into different legal regimes. 
 
1. State Sovereignty 
 
 In this section, I begin by surveying the early conception of sovereignty and its focus on 
the internal dynamics between the state and the population on its territory. I then look at how the 
discourse of sovereignty shifted from the internal to the external dimension where the focus is 
mainly on state’s freedom from outside intervention. After observing the existence of an intrinsic 
tension between the internal and the external dimension, I show that the concept of state 
sovereignty has over time lent itself to a much more permissive interpretation. Finally, I study 
the position of the state vis-à-vis other international subjects such as individuals, international 
organizations, and insurgents to determine which entities will have full legal status, that is the 
ability to be vested with  rights, powers, and duties65 beyond those which are afforded by the 
state. This is important for the purposes of modeling a legal regime because it determines not 
only who the relevant actors are but also what kinds of legal actions are available to them.  For 
the purposes of modeling a court design on the basis of state sovereignty, we will see that the 




interests, 2) can solicit an international court to assist the state only, and 3) can determine the 
legal status of all other entities, i.e. insurgent, individuals/citizens under its jurisdiction. 
  
1.1 The Internal and External dimension of State Sovereignty 
 
 The concept of sovereignty originates from the notion that states have absolute control 
and authority within their territory and domestic policy domain. Early writers on the subject such 
as Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes focused mainly on the internal dimension of sovereignty, which 
encompasses the relationship between the state and the population within its territory. The state’s 
external relations were deemed of secondary concern.66 While these writers held that state power 
was absolute, they also acknowledged that the state’s preponderance of power was not 
unfettered. The population could call the state into question should it abuse its power. Thus, it 
was held that individuals were the primary holders of sovereignty, and would designate the state 
as the sovereign power. 
 The notion of sovereignty included not only the two core components of territory and 
population, but also the notion of justice. The concept of justice and its compatibility with the 
notion of state sovereignty is already studied in Grotius. This problem then became prominent 
during the French Revolution. As Dacyl puts it, “revolutionist claimed that any abuse of state 
power in relation to the populace constituted a violation of the ‘first social contract’ between the 
ruler and the population upon which the very idea of sovereignty was built”.67 In this sense, 
sovereignty is conceptualized as an internal dynamic: On the one hand, it focuses on the 
authority of the state to maintain control over the territory and population; on the other hand, it 




check. In particular, the authority afforded to individuals legitimates insurgency against abusive 
states. 
   The focus of the debate shifted to the problem of territorial sovereignty as the state’s 
external relations became of paramount concern. Krasner classifies the external dimension of 
sovereignty as the Westphalian state, which was conceptualized around two core components: 
territory and autonomy. Territoriality means that state authority is exercised over a defined 
geographic space rather than people; while autonomy means that no external actor can exercise 
authority within the border of the state.68 
 The notion of the Westphalian state finds its origin in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, in 
which it was agreed that belligerent countries would refrain from meddling in each other’s 
internal affairs after the Thirty Years War. From this agreement, the concept of states and the 
interactions between them changed significantly: while it was commonly accepted that states 
were different from each other in terms of size and capabilities, the Treaty emphasized that this 
did not render stronger states the right to interfere in the internal affairs of smaller and weaker 
states. As a consequence of this view two main principles emerged, which were to guide the 
relations between states: the principle of non-interference and the principle of state equality. 
 The principle of non-interference has been upheld in several legal instruments from the 
French Constitution of 1793 to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, where the United States declared not 
to intervene in European affairs and requested that Europeans refrain from intervening in the 
Western Hemisphere.69 In the 19th century, South American states were strong proponents of the 
principle of non-intervention following their independence from European colonization. African 




colonization. After WWII, states vowed to adhere to the principle of non-intervention through 
the United Nations (UN) Charter Article 2 (7) except when there were threats to peace and 
security.70  
 While upheld in theory, the principle of non-interference has been severely 
“compromised” in practice. Examples abound of unlawful interference of one sovereign state in 
another sovereign states internal affairs.  Cassese (2001) attributes such interference to states’ 
pursuit of their national interests. Prior to 1945, states did not adhere to the principle of non-
intervention especially when their interests overrode this rule. It was commonly accepted that if a 
state’s interests were paramount then it could legally intervene in another state’s affairs by force 
or the threat to use force in the external and internal affairs of another state.71  Such violations 
were also prevalent during the period of the Cold War and particularly poignant during state 
independence from colonization. Several countries coming out of independence experienced 
civil strife where insurgent groups were being generally backed by foreign governments 
(communist and democratic alike) promulgating their ideological views. Moreover, these foreign 
states would typically make claims to the principle of non-interference and the domestic 
jurisdiction clause to shield themselves from external scrutiny of human rights abuses committed 
within their territory. 
 
1.2 Tensions between the internal and external dimensions of state 
sovereignty  
 
 After the breakdown of communism and the end of the Cold War, matters of state 




certain circumstances, to interfere in the internal matters of a state. In this phase, it became of 
paramount importance to determine who could call into question a state’s unjust actions against 
its population. For many scholars, who is attributed this right is the main factor in determining 
the degree of sovereignty of a state. According to the early view, international law regulated only 
state to state relations and had no authority on how a state dealt with its own citizens. This 
situation started to change after the Second World War with the emergence of the human rights 
movement, following the trials of Nuremberg and Tokyo. At first, the practical effect of these 
transformations was somewhat limited due to the power politics of the Cold War (see below). 
But, as the Cold War came to an end, dramatic changes took place with the institution of 
Nuremberg-inspired international war crimes tribunals aiming to combat and prosecute human 
rights atrocities in war torn countries.  
 Consequently, these developments have been accompanied by a monumental change in 
the theorization on the notion of state sovereignty. The human rights movement blurred the 
distinction between the internal and external dimension of state sovereignty, for the state no 
longer had sole authority over its citizens. This authority now was assumed by the community of 
states, who could take measures to legitimately intervene in the internal matters of a state. In 
other words, how a state treated its individuals in its territory became a matter of international 
concern, and international measures could be taken to protect these individuals.72  
 Krasner (1999) points out that this depletion of the concept of state sovereignty had 
historically already taken place in at least two other circumstances: the abolition of slavery and 
the protection of minority rights. Great Britain unilaterally abolished slavery in several states and 
the League of Nations required states to uphold laws with regard to the fair treatment of 




“compromising Westphalian sovereignty” or rather violating states autonomy, is and has been 
the norm in international relations, and in some cases such compromises has led to more peaceful 
and stable outcomes.73  In a more restrictive form, that is, when there is a threat to international 
peace and security, the UN Charter upholds a similar belief that is enshrined in Chapter VII 
provision, which permits the abrogation of the principle of non-intervention. The interpretation 
of what constitutes a threat to peace and security has expanded to include human rights atrocities, 
namely how a government mistreats its’ own citizens.  
 It is to be stressed that these theoretical and legal changes have recently found concrete 
applications. With the rise of internal armed conflict coupled with the violence towards civilians 
during these conflicts, the international community has employed Chapter VII provision in 
several circumstances. For the first time since the Nuremberg Trials and the creation of the 
United Nations, the United Nations Security Council has labelled human rights atrocities in 
countries like Bosnia and Rwanda as threats to peace and security, and has allowed the 
community of states to intervene either through military force (Bosnia) or through international 
judicial institutions (i.e. International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, ICTY and 
ICTR respectively).74 
 
1.3 Legal Status of States 
 
 Since states are no longer the sole arbiter of how to cope with their own internal, and to 
some extent, external problems, it can be contended that states are no longer sovereign. Closer 
inspection of the relation between states and the other entities recognized in the international 




states still remain the primary players in the international system. For instance, with regard to the 
relations between the state and other international subjects such as insurgents, individuals, and 
international organizations, we see that states and only states possess full legal capacity, i.e. the 
ability to be vested with rights, powers, and obligations.75 All other international subjects possess 
limited legal capacity. All the more, these subjects are also limited in their capacity to act; unlike 
states, they cannot put into effect their rights and powers in judicial and other proceedings or to 
enforce their rights.76 In short, states are the only actors that can dictate, create, and decide upon 
the fate of other international subjects—this is precisely how states exercise their sovereign right. 
The remainder of the section will describe in more detail the current (legal) status of the relations 
between states and other international subjects.  
1.3.1 States in relation to Insurgents 
 Insurgents come into being through their opposition and subsequent struggle against the 
state to which they belong. Because of their transient nature, they either become the state or are 
defeated, and therefore, have limited legal capacity.77 To become an international subject, 
insurgents should have effective control over the territory, and civil commotion should reach a 
certain degree of intensity and duration.78 It is the state that decides whether or not the above 
requirements are met. According to Cassese, “If a state against which the insurgents are fighting 
grants them the recognition of belligerency, that is, admits that the conflict under way is an 
international armed conflict,  or else third States so recognise it, then rebels are automatically 
upgraded to international subjects entitled to all the rights and obligations deriving from jus in 
bello”.79 Cassese observes that “[S]tates are loath to grant such recognition, as is shown by the 
fact that it has very seldom been given”.80 Thus, rebels’ status is contingent on the state’s 




how it will deal with its internal and external problems, is upheld by the state’s sovereign right to 
determine the legal status of insurgents---they can either be common criminals or combatants. 
Third states can recognize rebels as international subjects, but such recognition does not mean 
that they can provide assistance to rebels. Under customary law, third states are duty bound from 
supplying assistance to rebels. They can engage in dealing with them, i.e. negotiate with them 
over the protection of third states nationals on rebel territory, help broker peace between the 
insurgent group and governments and even “…enter into agreements with those States that are 
willing to establish rapport with them,”81 or provide humanitarian assistance, but only to the 
extent that they are not assisting them to gain strategic military advantages. States, on the other 
hand, can receive assistance of any kind from third states, “including the dispatch of armed 
forces for wiping out the rebels”.82 (For more on the legal status of rebels see Section 3.5 below). 
1.3.2 States in relation to International Organizations 
 International organizations depend on states for their creation and execution. For the most 
part, they are instruments created by states to pursue their mutual interests; international 
organizations cease to exist once states decide to do away with them. When creating 
international organizations, states agree to delegate some of their authority to external forces. 
States might want to do so either in the hopes that such a move will assist them in pursuing some 
of their goals or because they might want to “tie their hands”. Hathaway points at the creation of 
the United Nations and international human rights organizations as examples of these two types 
of motivations. In the first case, a state agrees to adhere to the United Nations’ main provision 
purporting the principle of non-intervention in return for the United Nations collective protection 
should the state’s security be compromised. In the second case, a state adheres to those 




Whatever the motivation for adhering to international organizations, it must be stressed that any 
kind of intervention from international organizations in a state’s affairs is contingent upon a 
priori acceptance by the state.83  As  Waltz  puts it, “to say a state is sovereign means that it 
decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or 
not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments 
to them. States develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their own decisions 
about how to meet whatever needs they experience and whatever desires they develop”.84 Thus, 
external intervention of any sort is seen as illegitimate. International law and its core principles 
of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-intervention and domestic jurisdiction dictate that 
since states are the principal actors in the international scene, they are the only official entity that 
can petition an international body to intervene in its internal affairs. 
1.3.3 States in relation to Individuals 
 Traditionally, individuals were under the exclusive control of the state. As we have seen, 
this is no longer the case: individuals now possess international legal status (see Section 3 on 
cosmopolitan rights below). This means that individuals not only have rights and obligations at 
the international level, but also that international rules do not have to go through the medium of 
national legal systems but reach individuals directly.85 In fact, as a consequence of an ongoing 
trend in customary international law, the current relation between states and individuals is rather 
complex. On the one hand, states are responsible for bringing individual perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity, genocide, aggression, and terrorism to account either in national courts or 
international criminal tribunals. 86On the other hand, being recognized as international subjects, 
individuals have the right to call states into account for violations of these values as well. The 




petition international bodies regardless of whether this right is authorized by national legislation, 
this right is subject to limitations. Individuals only have the right to initiate proceedings against a 
state before an international body (i.e. the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights), and they are not allowed to participate in the international 
proceedings.87 Ultimately, the state still maintains the sovereign right to decide how to deal with 
problems vis-à-vis an individual on its territory regardless of the international body’s ruling.  
 
In sum, the idea of state sovereignty has evolved from a very strict interpretation, whereby 
the principle of non-intervention was upheld to ensure that it was the states’ prerogative to 
decide how to govern their territory and citizens without outside interference, to a more 
permissive stance, whereby external entities could interfere in the domestic affairs of the state. 
The crucial feature, however, is that this can happen only if the state consents to such 
interference.  In other words, only the state can request outside interference and if any other 
entity does so, it is because the state has allowed it to do so. Thus for the purposes of modeling a 
court based on the principle state sovereignty, we derive the following from this section: 1) only 
the state can request outside interference such as an international criminal tribunal, in other 
words the court cannot automatically intervene without state consent, 2) even if the state solicits 
the court, it does not have to adhere to court decisions if it is not aligned with the states’ 






2. Human Rights 
 
Scholars in the human rights camp call for strategies that serve the interest of global 
justice; certain crimes cannot go unpunished because they are so heinous that they affect not just 
the victims but society as a whole.88 Specifically, crimes against humanity by definition are of 
universal concern, thus holding perpetrators accountable becomes an international responsibility. 
The strategy they deem necessary to deal with such heinous crimes are international courts 
inspired by principles of universalized rule of law that can be imposed on any state whenever 
such laws are violated. 
In this section, I’m going to explore the notion of crimes against humanity and how it has 
emerged and developed overtime. This notion is of utmost significance because it has single 
handedly challenged the principle of state sovereignty. Crimes against humanity along with acts 
that violate international humanitarian laws are now the basis for individual criminal 
responsibility. In other words, states are duty bound to respect the rights of their citizens and are 
no longer shielded by sovereignty if these rights are infringed upon or denied. The international 
community can derogate from the principle of non-interference to protect the rights of 
individuals within a sovereign state and indict, apprehend, and prosecute any individual 
including heads of states for violating such rights. 
 
2.1 Crimes against humanity vs. state sovereignty: A brief historical 
summary 
 Certain rights are attributed to every individual or groups of individuals and, by their very 




crimes against humanity. While everyone would probably agree with this definition, it is too 
vague to be of any use. The matter becomes slippery as soon as we try to be more precise. To 
begin, crimes against humanity means anything atrocious committed on a large scale.89 Upon 
reflection, this leaves us with more questions than answers. For instance, the word “crime” 
implies reference to a law (actual, moral, etc.), but what is this “law”? And if any such law 
exists, does it codify the meaning of “atrocious” and “large scale”? And, even more 
fundamentally, who codifies such a law and who enforces it? It almost goes without saying that 
unless we take a strong ideological position, we will have to look for complex and manifold 
answers. I will begin by re-tracing the historical development, and will focus mainly on the 
creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal, as most of the principles inspiring today’s courts have 
emerged from the reflections generated by the Nuremberg experience.  
 At an abstract level, the most fundamental issue is the compatibility of the idea of crimes 
against humanity with that of state sovereignty. Both the idea of crimes against humanity and of 
state sovereignty, rather than being abstractly defined, have dramatically changed over time. In 
the traditional view, state sovereignty is understood as “absolute” within the “bounds provided 
by international laws,” which suggest crimes against humanity matter only in that they find an 
explicit recognition in international laws, and only those actions that violate existing 
international laws are to be prosecuted by the international community (nullun crimen sine lege, 
nulla poena sine lege). To illustrate, the 1907 Hague Convention preamble codified the 
customary law of armed conflict, and marks the first (official) appearance of the concept of 
crimes against humanity. After the First World War, the Allies, in connection with the Treaty of 
Versailles, established a commission to investigate war crimes that relied on the 1907 Hague 




crimes against humanity, in reference to the Turkish officials who committed crimes against the 
laws of humanity for killing Armenian nationals and residents during WWI.90 Several countries, 
including the United States and Japan, opposed the idea of crimes against humanity on the 
ground that the violations were moral and did not regard positive international law. Their 
opposition hindered the international prosecutorial process of Turks and other war criminals after 
WWI. 
  The situation is somewhat reversed in the period following the Second World War. In 
this instance, the occurrence of certain crimes, not explicitly recognized by international law, led 
to the enlargement of the definition of crimes against humanity. With the courts of Nuremberg 
and Tokyo, crimes against humanity are explicitly recognized as a matter of international 
positive law; a list of crimes against humanity is given, and most notably, a principle of retro-
activity is implicitly adopted. According to Orentlicher, the first two categories of crimes 
outlined in Nuremberg, crimes against peace and war crimes, did not challenge international 
law’s “bedrock principle of state sovereignty” in the way that crimes against humanity did.91 
Crimes against peace and war crimes concerned, by definition, relations between states. Crimes 
against humanity, instead included atrocities committed by Nazis against Germans-specifically 
German Jews, who would not be covered by humanitarian protections of the laws of war. That is, 
crimes against humanity included conduct of Germans against other Germans in Germany-which 
was an innovation in international law. 
Prior to WWII, how a government treated its own citizens was a matter of sovereign 
prerogative and not the business of other states. In this sense, crimes against humanity was a 
profound rupture of international laws deference to state sovereignty, and the justification for this 




developments to Chief Justice Jackson, the Chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg trials.92 Jackson 
recognized that if international peace and security were to be the new world order, national 
sovereignty had to be limited by holding accountable top government officials for criminal 
behavior. The Allies, however, gave the Nuremberg Tribunal jurisdiction to punish crimes 
against humanity only when they were committed in connection to war crimes. Orentlicher 
states, “The nexus requirement provided the principle legal rationalization for what would 
otherwise be an extreme assault on the citadel of state sovereignty”.93 As we shall see, however, 
this nexus no longer exists as crimes against humanity are no longer a subsidiary or an accessory 
for war crimes. 
 Summarily, the necessity of prosecuting certain crimes led to the international 
prosecutorial process at Nuremberg and Tokyo, where crimes against humanity was deemed as 
part of jus cogens, which constitute a non-derogable rule of international law. The implication is 
that perpetrators are subject to universal jurisdiction. All states have the duty to prosecute, 
extradite, and assist each other to secure evidence to prosecute. As Orentlicher observes, 
“Correctly understood, the emphasis on permissive international jurisdiction signifies the 
strength of international laws insistence that crimes against humanity must be punished and that 
this principle is so important that it justifies an exception to the bedrock principle of international 
laws respect for national sovereignty”.94 Later, this would be the inspiring principle for 
subsequent statutes creating ad hoc tribunals like the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal 





2.2 The Idea of Universal Jurisdiction: The International Community as a 
Guardian of Human Rights 
 
 In King’s view, Chief Justice Jackson’s approach to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity was an implicit endorsement of universal jurisdiction: international or national courts 
in any country have the jurisdiction to try cases of genocide and/or crimes against humanity, 
irrespective of where the accused is from or where the crimes were committed. The idea has 
become operative with the institution of the ICTY and the ICTR that were imposed on the states 
of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to bring those most responsible for committing 
international crimes to justice. These tribunals have automatic jurisdiction to prosecute violations 
of international humanitarian and human rights laws.96 
 According to Henkin, the recognition by the Nuremberg Charter of “crimes against 
humanity” as a violation of international law was the inspiring principle of the international 
human rights movement.97 The international human rights movement heralded the conviction 
that how human beings are treated anywhere concerns everyone everywhere. This movement not 
only prompted the incorporation of human rights law in domestic jurisdiction but also sparked 
transnational acceptance of human rights by the formalization of these rights in declarations and 
covenants such as the Universal Declaration for Human rights, and the International Convention 
for Civil and Political Rights, to name a few.98 The universalization of the ideology of human 
rights has made it applicable to all human beings in all political societies, while the 
internationalization of human rights has provided the condition of human rights in every society 
as a subject of international political concern, and led to the gradual growth of international 
human rights law. States are now obligated to respect and to ensure human rights of persons 




states’ domestic jurisdiction. That which is governed by international law or agreement is ipso 
facto and by definition a matter of international concern, not a matter of state’s domestic 
jurisdiction.”99  
In sum, the notion of crimes against humanity has categorically ruptured the sanctity of 
the sovereign state. Now, how a state treats its own citizens has become a matter of international 
concern rather than just a matter between the state and its citizens. To justify such an 
encroachment on a sovereign state’s internal affairs, crimes against humanity could only be 
punished if committed in times of warfare. As the human rights movement gained momentum, 
this nexus requirement began to lose its weight; crimes against humanity are now punishable 
without any reference to the circumstances under which they were committed.100 Sovereignty 
could no longer justify state impregnability, as such state officials are duty bound to 1) refrain 
from committing crimes against humanity, 2) prosecute violations of such crimes and 3) submit 
to the international community’s authority in the event that the state fails to prosecute violators.  
 As a consequence of this monumental change in the overall status of the sovereign state, 
individuals are now international subjects under international law. This implies two things: 1) 
individuals are no longer mere subjects of a state; they are now directly affected by international 
law which means that they have duties and obligations to uphold international laws; 2) 
individuals now have recourse to the international community should the state or any other 
individual(s) infringe upon their rights. When modeling a court on the basis of human rights 
principles, we will see that there is a duty to prosecute when the state has violated the human 
rights of its citizens or individuals within its territory, and as such an external entity such as an 
international criminal tribunal can automatically intervene to protect the rights of individuals 




2.3 Cosmopolitan Rights 
 
Another strand of the principle of human rights is cosmopolitan rights. While the concept 
of cosmopolitan rights is still based on the principles of human rights, the discourse on 
cosmopolitan rights shifts the focus from the state’s duty to protect citizens/individual human 
rights on their territories to the individuals’ rights and duties as citizens of a global community. 
Global cosmopolitan law rests on the idea that sovereignty resides with the individuals as well as 
states: if a government fails to protect the rights of its citizens by engaging in widespread killing, 
then others have an obligation to intervene.101 According to Donnelly, individuals in this model 
are seen as members of a single global political community (cosmopolis) rather than as citizens 
of a state.102 Since individuals are now legal subjects with fundamental rights under international 
law, then any individual, whether or not it is a party in the conflict or an individual from the 
country where the war is taking place, can request external intervention.103 The doctrine is that a 
violation of rights anywhere is a violation of rights everywhere and, therefore, must be 
prosecuted. In this section, we are going to see that the idea of cosmopolitan rights has led to a 
further weakening of the concept of state sovereignty to the point of calling for a re-
conceptualization of the idea of state sovereignty itself. 
2.3.1 Organizing Principle of the International System: Re-conceptualizing or Eradicating 
the concept of State Sovereignty?  
 With the end of the Cold War, the threat to state survival now mostly comes from within 
(non-state actors/insurgency) rather than from outside it (other states). As a result, modern 
international law no longer perceives the violation of sovereignty by outside forces only but also 




who violates the sovereignty of a state but a “home grown specialist” who seizes and wields 
authority of the government against the will of the people.105 Hence, international law has shifted 
its focus from regulating the behavior of states to securing the rights of individuals within states 
in times of peace and war.  
 The prevalence of internal conflicts has been the catalyst for this shift and has become the 
new security issue. Moreover, civilians have become increasingly vulnerable in internal 
conflicts. States and sometimes insurgents deliberately target civilians as part of their strategic 
military calculations during civil wars. In a report issued in 2001 by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) entitled “The Responsibility to 
Protect”, the Commission correctly located the dilemma. The report states that the UN has to 
deal with how to reconcile foundational principles of member states sovereignty and the 
accompanying primary mandate to maintain peace and security with the equally compelling 
mission to protect the interests and welfare of people within states. The Commission advises the 
UN to re-conceptualize sovereignty from sovereignty as “control” to sovereignty as 
“responsibility” and argues that this is not a transfer or dilution of state sovereignty but merely a 
re-characterization of the concept. This leads one to the following question: who is authorized to 
determine what the state is responsible for and when it has failed to uphold its responsibilities?  
 The Commission refers to the UN Charter Article 2.1 which upholds the principle of state 
sovereignty and defines internal sovereignty as “the capacity to make authoritative decisions 
with regard to the people and resources within the territory of the state...[and] the authority is 
constrained and regulated internally by constitutional power sharing arrangements”.106  Even 
though the Commission acknowledges that international law upholds the principle of state 




Nations Security Council.107   It explicitly suggests that national authorities are responsible to the 
citizens and to the international community through the United Nations. By shifting the authority 
away from the state it is not necessarily making the state responsible as it suggests but 
accountable for any infractions of the laws protecting the safety and lives of state nationals. 
Properly understood, state responsibility means shifting authority to new legal subjects such as 
international organizations, human rights agency, and individuals. Contrary to what the 
Commission claims, this is a transfer of state sovereignty for now sovereignty no longer resides 
solely in the state but in international organizations and individuals alike.108 
2.3.2 The Case for Individual Sovereignty: From legal obligation to legal recourse 
 According to Reisman , there is a “new constitutive human rights based conception of 
popular sovereignty”.109 International criminal law crystallizes on popular sovereignty by 
shifting liability away from a state that does a wrong to another state to placing liability of 
wrongdoing at the personal level. This marks the transition from individuals being seen as mere 
subjects of a state to the recognition of individuals as actual “entities” of international law. As 
legal entities, individuals are not only afforded “rights” but also given “obligations.” 
 Individuals are obligated to comply with some of the most fundamental values of 
international law; should there be a breach of these values, individuals could then be held 
accountable. Cassese claims that in recent times a number of international rules have come into 
being that directly impose obligations upon individuals and that generally these rules crystallize 
in the area of armed conflict (crimes against humanity, genocide, aggression, terrorism) and also 
peacetime. This is so whether the national legal system within which individuals live contains 




Now international human rights covenants and treaties hold that state officials or private 
individuals who are in breach of international criminal law during armed conflict or peacetime 
are criminally liable and can be brought to trial before the courts of any country (that has 
universal jurisdiction) as well as before international criminal tribunal (if such tribunals have 
jurisdiction).111 
  The immediate question is who can enforce these obligations? The traditional view holds 
that only states are entitled to bring violators of such obligations to trial either before national 
courts or international criminal tribunals. The modern view holds that individuals can enforce 
these obligations by way of treaty provisions of human rights that confer rights to individuals. 
Treaty provisions confer the right to petition international bodies on individuals regardless of 
whether or not they are authorized by the national implementing legislation of those treaties.  
According to Cassese, “this right is granted to individuals directly by international rules and 
exists whatever the content of national legislature”.112 Cassese outlines some limitations to this 
particular right: (1) individuals are given only a procedural right which means that they can 
initiate international proceeding before an international body only to determine whether the state 
in question violated the treaty to the detriment of the individuals; (2) this right is only granted by 
treaties illustratively in the following human rights treaties: the Optional Protocol to the United 
Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination of 1965 (Article 14), and regional treaties such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (Article 44) 
1969. The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights grants “any person or group of persons 
or any non-governmental entity legally recognized in one or more member States” of the 




on Human Rights petitions containing denunciations or complaints of violations of the 
Convention by a State party to it”.113 (3) Another limitation is that states must consent to clauses 
in these treaties that make them accountable to individuals.114 While some states may refuse to 
consent to clauses allowing their nationals to bring them to account, this limitation is mitigated 
by the principles of universal jurisdiction and civilian inviolability that guide the cosmopolitan 
human rights environment and allows other states, individuals i.e. the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and 
national judiciaries to call on international bodies on behalf of nationals who are legally 
constrained from doing so. 
 Thus, under current law, individuals have been granted legal rights that can bypass 
national legal systems and operate at the international level. The strength of international human 
rights norms has created new international bodies and agents such as international organizations, 
civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, who use international human rights norms 
and instruments as a point of reference from which to judge state conduct.115 These 
advancements have empowered individuals, for now they have recourse to these new agents and 
the legal status to petition international bodies to interfere when violations of human rights and 
humanitarian laws occur. 
In sum, with the prevalence of civil wars along with the rise in the level and number of 
atrocities committed against civilians in such wars, the idea of state sovereignty has been 
redefined. This was a necessary step to regulate the conduct of war within states. Now, 
international law imposes obligations not only on states but also on individuals within states. 
Individuals also have rights under international law and one such right is the ability to petition 




rights. The implication derived from this view is that any individual from any country and 
irrespective of where the atrocities take place can petition an international body to intervene on 
behalf of victims and prosecute perpetrators without necessarily securing states’ consent. Thus 
from this viewpoint we can automatically assume that anybody, or any “entity” can directly 
intervene in the internal affairs of a state. This is very much in line with the implications drawn 
from the human rights perspective. For the purposes of modeling a court based on the 
cosmopolitan rights, we derive from the above analysis: 1) individuals have legal status and can 
petition an outside entity, such as an international criminal tribunal, to act on its behalf against 
the state should the state infringe on their rights, and 2) everybody, including civilians and 
individuals not directly involved in a war can call the court to intervene. In fact, when we get to 
modeling the various views, it will be convenient to model simultaneously the human rights view 
and the cosmopolitan view since in both cases, courts can, in effect, automatically intervene 
upon grave violations of the law. 
 
3. Domestic Tort Litigation 
 
 The principles behind the domestic tort litigation procedure are very different from those 
seen above. In this section, after highlighting the operational features of the domestic tort 
litigation procedure, I will consider why this procedure might be a more efficient and viable 
option to deal with the international management of civil wars. I will also briefly discuss the 
differences between international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict (civil 
wars), which is necessary to reify the distinctiveness of civil wars. As we shall see, the issue of 




the context of civil wars. I will observe that an effective transposition of the domestic tort model 
to the international management of civil wars demands that insurgents should have the same 
rights as states to petition international courts. In fact, this is a pre-condition for any type of 
bargaining to take place between insurgents and governments.  
 
3.1 Domestic tort litigation procedure: international management of civil 
wars 
 
 When the international community was called upon to handle the war in the former 
Yugoslavia (which I will classify as a civil war with international dimensions), international 
lawyer Anthony D’Amato pointed at the potential advantages of applying the domestic tort 
litigation model. His main contention was that leaders would not have an incentive to bargain for 
peace with prosecutions pending. He proposed the domestic tort litigation model, which is based 
on the notion that “exact justice” can be attained among individuals in conflicting situations 
without necessarily involving a court. In essence the idea is that an international criminal tribunal 
would prosecute perpetrators only if they fail to agree inter se, and abstain from any intervention 
otherwise. 
 In the context of civil wars, it is precisely the parties’ ability of reaching a settlement that 
makes this model suitable for pursuing the goal of a durable peace. Two aspects of this model 
deserve special attention. Firstly, for this procedure to work in the international management of 
civil wars, states and more importantly non-state actors (specifically, insurgents) need to be able 
to petition international courts to intervene. This constitutes a big departure from the strict state 




status (see section 3.5).116 In conformity with the domestic tort litigation procedure proper, this 
model, however, is also quite different from the human rights/cosmopolitan model because the 
court cannot intervene if not requested. Secondly, the prosecutorial power attributed to the 
international tribunal (that is, the actual prosecutorial ability of the court) is a factor of utmost 
importance, which ultimately will determine the outcome of the bargaining between the parties. 
In fact, it is precisely the potential threat of prosecution that would be used by the parties as a 
“chip” at the bargaining table. I will consider the second aspect of this model in greater detail in 
Chapter IV and V. 
 
3.2 The Domestic Tort Litigation Procedure Proper 
 
 D’Amato transposes the procedure of out of court settlements of civil disputes in the 
particular area of personal injury litigation to the international management of civil wars. He 
observes some similarities in the underlying conditions of these two situations.  First, in civil law 
cases as in civil wars there is usually an injured party that can claim redress for injuries caused 
by another person. Second, at some level, negotiations have to take place in order to settle the 
dispute. The legal rules which redress claims for damages by accident victims are found in the 
law of negligence, which is based on the legal principle that, “where an injury has been caused 
by the negligent behavior of another person the injured plaintiff may bring an action for 
‘damages’ against that third party”.117  Thus, the general idea is that of creating an environment 
which would lead opposing parties to bargain. D’Amato looks specifically at the domestic tort 
litigation procedure and at the law of negligence for guidance to create such an environment in 




 The most salient feature of the formal rules of the law of negligence is that a court cannot 
directly intervene unless solicited by one of the parties involved. This particular feature provides 
the structure for negotiations because it is under the threat of court proceedings that settlements 
are ultimately concluded; without the threat of proceedings there is little to no incentives for 
complicit parties to respond to claims of damages.118 Cases are settled by means of compromise 
rather than adjudication because the interests of both parties are best served by avoiding the 
court. Genn argues that the act of compromise is an efficient solution to the stark difficulties, 
uncertainties and cost of protracted court proceedings in domestic litigation.119 If one deems 
valid this point of view, then one should have no trouble considering the extension of the 
practice of compromise to the international management of civil wars. For those “difficulties, 
uncertainties and cost of protracted court proceedings” are highly accentuated in the context of 
civil conflicts. 
 Unlike criminal justice, there is no element of (criminal) ‘punishment’ for negligent 
parties in the award of damages. The law of negligence, however, covers concerns other than 
restitution to plaintiffs. Genn again argues that both deterrence and retribution are considered to 
be important and legitimate functions of the law of negligence.120 This is especially clear in 
D’Amato’s analysis, which takes into account the international interest of deterring future war 
criminals when arguing for the use of procedures based on the law of negligence. 
 D’Amato observes that these principles have already been used in criminal matters. In 
ancient Roman law, the patricians could avoid punishment for the delicts they committed by 
paying full compensation to the victims of their crimes or the victims’ heirs. The system’s logic 
is that, since patricians had sufficient assets to be able to pay full compensation, the prospect of 




setting, the shortcomings of this two-track system are evident as one would imprison the 
impecunious criminals while allowing wealthy ones to buy their way out of jail.121  But, as 
D’Amato explained, these shortcomings are likely to disappear when these principles are applied 
to the international management of civil wars. In these settings, typically all parties to the peace 
negotiations have assets that the other side desires; thus, these assets constitute valuable 
bargaining chips. Furthermore, as long as potential punishment is commensurate to the gravity of 
the crimes committed, more culpable parties would have a greater incentive to avoid the court 
and would therefore make more concessions. In D’Amato’s words “political and military leaders 
in future wars would thus be subject to a double-barrelled uncertainty...” possible court 
proceedings, or loss of valued assets.122 Either way military and political leaders should be 
deterred from causing injury for fear of future unfavorable ramifications. 
 It is clear that the effective transposition of the domestic tort litigation principles to civil 
wars requires that the same rights would be afforded to all warring parties. Thus, in particular, 
from the viewpoint of the law both states and insurgent groups should have the same rights. Yet, 
the situation is quite different under the current legal system where several rights are afforded to 
states but not to insurgents. The remainder of this section is devoted to examining the current 
state of affairs. 
 
3.3 The traditional distinction between International armed conflict and 
Non-international armed conflict (civil wars) 
 
 A distinction of fundamental importance is that between international armed conflict and 




because states have historically accepted the obligations to rules that regulate the conduct of war 
and the treatment of victims, especially non-combatants, when a conflict is between states.123 On 
the contrary, states have been reluctant to create and adhere to laws governing the conduct of war 
in the non-international armed conflict context.124 In fact, non-international armed conflict is 
governed by Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol II 
to the Convention, which provide only minimal standards of norms that are applicable to armed 
conflict not of an international nature. According to Additional Protocol II, non-international 
armed conflict (= civil wars) are armed conflicts that take place between a state’s armed forces 
and non-state armed forces, “which under responsible command, exercise such control over a 
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and 
to implement this Protocol” (Article I). 
 A more recent definition of civil wars appears in the Rome Statute which stipulates that 
they are “armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a state when there is protracted armed 
conflict between government authorities and organized armed groups or both such groups” 
Article 8(2)(f). Schabas notes that the existence of organized non-state armed groups are 
essential to the definition of internal armed conflict.125 Common Article 3 does not impose this 
requirement but Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute apply 
only when non-state actors with a certain level of organizational capacity exist.126 Additional 
Protocol II actually calls for the existence of a de facto state, in that the control of the territory by 
non-state groups must be state-like (yet, recognition by either other states or international 
organization is not required).127 The definition also hinges on the level of intensity of the 
conflict, which must reach a certain threshold before these provisions apply. In fact, this 




tend to be extremely violent at the onset (because it is only after committing a significant amount 
of atrocities that combatants would have access to international instruments). 
 Schabas argues that the significance of the distinction between international and internal 
armed conflict resides in the punishment of such acts as international crimes.128 An implication 
of the view that Common Article 3 is the only provision that addresses internal armed conflict is 
that the grave breach system does not apply.  Thus, it follows that international crimes do not 
exist in internal armed conflict and this provides the grounds for states to maintain that rebels are 
mere criminals and should be governed by ordinary criminal law.129  
 With the rise in the number of international tribunals with jurisdiction to punish 
international crimes in the context of civil wars, this view is hardly tenable. Schabas further 
maintains that, “the recognition that acts committed by non-State actors as well as, of course, by 
the States themselves and those acting on their behalf- during non-international armed conflict 
constitute international crimes has...subjected such acts to prosecution by the courts of other 
States. This has been done under the principle of universal jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of an 
international court”.130 Since non-state actors and the individuals comprising them can be 
prosecuted for international crimes during internal armed conflicts, then this implies that non-
state actors are obligated to abide by rules governing international humanitarian and human 
rights laws. What, then, is the legal status of non-state actors such as rebels/insurgents in light of 






3.4 International Legal Status of Insurgents: On the Right to Petition 
International Courts 
 
 Current regulations and conditions on the status of insurgents in international law, as the 
late Cassese put it, “…is rather confused and rudimentary”.131 As such, I will limit this 
discussion and focus primarily on the subject matter at hand; that is, the issue on the right of 
insurgents to petition the intervention of an international court during violent internal armed 
conflict. It will be recalled that this is a necessary condition for the effective transposition of the 
domestic tort litigation model to the international management of civil wars, and more 
importantly, a pre-condition for any type of bargaining to take place. 
As we have seen in section 1.5.1, states determine the legal status of rebels and often do 
not grant rebels recognition of belligerency. According to Moir, “[r]ecognition of belligerency by 
the parent state brought into effect the jus in bello in its entirety between it and the rebels…such 
recognition was clearly more beneficial to the insurgent than to the government, which was no 
longer in a position to put down the insurrection in any manner which it saw fit, treating rebels as 
mere criminals at the mercy of domestic law. Rather, it found that rebels had rights and duties 
analogous to its own which served to eliminate the inequalities between the sides to some 
extent…”132 It is precisely for this reason that neither states nor third states rendered this 
recognition, and as such the traditional doctrine of “recognition of belligerency has fallen into 
disuse as a legal concept”.133  Under the current legal system, insurgents have obligations to 
abide by humanitarian and human rights laws (Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II) 
even though they can neither sign nor accede to international agreements. 134 Moreover, the right 
to petition an international court is a right that is afforded to states; rebel groups do not enjoy the 




to persuade the Prosecutor or the UNSC to investigate crimes committed by states. Rebels have 
equal access as a state to solicit a court only when it has won a decisive victory and has become 
the state. Rwanda is a case in point. The Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), originally 
rebels in the conflict, overcame the Hutu led government and received recognition from other 
governments as the official representatives of the state. It also had effective control of Rwandan 
territory and the conflict had reached a level of intensity that amounted to genocide.  During the 
genocide, the Hutu led government still held a seat at the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and was considered legitimate despite its ongoing egregious acts. The international 
community not only feigned ignorance of what was going on in Rwanda but also refused to call 
the government’s actions genocide. Since the international community denied the fact that 
genocide was indeed taking place, getting outside assistance to end it proved difficult. The only 
form of effective intervention came only after the RPF won a decisive victory over the Hutu 
government.  
If states are the only entity that can petition a court and there is a potential for rebels to 
take full control and install themselves in place of the government, it is logical to maintain that 
they should be able to petition the court before they seize power. According to this view then, 
international courts should take rebels into account under two conditions, 1) when they have 
become a full-fledged state, and/or 2) when they have committed international crimes. For 
instance, in Rwanda, the RPF called the international community to create an international 
criminal tribunal to intervene only after they had seized power and defeated the Hutu 
genocidaires. From this assessment, one could reach the strange conclusion that international 
courts can only come into the picture after a significant level of carnage and atrocities (i.e. 




cases) become the official state may not only curb the level of intensity and atrocities committed 
in civil conflicts but also hold uncontrollable violators of international crimes within their own 
insurgency group accountable135 and keep government actions in check. We have seen that in the 
current legal system, the right to request intervention of international courts is not always granted 
to actors other than states, and when it is granted, it is only under certain circumstances (i.e. 
individuals, NGO’s in the cosmopolitan viewpoint). Just as opposing actors in a civil system 
have the same rights; the transposition of the domestic tort litigation to the international setting 
requires that warring parties have the same rights in order to request intervention in the internal 
affairs of the state. Thus, laws have to be changed for the domestic tort litigation idea to work in 
the international setting. One possibility would consist in bringing back some elements of the 
traditional doctrine of recognition of belligerency as a legal concept, but the right to grant such 
recognition should not be limited to states. For instance, one could envision a regime inspired by 
the principles of the domestic tort litigation where the Chief Prosecutor is also attributed the right 
to declare the status of belligerency. Such a move will “eliminate inequalities of both sides,” 
which implies that both parties could potentially solicit the intervention of the court upon the 
infraction of the law.136  Again, this is a big departure from the strict states sovereignty 
perspective because states can no longer do as they please in such circumstances; the court can 
be called to bring the state to account by a non-state entity.137 Thus for the purposes of modeling 
a court based on the DTL, 1) the court cannot intervene unless solicited by one of the parties 
directly involved in civil warfare: the government and/or rebels, 2) if the court is solicited, all 
parties - including the one that called the court - will be tried if complicit, and 3) since the court 
cannot directly intervene, it cannot prosecute parties for crimes committed if both parties come 





To conclude, if we were to conceive of a political spectrum where at one end there is 
strict state sovereignty and at the other end there is human rights/cosmopolitan right, the 
domestic tort litigation legal view would fall somewhere in between. The domestic tort litigation 
model is aligned with the interpretation of state sovereignty because international courts cannot 
intervene without the request of one of the parties directly involved in the conflict, i.e. the state, 
but departs from the sovereignty viewpoint because rebel groups are granted state like status 
which gives them the right to petition international courts. Unlike the human rights viewpoint, 


















In Chapter III, I traced the evolution of the concept of state sovereignty, surveyed the ideas of 
human rights and cosmopolitan rights and, finally, looked into D’Amato’s proposal to use the 
domestic tort litigation procedure to deal with the international management of civil wars. In this 
chapter, we are going to see how the different ideological views described above translate into 
substantially different legal regimes. The common thread running through these regimes is the 
overall goals of securing peace and justice. One of the main objectives of this chapter is to 
consider whether these two goals can be pursued in tandem or are incompatible as D’Amato 
claims. He argued that while justice was a commendable goal to pursue it was inconceivable to 
obtain in practice. I’m going to explore this claim by first considering debates between two 
camps: 1) those that believe there is a duty to prosecute in order to fulfill the goals of justice and 
peace, and 2) those that do not believe that international law would impose such duties on a state 
in precarious situations like civil wars and focus instead on ways to secure peace.  I will then 
examine specific design features of each legal regime to determine whether or not such features 





1. Peace and Justice or Peace vs. Justice 
1.1 The Duty to Prosecute: Logics of appropriateness or Logic of 
consequences? 
 For the purpose of situating the debate as to whether it is necessary to prosecute 
perpetrators of international crimes or settle political accounts before dealing with matters of 
justice, I want to consider two distinct approaches that guide political behavior. Drawing on the 
works of March and Olsen, it is argued that all political and social environments operate under 
two alternative logics of conduct, the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness.138 
The logic of consequences assumes that there exist different courses of actions with no particular 
rule dictating what action to take. A person is only being guided by rational calculations 
determining which action will lead to the political actor’s preferred outcome. The logic of 
appropriateness, instead, assumes that there are rules and roles that guide a political actor’s 
behavior and the type of act chosen is what is appropriate given the particular rules and roles.  
 Those who advocate the political and legal views of human rights and act according to 
these international rules and obligations are operating under the logic of appropriateness. In 
contrast, scholars of the consequentialist persuasion acknowledge the general principles and laws 
dictating the duty to prosecute international criminal offenders but argue that there may be more 
pressing goals at stake, like ceasing hostilities and attaining a durable peace.139 If peace is the 
preferred goal and the strategy of justice fails to maximize the attainment of peace, then as per 
the logic of consequences political actors should follow alternative courses of action to obtain the 





1.2 Logic of appropriateness 
 
 Some scholars contend that there is a duty to prosecute to attain justice no matter what 
the consequence(s) and cite numerous legal instruments (such as the UN Charter and the 
Genocide Convention) which obligate states to prosecute international crimes. Doing otherwise 
is considered illegal.140 There are numerous international legal instruments, ranging from 
customary law to treaty based obligations and UN Security Council Resolutions calling for the 
prosecution of violators of international crimes, which include genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and other international crimes such as aggression, torture, and terrorism. Legal 
scholars, such as Paust and Orentlicher to name a few, argue that international law does not 
allow for the abrogation of the duty to prosecute when any of the above laws have been 
violated.141  
 There are other scholars who push this argument in the direction of the logic of 
consequences when they argue that individual perpetrators of international humanitarian and 
human rights crimes should be held accountable and punished to ensure peace. Akhavan (1995) 
is of the opinion that there is a complementary interrelationship between war crimes prosecution 
and the peace process. Long term peace cannot be achieved without individual accountability 
(see below DTL model). He claims that individual accountability will deal with the root causes 
of the conflict and can create genuine and lasting reconciliation. He further contends that what is 
needed for a durable peace is the absolution of collective guilt for horrific crimes and that 
individual accountability for war crimes through an impartial tribunal would be able to 
accomplish this goal.142 In short, retributive justice is seen as a means to the end goal of peace.143 
None of these scholars, however, show exactly how justice leads to peace. If anything, what they 






1.3 Logic of consequences 
 
 Scholars on the other side of the debate argue that retributive justice is by no means the 
only way to achieve peaceful outcomes. Those on the side of Nino seem to understand that what 
needs to be specified is the goal that one wants to achieve from transitional justice and/or the 
international management of civil war before one decides that prosecutions are the best way to 
achieve it. As D’Amato made clear, if one aims for achieving a durable peace, justice, while 
desirable, might be practically untenable. He questions the assumption discussed above that the 
prosecution of perpetrators is the best way to deal with past atrocities especially when these 
perpetrators are usually those leaders instrumental to ending the war and ensuring a durable 
peace. Advocates of this position recognize that prosecutions are usually impossible in the wake 
of human rights disasters and may in fact spark future atrocities.144 Thus, scholars on this side of 
the debate explore various types of non-prosecutorial mechanisms to attain both the goals of 
peace and restorative justice. 
 Bassiouni provides a comprehensive list of accountability measures: international 
prosecutions, international and national criminal investigatory commissions, investigative truth 
commissions and reconciliation hearings both national and international, national prosecutions, 
national lustration mechanisms, national civil remedies, and international mechanisms for the 
compensation of victims. He argues that “we cannot look at each mechanism exclusively from 
the perspective of a crime control model but as an instrument of social policy that is designed to 




accountability measures as an indispensable component to peace and eventual reconciliation and 
has a broad definition of justice which ranges from the prosecution of all potential perpetrators to 
the establishment of truth.  
1.4 Which logic prevailed in practice?  
 
 In the 1990’s, the views from the logic of appropriateness prevailed. The international 
community adopted international prosecution as the primary accountability mechanism to deal 
with perpetrators of international crimes. Consequently, various international legal regimes (see 
below) were designed with the primary intent of bringing perpetrators to justice. Drafters of the 
statutes creating these international legal regimes assumed that by endowing the regimes with 
certain legal powers and jurisdictions, one would be able to prosecute the most complicit 
individuals and deter potential perpetrators from committing more atrocities. The general 
assumption was that bringing perpetrators to justice would contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace.  
 What the drafters of the statutes failed to realize was that international adjudication 
mechanisms serve to attain the goal of justice only, especially since such institutions are usually 
designed with specific legal powers and jurisdictions that make the apprehension and prosecution 
of international criminals possible.146 The question of whether subjection to international 
prosecution creates incentives for warring parties to bargain for a mutually beneficial peace 
agreement or rather leads them to continue warfare is left hanging.  This thesis aims to address 
this question and, more generally, the problem of whether or not peace and justice can be 
pursued simultaneously. In this Chapter, I will discuss the salient design features of the legal 




tort litigation (DTL) and analyze case studies, specifically, the war in the former Yugoslavia 
(HR), and the wars in Uganda and Sierra Leone (SS) to highlight some of the features of each 
legal regime design.147 
2. Vertical Cooperation Model: Human and Cosmopolitan Rights 
(HR/CR) Legal Regimes 
 
 The ideas of human rights and cosmopolitan rights are implemented through what 
international lawyers call the vertical cooperation model. When the relationship between the 
state and the court is regulated by the vertical cooperation model, the court can intervene upon 
the violation of any international crime without being solicited by any entity.148 The international 
court is a supra-state entity that can be imposed on a state in conflict and can indict, apprehend, 
and prosecute anyone that violates international law. Neither the principles of non-intervention 
nor of state consent are fully subscribed to in this model. An international judicial body, usually 
created by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), supersedes not only individuals within 
a sovereign state but the state as well. The legal regimes emanating from the vertical cooperation 
model are crystallized in the International Criminal Tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR respectively). I will mainly consider the ICTY; the first criminal 
tribunal of its kind since Nuremberg.149  
 The fundamental difference between Nuremberg and the ad hoc tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia is that the former emerged as a result of an international conflict while the latter was 
the result of a civil conflict with international dimensions. As a consequence, there are some 
substantial differences in the drafting of the two statutes (see Security Council Resolution 827 




Nuremberg tribunal is the same:  the principle of criminal accountability.150 The international 
legal paradigm is one whereby individual state elites (leaders both civil and military) are 
prosecuted for international crimes committed and facilitated by the state. Before I delve into the 
details of the statute creating the ICTY as a legal regime, I provide a brief case study of the war 
in the former Yugoslavia and the events that led up to the creation of the ICTY. 
 
2.1 The war in the former Yugoslavia 
 
 In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence and seceded from Yugoslavia. 
Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, reacted and declared war to both countries. Since the Serb 
controlled the state military (JNA) which was mainly comprised of Serbs, it had a military 
advantage and used its troops stationed in Croatia and Slovenia to make quick military and 
territorial gains. With the capture of Krajina in Croatia, the Serbs were able to create territorial 
cohesion for Croatian Serbs.151 
 The following year, Bosnia declared its independence and as a consequence the war 
spilled over to Bosnian territory. General Ratko Mladic led the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries and 
set out to ethnically cleanse predominantly Muslim towns in Bosnia. Through mass murder and 
the internment of Muslim and Croats in camps, Mladic was able to create an ethnically pure 
Republika Sprska. Serbs were not the only parties in the war that employed ethnic cleansing as a 
military strategy to gain territory; Croatians used similar tactics against ethnic Serbs and 
Muslims in Bosnia and Croatia. Because of the use of ethnic cleansing, both Serbs and Croatians 
had a military advantage over Bosnians: 2 million Bosnians were displaced by the end of 1992152 




 Once the international community caught wind of the humanitarian and human rights 
violations taking place in Bosnia, it immediately intervened. In 1991, the United Nations (UN) 
sent peace troops (UNPROFOR) to establish “safe areas” for the protection of Bosnian refugees. 
This move did not have an immediate effect. Conflict and the commission of war crimes 
intensified as the Bosnian Serbs targeted and shelled UNPROFOR safe areas. The Bosnian cities 
of Srebrenica and Sarajevo, former Yugoslav capital, bore the brunt of war. As a consequence of 
continued violations of the law, the UN passed financial sanctions against Serbia. Even with 
international sanctions and direct intervention (through humanitarian assistance), the UN effort 
failed to deter the Serbs. 
 In 1993, the Vance-Owen Plan, which divided Bosnia into ethnic cantons, was offered to 
all parties in the conflict. The main objective of the plan was to force the Bosnian Serbs off 
cleansed territories. The Plan was ultimately rejected by all sides and as such, no progress was 
made to end hostilities between the warring parties.154  Other diplomatic efforts proved futile. 
The international community began to create alternative courses of action, one of which was the 
Joint Action Plan, which called for the sealing off of the Bosnian border from further Serbian 
and Croatian encroachment, and for the establishment of six Muslim “safe areas” throughout 
Bosnia. Despite these efforts, the warring parties were undeterred: Serbs continued to occupy 
safe areas and, both Serbs and Croats continued to attain Bosnian territory though ethnic 
cleansing.155 
Acting under the Joint Action Plan, in 1994 NATO issued an ultimatum which called for 
Serbian forces to withdraw from Sarajevo or face bombing. The ultimatum was partially 
fulfilled: Serb forces lifted the siege of Sarajevo and only partially withdrew. While NATO was 




Muslims creating the Croat-Muslim Federation. This led the two sides to sign a peace agreement 
and allowed the Bosniacs to be fully armed. The alliance served four purposes: 1) it stabilized 
Bosnia, 2) it ended Muslim-Croat territorial division, 3) it ended Croat-Muslim fighting, and 4) it 
created a stronger military opponent against the Serbs.156 
Later on that year, the international community made further strides in its pursuit to end 
hostilities. A Contact Group consisting of five great powers, France, Germany, Russia, United 
Kingdom, and the United States issued an ultimatum and offered Serbs an “all or nothing” deal: 
the Serbs were to surrender territory including territory acquired via ethnic cleansing. The Serbs 
were divided on which course of action to take. Bosnian Serb president, Radovan Karadzic 
rejected the ultimatum since it required relinquishing territory that constituted the new Republika 
Srpska. Serbian president, Milosevic, who sought to ease sanctions and oust Karadzic, wanted to 
accept the plan. Due to the alignment of interest with the international community, Milosevic 
became the primary negotiator of the Bosnian Serbs, minimizing the role of both Karadzic and 
Mladic. Bosnian Serbs conceded to end the war only if they could keep territorial gains, if not, 
they would continue to fight. 
Despite NATO’s ban on shelling UN designated “safe areas,” Bosnian Serbs forces 
continued the siege of Sarajevo and as a consequence, NATO took military action and air raided 
their forces in May 1995. Bosnian Serbs responded by shelling all 6 “safe areas” in Bosnia and 
took 350 UNPROFOR soldiers hostage. As the international community attempted to release the 
hostages, NATO halted air strikes. The conflict came to a climax when Bosnian Serbs massacred 
Muslim men and boys in UN designated safe area of Srebrenica. To shield themselves from 




thereafter, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Richard Goldstone indicted Karadzic and Mladic, 
for the second time, for genocide and crimes against humanity.157   
2.2 The ICTY 
 
 In 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) formed a War Crimes Commission to 
investigate violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in the former 
Yugoslavia. While the UNSC thought it unrealistic to expect leaders to negotiate for peace if 
they knew that shortly after the peace agreement they would be facing potential prosecution and 
life imprisonment, it still preferred less invasive accountability measures rather than military 
intervention.158 Providing amnesties to leaders in exchange for peace was also considered, 
however, given the nature of the preliminary report issued by the War Crimes Commission, it 
appeared that the international community was under legal obligation to prosecute war criminals. 
 The report described in detail the commission of war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia. It 
concluded that the atrocities in Yugoslavia could be characterized as grave breaches to the 
Geneva Convention and the Genocide Convention.159 The categorization of the crimes as grave 
breaches and genocide, both crimes that do not allow any derogation from prosecution, triggered 
the obligation for the international community to prosecute and obliterated any possibility for 
granting amnesties. On February 22, 1993, the UNSC adopted Resolution 808, creating an 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which would prosecute 
individuals responsible for violations of international humanitarian law committed on the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.160 
2.2.1 Salient Features of the Human Rights Legal Regime: The International Criminal 




 The human rights and cosmopolitan rights legal regimes are based on the vertical 
cooperation model which means that a supra-state entity, like the UNSC, dictates that the pursuit 
of justice will be taken out of the hands of the state. There are two particular provisions in the 
statute creating the ICTY that illustrate this point: UN Chapter VII powers and subject matter 
jurisdiction. First, the court is endowed with UN Chapter VII powers, which means that the 
tribunal is not only imposed on the former state of Yugoslavia, but requires its full cooperation. 
In addition, it obligates all states party to the United Nations Charter to cooperate with the 
international tribunal. Second, the statute is also endowed with an extended subject matter 
jurisdiction, which means that it can regulate the conduct of war in the former Yugoslavia by 
applying laws that govern international armed conflict to civil wars as well.  This implies that 
acts that violate international law, while committed in the civil war context, are now considered 
international crimes and are, therefore, subject to international prosecution. 
2.2.2 UN Chapter VII powers 
 In the UN Charter, Chapter VII calls for the Security Council to decide what measures to 
take to stabilize situations that constitute a threat to international peace and security (UN Charter, 
Article 39). In the case of the former Yugoslavia, an international court was established to deal 
with these threats.  With UN Chapter VII powers, the Security Council also calls on member 
states to assist in fulfilling its decision(s) (UN Charter, Article 41). In fact, member states are 
obligated to give effect to the decisions made by the Security Council under Chapter VII, 
because these states ceded some of their sovereignty to the Security Council to act on their behalf 
on matters of peace and security (UN Charter, Article 24(1)). This implies that all member states 
of the UN are obligated to cooperate with the court and have to abide by any request of the court 




 This provision is further reinforced by judge-made rulings in specific cases. Cassese 
illustrates the vertical relations of states and international courts in his analysis of Blaškić 
(subpoena) case.162 In this case it was upheld that: (1) the Statute of the tribunal imposes upon 
states an obligation to cooperate, and in the case of non-compliance by a state the sanctioning 
powers of the Security Council would take effect; (2) states cannot refuse to comply with the 
court based on the traditional clauses of interstate judicial cooperation such as double 
criminality, political offense, nationality of the person request for surrender; 163 (3) the tribunal 
has a final say as to whether states can refuse handing over documents or evidence on grounds of 
national security concerns; and (4) the collection of such evidence may be conducted by the 
relevant state, but the prosecutor of the international court can conduct investigation on the 
territory of the states of the former Yugoslavia and on territories of other states that have 
implemented legislation authorizing Tribunal activity.164 Overall, the international court has 
primacy over individuals, states and their national courts, which implies that those indicted by 
the tribunal can be implicated and apprehended by any state in accordance with the ICTY 
mandate.    
2.2.3 Extended Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 The second salient feature in the statute creating the ICTY is the provision of extended 
subject matter jurisdiction. This provision enables the tribunal to prosecute perpetrators for 
crimes ranging from war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and other violations of 
international criminal law during an internal armed conflict. According to Cassese, 
“Traditionally... [v]iolations of international law committed in the course of internal armed 
conflicts were not criminalized. Thus a glaring and preposterous disparity existed” [between the 




judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić (Interlocutory Appeal). Tadić was charged 
with committing acts that constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Convention (Article 2 of the 
Statue establishing the ICTY), violating the laws or customs of war (Article 3 of the Statute), and 
committing crimes against humanity (Article 5 of the Statute).166 He claimed that such crimes 
were inapplicable to his case because these acts only applied to international armed conflicts and 
the war in Yugoslavia was internal. The Chamber did not find the conflict to be purely internal in 
nature. It did not only conclude that internal wars have international dimensions, but also that 
war crimes could be committed in both international and internal armed conflicts. Moir writes 
that “[t]he Chamber began by outlining the traditional dichotomy between the regulation of 
international and internal armed conflicts, but felt that the approach of international law had, 
over time, become less State-oriented, inevitably leading to the following question” Moir quotes 
Tadić (Jurisdiction): 
 Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of 
hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary 
suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or 
providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign 
State? If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must 
gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy 
should gradually lose its weight.167 
 Thus, individuals could be held accountable for international crimes committed in both types of 
wars. 
 This was an extremely important ruling for two reasons: 1) international law initially 
designed to regulate interstate relations could now regulate how wars were fought within states 
and 2) the minimal standards of humanitarian law no longer solely applied to internal armed 
conflicts (Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions), it was now coupled with higher standards of 




extension, the potential threat of prosecution is higher since the ‘grave breach’ provision is 
subject to the principle of universal jurisdiction.169 This means that perpetrators of such crimes 
can be prosecuted in any state that adheres to this principle. The principle of universal 
jurisdiction dictates that states are obligated to prosecute grave breach offenders in their national 
courts or extradite them to the international tribunal, regardless of the offender’s nationality, the 
place of the commission of the crime, and the nationality of the victim. Thus, perpetrators of 
such crimes are unlikely to escape prosecution if they are charged with committing acts that 
constitute ‘grave breaches.’  
2.2.4 Temporal Jurisdiction and the Principle of Primacy 
 There are other salient features in the statute creating the ICTY which ensure that 
violators of international crimes are held accountable. They are crystallized in the temporal 
jurisdiction, which marks the time period in which the court has jurisdiction to prosecute, and the 
principle of primacy, which gives the international court primacy over national courts to deal 
with violations of international law. 
 The temporal jurisdiction of the ICTY begins on 1 January 1991 which marks the start 
date of the war in the former Yugoslavia (Article 1). It does not have an end date because the 
court came into effect during the war. Thus the court can account for all violations of 
international law from the start date of the war in 1991 and onwards. This provision reinforces 
the threat of prosecution by sending a signal to perpetrators that past and future transgressions 
will be brought to account. 
 The provision of primacy has also shaped the international community’s response to war 




underlying local/ethnic tensions that give rise to the offenses. In the statute creating the ICTY, 
Article 9 provides that the tribunal has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts to prosecute 
perpetrators of international crimes but that the tribunal “shall have primacy over national 
courts”. Cassese claims there are two reasons behind this decision: 1) the ongoing civil conflict 
in the former Yugoslavia and 2) the ethnic tension and animosity in Yugoslavia rendering 
national courts unable and unwilling to conduct fair trials.170 What matters is the principle of 
criminal accountability; considerations of civil/ethnic nuances of the war are antithetical to the 
principle. This idea has important implications for the practical design of the court: neither local 
judges nor lawyers are part of the proceeding nor are local laws incorporated in the statute 
creating the ICTY. Once again, the need was felt to affirm the overriding authority of the 
international tribunal by stressing its primacy over national courts which have the proclivity to 
allow local/ethnic factors to affect court proceedings. To ensure independence and impartiality, 
an international tribunal seemed the appropriate venue for such cases.171 In sum, to secure the 
prosecution of the most culpable perpetrators and avoid possible immunity, the provisions of 
temporal jurisdictions and of primacy enable the tribunal to account for the most egregious 
crimes and penalize perpetrators according to international standards. 
 
2.3 Preliminary evaluation of the ICTY’s ability of achieving justice and peace 
in civil wars 
 
 To ensure that perpetrators would be brought to justice, the ICTY was designed with 
certain legal powers and jurisdictions that, in principle, make it difficult for perpetrators to 
escape prosecution both nationally and internationally. All of the following provisions, Chapter 




of primacy, are a reflection of the ideas coming out of human and cosmopolitan rights 
perspective. In principle, the incorporation of all of these design features in the statute creating 
the ICTY makes the threat of apprehension and prosecution credible. In principle, under this 
regime all culpable parties should be prosecuted at some point in time.172 
 As of today, the ideas of human rights and more specifically universal jurisdiction have 
become dominant and are the inspiring principles of international courts. Yet as they are 
inherently tied to concerns of absolute nature, they abstract from the specifics of any given 
historical or political situation and their application may lead to some undesirable outcomes. For 
instance, by prosecuting the very leaders needed to secure local peace and stability, such regimes 
may obtain the goal of justice but may undermine the attainment of peace. To attain the goal of 
peace, legal regimes need to be designed to create incentives for combatants to bargain for peace. 
Under the legal powers and jurisdictions afforded to the HR legal regime, neither the government 
nor insurgent groups are likely to have an incentive to bargain for peace knowing they will both 
be automatically prosecuted for the crimes they have committed. To illustrate, I continue to 
analyze the war in the former Yugoslavia. 
2.3.1 Justice vs. Peace 
 In 1994, international lawyer Anthony D’Amato asked the following question: “If they 
[war criminals], or their close associates and friends, face potential life imprisonment by simply 
signing a peace treaty, what incentive do they have to sign it?”173 He predicted that given the 
legal regime in place (HR), for peace or any semblance of peace to ensue, UN officials (in this 
case US officials), “…may have to extend some form of assurance to the leaders in the former 




thesis consists of two main points: 1) on the one hand, justice oriented systems like those on HR, 
create disincentives to negotiate for peace, and 2) on the other hand, domestic tort litigation 
(DTL) like systems generate the appropriate incentives to bargain for peace even though they 
might fail in the dimension of justice. I will show that both points ended up being correct. With 
the indictments of war criminals and the subsequent massacres at Srebrenica, the shortcomings 
of the justice-based systems appear clearly in the first phase of the Yugoslavian war. In contrast, 
the virtues of the DTL-like system appear in the second phase of the Yugoslavian war. I will 
argue that in that phase the US intervention created a de facto DTL, which eventually led the 
conflicting parties to sign the Dayton Accords (see below section 5.5). 
2.3.2 Trading Peace for Justice 
Between 1993 and 1994, the war continued in the most brutal way. According to William 
and Scharf, “The same week that the Secretary-General submitted the Legal Office’s proposed 
statute [for the ICTY], Croatian defense forces had rounded up thousands of Muslim men in 
raids on the city of Mostar and had deported them to detention centers, which were little better 
than the Serb-run concentration camps. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs were conducting a fierce 
assault on the Muslim towns of Zepa and Srebrenica, which had swollen with thousands of 
refugees from surrounding villages”.175  The following year (25 July 1995), the Chief Prosecutor 
of the ICTY, Richard Goldstone indicted Karadzic and Mladic for the first time for genocide and 
crimes against humanity.  On the same day of the indictment, Karadzic and Mladic forces took 
Zepa, another UN “safe area”.176 
Most critics argue that the presence of the court failed to deter Mladic and Karadzic 




suggest a different interpretation. It was not so much that the courts threat of prosecution proved 
to be not credible, but instead since both men had been indicted, neither had an incentive to stop 
fighting. It made more sense for them to keep fighting and secure as much territory as possible 
no matter what the cost. In fact, following the first indictment, Bosnian-Serb forces carried out 
one of the most brutal attacks in the war. In mid-July 1995, they attacked a UN safe area of 
Srebrenica murdering as many as 7,000 men and raping and torturing women and children.177 
2.3.3 Trading justice for peace 
 When the American delegation intervened in the war in 1994, it recognized that the 
presence of the ICTY thwarted any possibility of attaining a durable peace, and hence made 
assurances to leaders instrumental to securing peace in the former Yugoslavia that they would 
not be apprehended or prosecuted. In fact, the American delegation made sure that no mention of 
apprehension and/or prosecution of war criminals appeared in the Dayton Accords that all parties 
to the conflict eventually signed. 178 I will discuss this phase more thoroughly in section 5.5 
below, where I will argue that a de facto DTL was in place. 
  
In sum, consistent with the human rights and cosmopolitan viewpoints, when 
international crimes have been violated in civil wars, entities other than the state proper, i.e. 
international criminal tribunals, have legal status that can override state sovereignty. To ensure 
justice in the former Yugoslavia and redress the international crimes committed during the war, 
the UNSC created the ICTY and endowed it with the necessary legal powers and jurisdiction that 
serves to constrain any state from neither derogating from the duty to prosecute nor affecting the 




afforded provisions such as Chapter VII powers, extended temporal and subject matter 
jurisdiction, and primacy that make the threat of prosecution credible. In civil wars, since both 
the state and the insurgent groups are prosecuted upon violating the law, neither one is likely to 
have an incentive to negotiate. As such HR legal regimes ensure the attainment of the goal of 
justice but not necessarily peace. 
 
3. Horizontal Cooperation Model 
 
In recent years, an attempt has been made to reconcile the idea of state sovereignty with that 
of human rights. The principle is as follows: a state maintains its sovereignty but it is entitled to 
willingly give away part of it by signing a treaty with other states. Thus, in particular, a state can 
sign a treaty whereby it agrees to allow intervention of external entities such as an international 
court in its own domestic affairs in the face of violations of international criminal law. This 
model is referred to as the horizontal model in that after a treaty is signed, both the domestic 
court and the international court operate at the same level or have the same legal rights to redress 
such violations. These ideas found their application in the Rome Statute of 1998 which instituted 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC came into force in 2002 after sixty states 
ratified the Rome Statute. 179 According to the Statute, states 1) agreed to delegate some of their 
authority to the ICC to directly intervene and assist the state in investigating and prosecuting 
violators of international criminal law; and 2) agreed to adhere to the statute creating the ICC to 




As we shall see, however, the application of this court model did not stay true to its original 
intent and ended up, in practice, being reminiscent to the old idea of state sovereignty.180 For 
instance, while the ICC has legal power and jurisdiction through the chief prosecutor to directly 
intervene and indict, apprehend, and prosecute individuals subject to state sovereignty (more in 
line with HR), in practice, this does not occur without states’ consent. 
 
3.1 Salient Features of the Horizontal Regime: The International Criminal 
Court (ICC) 
 
 3.1.1 The Role of the State 
 Cassese (2003) argues that the Rome Statute contains specific design features that put 
limits on the ICC’s ability of apprehending and prosecuting perpetrators. Thus, for all practical 
purposes, the state is the entity that can easily petition a court’s intervention to bring perpetrators 
to justice, and the ICC is merely ancillary to the state.181 
 To begin, Article 86 of the statute creating the ICC provides that there is a general 
obligation for states to cooperate with the court. This provision was intended to mitigate the 
judicial power of interpretation of the duty to cooperate and to lay down “legislative safeguards” 
for the state.182  Unlike the ICTY, where such issues were left for the judges to decide (i.e. 
Blaškić (subpoena) case), the Statue creating the ICC spells out the general obligations of the 
state to cooperate to restrict as much as possible Blaškić (subpoena) case outcomes (see above 
Salient features of ICTY). But this provision is sidetracked by the lack of enforcement power in 
the event that a state fails to cooperate. According to Article 87, if a state fails to cooperate, the 




Parties or the Security Council. Cassese argues that there is no enforcement power to make states 
cooperate by way of acts or countermeasures put forth by the Assembly of States, or by way of 
the UNSC stepping in and imposing sanctions.  He further questions why the Security Council 
should not act under Chapter VII powers especially when a state’s refusal to cooperate could 
amount to the threat to peace and security. In fact, while the Statute does not exclude these 
possibilities, it does not explicitly mention them.183 The lack of countermeasures in the event that 
states fail to cooperate with the ICC is testimony to the state centric approach taken to deal with 
matters of international justice. In other words, it is the state’s prerogative to decide whether or 
not to cooperate with the court. 
 On matters of collecting evidence, issuing summonses and warrants, the statute does not 
specify who is responsible for these tasks: whether the ICC prosecutor with the assistance of 
state authorities or state enforcement with the assistance of judicial authorities. Cassese believes 
that given the tone of the Statute, particularly on its insistence to comply with requirements of 
the national legislature, the statute intended for the latter.184 Again the intent is, first and 
foremost, to maintain state sovereignty, thus delegating such matters to the authority of the state.  
 With regards to the statute’s stipulation on the possible surrender of persons, the relation 
is subject to interstate judicial cooperation which is stated in Article 10 (1) of the statute creating 
the ICC. This relation is based on similar treaty provisions between states; that the offense be 
considered as such in both the requested state and the requesting state on matters of extradition. 
In matters of competing request for surrender and extradition of persons, the court does not have 
primacy as stipulated in Article 90 (6) and (7). Cassese argues that this is one of the major 
misgivings of the statute creating the court, for instead of giving the court primacy, which would 




statute gives primacy to state control over these matters. 185 A state party can even comply with 
the extradition request by a non-party state to the statue of the ICC instead of complying with the 
request of the ICC.  
 Finally, the statute again submits to states concerns in matters dealing with the protection 
of national security information under Article 93(4). It provides that a state party may refuse to 
assist the court if the assistance requires disclosure of evidence that relates to matters of national 
security. This provision clearly adheres to the fundamental guiding principle of interstate and 
now state-international court relations which is based on the principle of non-interference. As 
Huth et al. (2006) would argue, the Rome Statute creating the ICC is but a “covenant without the 
sword”, a regime that caters to the concerns of state sovereignty, has little to no enforcement 
power (should a state fail to cooperate), and whose function is entirely dependent on the consent 
and cooperation of the accused state and of other states.186 These features are all the more telling 
with the principle of complementarity, which the ICC Statute upholds. 
3.1.2 The Principle of Complementarity 
 The principle of complementarity (Article 1 of the Rome Statute) states that the ICC is a 
subsidiary or complementary to national courts. In other words it does not have primacy over 
national courts. The priority in the exercise of jurisdiction is given to national courts. Cassese 
points out two reasons for this approach. The first reason is based on matters of practical 
concerns. The ICC cannot handle all cases from all over the world. It is deemed conducive to 
leave the majority of cases to national courts that are a) better positioned to collect the necessary 
evidence, and b) can efficiently exercise their jurisdiction on grounds of territoriality, nationality, 




principles of non-intervention and state consent, the state has the authority to handle its domestic 
affairs including matters that deal with the pursuit of justice without outside interference. 
Cassese observes that,  
“complementarity even applies whatever the trigger mechanism of the Court’s proceedings, that 
is, when a case (i) has been brought to the Court by a State party (Article 13(a) and 14), or (ii) 
has been initiated by the Prosecutor…and the Prosecutor has been authorized by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to commence a criminal investigation (Article 13(c)  and 15), and when (iii) it is the 
UN Security Council that has referred to the Court a ‘situation in which one or more of …[the] 
crimes [falling under the Court’s jurisdiction] appears to have been committed’ (Article 13(b) 
and 52(c).”188 
 
Moreover, if the state does require the involvement of an outside intervener, the complementarity 
provision allows the state to request the intervention of the ICC in the event that it is “unable” to 
prosecute (Article 17 (3)).  A state is “unable” to bring a person to trial when the judicial system 
is in shambles, which is usually the case during and after most civil wars. States devastated by 
civil strife find it difficult to detain the accused, collect necessary evidence, and to carry out 
criminal proceedings.189 Under such circumstances a state can request ICC intervention to 
commence judicial proceedings. 
 Matters become murky when the state is “unwilling” to intervene and the ICC wants to 
intervene anyway (Article 17 (2)).  This may happen not only when the state refuses to prosecute 
but also when it has taken measures to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility. 
Such measures include amnesties. States can also refuse to prosecute by delaying proceedings 
without any intention of bringing the person to justice. Other examples of state unwillingness to 
prosecute are show trials, which are often used to satisfy international concerns to bring a person 
to justice, but such trials are usually neither independent nor impartial. 




 On matters of subject matter jurisdiction, the Rome Statute governing the ICC is credited 
for going beyond the laws governing internal armed conflict, when it included other war crimes 
as violations of internal armed conflict. Moir is of the opinion that the Rome Statutes inclusion 
of other serious violations of the laws of internal armed conflict beyond that which is contained 
in Additional Protocol II is consistent with the ‘gradual blurring of the fundamental difference 
between international and internal armed conflicts’, which is short of the approach taken by the 
ICTY. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY maintained that “what is inhumane and consequently 
proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife,”190 and 
suggests that only one corpus of law, specifically laws that govern international armed conflict, 
apply to all conflicts. Cassese, on the other hand, believes that the Rome Statute takes a step 
backwards since it still maintains the distinction in the rules regulating the two types of wars in 
the first place.191 The distinction between the two types of wars is upheld in the following 
provisions of the Rome Statute Article 8(2) (c-f): where it determines when an internal armed 
conflict exists. For the relevant laws to apply to an internal armed conflict, the conflict between 
state officials and insurgent groups has to be ‘protracted’. While Moir welcomes this provision 
because it significantly lowers the threshold from that of Additional Protocol II,192 Cassese, 
instead, still perceives this decision as somewhat retrograde in light of the developments to 
abolish the distinction between the two types of war (i.e. Tadic Interlocutory Appeal). He 
attributes the decision to maintain this distinction to the majority of the states gathered at the 
Rome Conference, who “preferred to tread gingerly so as to take due account of States’ 
concerns” and argues that the ICC is “marred by being too obsequious to State sovereignty”.193  
 ICC submission to state sovereignty concerns is further compounded by Article 124 of 




crimes committed by their nationals or on their territory “shall not become operative for a period 
of seven years”.194 Since states can delay prosecutorial activity of their nationals for quite some 
time, this provision is likely to decrease the possibility of any kind of prosecution, national or 
international, in the long run.  
 In addition, the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction begins on the day the court entered into force, 
1 July 2002. It does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed before this date. Given the 
ICC’s temporal jurisdiction, states can easily avoid prosecuting violations of international laws 
that took place before 2002, especially those that the state itself may have violated. Unlike the 
regimes coming out of the human rights and cosmopolitan rights perspectives, there appears to 
be ample room for immunity in legal regimes reflecting the pure state sovereignty viewpoint.    
 
3.2 Preliminary evaluation of the ICC’s ability of achieving justice and peace in 
civil wars 
 
 On matters of justice, it is the state that determines how it will achieve this goal. 
International legal regimes are there to serve their interests only. Should a state decide not to 
bring perpetrators to justice, the ICC can attempt to intervene, but as the state-centric provisions 
of the Rome Statute clearly show above, states can avoid cooperating with the ICC without 
necessarily being sanctioned for their lack of cooperation.  
 It is important to emphasize that the ICC needs the cooperation of states to exercise its 
own jurisdiction effectively. State cooperation does not, however, guarantee the ICC’s 
effectiveness in rendering full justice. To ensure that certain crimes fall under the jurisdiction of 




cooperation to prosecute the crimes of insurgents within the state (see The Case of Uganda 
below). In this set up, justice is one-sided and the duty to prosecute can be partially fulfilled at 
best. If the court is triggered by any other entity, be it by the Security Council, the Prosecutor of 
the ICC, or other state(s), to prosecute state officials in particular, then the state concerned is 
unlikely to cooperate with the ICC to bring such culprits to justice.  
 Thus, in this legal system justice is likely to be fully rendered under two circumstances: 
1) in the event that the state calls the court when it is not culpable for perpetrating international 
crimes but other parties to the conflict are; or 2) in the event that the state concerned is complicit 
and its interests are aligned with the ICC, in which case it would willingly subject state officials 
to national or international prosecution. However, in the event that the state has violated 
international law and its interests are not aligned with the ICC, it is unlikely that the ICC will be 
able to bring the state to justice without the cooperation of the said state and other states. In the 
civil war context, unless other states have some stake in the conflict, the ICC is unlikely to 
secure the cooperation of other states especially since there are no provisions that specify the 
necessary procedure to sanction other states for failing to cooperate. 
 Under this legal regime, then, the ability of rendering full justice seems to be just as 
unattainable as creating incentives for combatants to bargain for a durable peace. Since the state 
is can directly call the court to intervene, the state sovereignty legal regime is not neutral. Such 
regimes generate a bias toward the government and make insurgents more susceptible to 
prosecution than government forces. This is extremely problematic because the state will 1) have 
an incentive to commit crimes as part of their military strategy to fight off insurrection195 and 2) 
will not have an incentive to bargain with insurgents especially when an international court can 




the government and other states are unlikely to do so for fear of being accused of violating the 
principle of non-intervention in matters of civil strife, the government has a clear incentive to go 
to war. Under these circumstances, peace is unlikely to occur and the commission of 
international crimes is likely to increase (see The Case of Uganda below). 
 Under this system, insurgent groups are the only entity that has an incentive to bargain 
for peace. Given that the state can directly call the court among the warring parties, it makes the 
cost of war higher for the rebel group relative to the government, thus strengthening the 
government’s position at the bargaining table. If they do negotiate, it is unlikely that both parties 
will reach a mutually acceptable agreement and insurgents will have more of an incentive to 
resume warfare. Knowing that they can be prosecuted if the government decides to call the court, 
insurgents will not have anything to lose by resuming warfare and may commit more 
international crimes as a result (similar effect of the HR model but the effect is only felt by 
insurgents in the SS legal regime). Since the ICC is so dependent on some third party (be it the 
concerned state, other states, even insurgent groups196) in order to function properly, it is 
unlikely to create incentives for warring parties to bargain for mutually acceptable agreement. In 
sum, the ICC is unlikely to render full justice or assist combatants to bargain for a durable peace 
during civil conflicts. Below, we are going to see that all of these potential drawbacks emerged 
in the case of the civil war in Uganda. 
 
3.3 The Case of Uganda 
 
 In December 2003, the ICC received its first referral from the Government of Uganda to 




that had been causing havoc in the northern part of Uganda for the past nineteen years. The chief 
prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, put aside the case of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, which was the first case the ICC wanted to investigate, and instead, welcomed the 
opportunity to assist the government that directly petitioned its intervention to bring perpetrators 
to justice. After preliminary scrutiny of the case, the ICC accepted the referral on 29 July 2004. 
Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo determined that the crimes allegedly committed in northern 
Uganda fell within the subject matter jurisdiction under Article 7 (crimes against humanity) and 
the temporal jurisdiction (July 1, 2002) of the court, and concluded there was a reasonable basis 
to commence an investigation.  
 The fact that the state of Uganda willingly petitioned the ICC to intervene on matters of 
purely internal affairs have led many to argue that the president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, is 
merely using the ICC as an instrument to further his political interests.197 In particular, Arsanjani 
and Reisman (2005) cautioned those who perceived the referral by a state government as a sign 
of confidence in the ICC to temper their enthusiasm. They forewarned that the implications that 
one can derive from the referral were far from laudatory for three reasons: 1) it could encourage 
governments to defer domestic problems that they were unable and unwilling to settle to the 
court; 2) it allows governments to “co-opt the ICC in a confrontational criminal context for what 
---despite all the attendant violence ---may essentially be political struggles, for which 
negotiation and settlement might be the only practical mode of restoring minimum order”198 ; 
and 3) it falls short of the requirements of admissibility under Article 17 of the Statute.  I will 
focus mainly on the first two stipulations and show that each time the government of Uganda and 
the LRA are at the brink of bargaining for peace, the government employs some external 




the LRA.  The government’s inability to defeat the LRA militarily has led it to use the ICC not 
only to further militarize itself but also to gain more bargaining leverage should renegotiations 
take place. 
3.3.1 The War in Uganda 
 Northern Uganda has been a region of particular contention since Yoweri Museveni, 
leader of the National Resistance Army (NRA), ousted an Acholi dominated government in 
1986. The LRA, led by Joseph Kony and composed ethnically of Acholi from northern Uganda, 
main objective was to oust and replace the current government. Over the years their aims have 
become more obscure as most of their military aggression has been directed against their own 
people. Being the most powerful rebel group in the region since the early 1990s, the LRA 
enjoyed the support from the Acholi civilian population.199 Because of rebel military failure, 
brutal government counterinsurgency against the civilian population, and overall war fatigue, the 
Acholi support of the LRA waned.200  It perceived the reduced support from the Acholi as a 
change of allegiance to the government and as such inflicted inane violence from indiscriminate 
killing, rape, pillage, to the abduction of children, on the Acholi population. The LRA was 
mainly supported by the government of the Sudan, where it was allowed to retreat to camps and 
bases to recuperate and rearm in the south of Sudan.201  
 Government counterinsurgency did little to protect civilians. The Uganda People’s 
Defence Force (UPDF), the successor of the NRA, has been accused of using force to destroy 
suspected rebel support among civilians.202 Throughout  the 90’s, government forces carried out 
a number of massacres and other atrocities, including forced displacement of Acholi from their 




entire villages,” threatening to kill anyone who attempted to leave the camp.203 According to 
Branch, “the total population of these camps have grown from few hundred thousand in 1996 to 
almost a million by the time of the ICC’s intervention, encompassing nearly the entire rural 
population of the Acholi subregion”.204 
 In 2000, an Amnesty Act, backed primarily by the Acholi community and civil society 
groups, passed in the Ugandan parliament. The Act granted immunity from prosecution to all 
rebels including leaders who renounced, abandoned the rebellion, and surrendered their arms. A 
bargaining space opened up with the passage of the Act; Acholi religious leaders launched a 
peace initiative calling both sides to resolve the conflict in the north via negotiations. An 
internationally backed amnesty commission was established to resettle rebels who voluntarily 
surrendered.205 At first, the initiative seemed to be effective: as of 2001, LRA terror tactics 
diminished significantly. It is reported that fewer than 100 children were abducted and attacks 
against civilians waned.206 Despite the progress that was being made toward a peaceful 
conclusion, top LRA leaders did not take immediate advantage of the amnesty. Instead of further 
backing the Amnesty Act and peace initiatives emanating from the Act, in 2002, President 
Museveni 207 in turn, aborted the peaceful efforts by joining the international “anti-terrorist” 
coalition led by the United States and signed the Anti-Terrorist Act.  The Anti-Terrorist Act not 
only classified several rebel movements as “terrorists” but also allowed the government to re-
arrest former rebels who had been pardoned under the Amnesty Act.208 
 Furthermore, Uganda and Sudan signed a protocol allowing Ugandan soldiers to hunt for 
members of the LRA inside southern Sudan thus launching military Operation Iron Fist. As a 
consequence, military pressure on the LRA increased leading to the resurgence of full-blown 




reported that “from June to December 2002, an estimated five thousand children were abducted, 
more than in any other year since the conflict began…”210 Abductions went unabated through 
2003 and into 2004; it is estimated that 12,000 children were abducted from mid-2002 to 
2004.211 
 As violence escalated and government forces failed to decisively defeat the LRA, on 
December 2, 2003, President Museveni referred the case to the ICC. Shortly, thereafter, “Uganda 
and Sudan renewed their bilateral military protocol resulting in ‘Operation Iron Fist II’ [, which] 
allowed Ugandan troops to pursue the LRA across Sudanese borders”.212 The LRA experienced 
several setbacks as it was progressively weakened by government forces that overran their 
military camps in southern Sudan. This led the LRA to cross from Sudan to Uganda attacking 
villages and refugee camps in pursuit of food and new recruits. 
With some military success of government forces and backing of the ICC, the 
government was able to redraft the Amnesty Act by granting immunity to lower level rebels and 
exclude only the top LRA leadership from the legislation, “thereby ensuring that those bearing 
the greatest responsibility for crime against humanity committed in northern Uganda are brought 
to justice”.213 With LRA leadership in a state of flux, the dynamics changed between the top 
leaders, who were divided on whether or not to accept amnesty and whether to recommence 
negotiations. Among lower level and medium level LRA members, the referral to the ICC 
prompted significant defection from the LRA, thus incapacitating and weakening it militarily. As 
a result of a weakened LRA, a bargaining space opened up yet again.  
In November 2004, Betty Bigombe, former minister in the Ugandan government and 




peace talks with the LRA and the government.214 She attempted to get the rebels to sign a 
ceasefire agreement at the end of December 2004, but they refused and fighting broke out again. 
Bigombe was able to ‘rebuild the eroded trust’ and continue mediation between the warring 
parties. Bigombe intended on persuading the LRA to end the rebellion and accept the amnesty 
offer from the government, however, her efforts were undermined when the ICC issued arrest 
warrants for five of the top LRA leadership including Joseph Kony in October 2005. Bigombe, 
herself, abandoned the peace talks identifying the ICC’s move as a deterrent for the top LRA 
leaders to negotiate. It was inconceivable for them to surrender and seek amnesty with 
prosecutions pending. 
3.3.2 ICC intervention in Uganda: Rendering Justice? 
 Above, when I evaluated the state sovereignty legal regime’s ability of achieving justice, 
I argued that in this system justice is fully rendered when 1) the state itself is not complicit in the 
commission of international crimes but other parties are, in which case it would call the ICC to 
prosecute the complicit party or 2) when the state concerned is complicit and its’ interest are 
aligned with the court, in which case it would willingly subject state officials to national or 
international prosecution. Regrettably, neither requirement was met in the case of Uganda. 
  For starters, in the Ugandan case the government itself is complicit of war crimes. 
According to Branch, “[Ugandan] government internment of over a million people without 
necessity and without adequate protection and aid constitutes a grave violation of the laws of war 
and certainly fall within the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction”.215 The ICC accepted the referral from 
the Ugandan government on the basis of gravity; thus while acknowledging that international 




perpetrated by the LRA because they are graver then those committed by the government. Chief 
Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo explains: “The criteria for selection of the first case was gravity. 
We analyzed the gravity of all crimes in northern Uganda committed by the LRA and Ugandan 
forces. Crimes committed by the LRA were much more numerous and of much higher gravity 
than alleged crimes committed by the UPDF. We therefore started with an investigation of the 
LRA.”216 By focusing the investigation on LRA crimes only, many scholars believe that the ICC 
played into the political machinations of the government and hence argue that the ICC has 
become an ancillary of it.  
 President Museveni has been quoted as saying “that he is prepared to cooperate with the 
prosecution with regard to the allegations: ‘I am ready to be investigated for war crimes… and if 
any of our people were involved in any crimes we will give him up to be tried by the ICC. And 
in any case, if such cases are brought to our attention, we will try them ourselves’.217 This 
statement is telling because the government admits to being capable and willing to try its own 
perpetrators of war crimes in its own courts, indicating that the Ugandan judicial system is 
operational.218 This has led many scholars to ask why the Ugandan government referred the case 
to the ICC in the first place and why the ICC agreed to accept the referral in light of the fact that 
it is not a body that was intended or equipped “to resolve through judicial means, a long standing 
political problem of a government”.219 What is more, the case does not meet the requirement of 
admissibility under Article 17 of the Rome Statute. Recall, that Article 17 underscores the ICC 
as a court of last resort. In other words, if a state is “unable” to bring a person to trial due to an 
incapacitated judicial system, or a state is “unwilling” to intervene, then it can call the court to 
exercise jurisdiction. From the president’s statement above, Uganda has neither demonstrated 




 The government cites the following motivation for its referral: it has exhausted all other 
measures to bring to an end the terrible suffering of the Ugandan people and it pledges full 
support and cooperation to the Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of LRA crimes.220 
Despite initial promises of cooperation, the Ugandan government has threatened several times to 
withdraw the referral to the court, suggesting that it would halt further cooperation should its 
own military become subject to prosecution. According to Branch, the government retracted its 
claim of complicity when “Attorney General Amama Mbabazi stated categorically that the 
UPDF is not guilty of crimes and will not be tried by the ICC”.221 This is problematic for the ICC 
because without government cooperation the investigation is at risk of closing down completely. 
It is important to emphasize that the ICC needs the full cooperation of the state to exercise its 
own jurisdiction effectively. This is an objective limitation of the ICC, for in order to elicit some 
form of cooperation from the government, the ICC had to turn a blind eye on the crimes 
perpetrated by it.  
 The Ugandan referral to the ICC illustrates how legal regimes emanating from the 
principle of state sovereignty fail to render full justice. The justice that is rendered is one-sided 
or partial at best. Moreover, under this system it is the state that determines how it will use 
international instruments such as the ICC as a mechanism to resolve internal problems and fulfill 
political interests. 
3.3.3 The ICC intervention in Uganda: Achieving Peace? 
 When evaluating the state sovereignty legal regimes (SS) ability to achieve peace, I 
argued that the SS regime fails to create incentives for a government to bargain with rebel 




intervene, the SS regime generates a bias toward the government, as such, the government will 1) 
have an incentive to commit crimes as part of their military strategy to fight off insurrection and 
2) will not have an incentive to bargain with insurgents since the court can potentially assist the 
government in prosecuting them. In this section, I will argue that by soliciting the ICC to 
intervene, President Museveni has a) delegitimized the LRA as a political force to be dealt with 
via peaceful means; b) emboldened the government to militarily defeat the LRA; and c) created a 
disincentive for the LRA to continue peaceful negotiations while creating an incentive to resume 
warfare. 
 Given the classification and parlance of the ICC on matters dealing with the LRA, one 
can see how legal regimes emanating from SS grant legal status to the government of Uganda 
only. It appears that the LRA does not have any legal status and the ICC confirms and supports 
this stance by classifying the LRA as common criminals. Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo 
depicts the LRA in the following manner: “The Lord’s Resistance Army, the LRA, is an armed 
rebel group, claiming to fight for the freedom of the Acholi people in northern Uganda. For 
nineteen years the people of northern Uganda have been killed, abducted, enslaved, and 
raped”.222 He further refers to the group and their actions as a “criminal campaign” thus reducing 
it to a criminal group rather than as a potential party with whom one can negotiate. Moreover, 
the ICC did not take heed of any of the reparation demands of the LRA some of which are 
aligned with the Acholi community. The demands include, “the return to their homes, the end of 
government violence and repression, and the political and economic equalization of the north and 
south [of Uganda]…”223 Instead, the ICC legitimizes the government to hunt down and capture 




 It has been argued that the referral has emboldened the Ugandan army. Akhavan notes 
that after the referral, “[t]he resulting military advances were unprecedented and included the 
reported capture in September 2004 of Kony’s bodyguard and intelligence officer, as well as the 
injury of deputy Vincent Otti, near the town of Pakanyara, 160 kilometers north of Uganda’s 
border with Sudan”.224 This coupled with the renewal of a bilateral military protocol between 
Uganda and Sudan and culminated in Operation Iron Fist, which weakened the LRA, prompted 
renewed willingness to negotiate for peace. For instance, in February 2005, LRA top negotiator, 
Brigadier Sam Kollo, surrendered to the Ugandan Army. Kollo had earlier suggested that the 
LRA had wanted to negotiate for peace but noted that the “Ugandan government is never 
serious”.225 Kollo’s comment is consistent with prior observations about the dynamics of warring 
parties in the SS legal regime. I had argued that insurgent groups were the only entity that had an 
incentive to bargain for peace under SS. As illustrated in the case of Uganda, the cost of war is 
higher for the LRA relative to the government since the government has ICC backing, which also 
strengthens the government’s position at the bargaining table. If warring parties do negotiate, it is 
unlikely that they will reach a mutually acceptable agreement and insurgents will have more of 
an incentive to fight.  
Despite LRA weakness, it still poses a threat to civilians in Acholiland. As it tried to 
rebuild it incapacitated forces, abductions of civilians and violence intensified. Moreover, once 
the ICC unsealed the arrest warrants of five top leaders on October 2005, all efforts of peaceful 
negotiations under way in Juba (southern Sudan) were aborted. Chief negotiator Betty Bigombe 
recognized the futility of such efforts especially since “[f]ocusing on top leaders will deter them 




abductees) already have, undoing the great pains taken by the Acholi communities to assure the 
LRA that amnesty is credible”226.227  
 
4. Hybrid Legal Regimes: A Variant of the Horizontal 
Cooperation Models 
 
 In the past decade, a third type of legal regime emerged to adjudicate international crimes 
committed in the context of civil wars. Such regimes come about after hostilities have ended and 
there is some semblance of peace. Usually, the presiding government calls on the international 
community to assist it in bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice in the following 
circumstances: 1) when the judicial system has been completely devastated by war and the state 
needs legal and financial assistance to rejuvenate it; and/or 2) when the government has an 
interest in ending “the cycle of impunity” by legitimately prosecuting their enemies.  
 Governments in this predicament envision the creation of the ad hoc tribunals such as 
those developed by the UNSC for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda but with legal designs 
more attuned to respect state sovereignty and the nation’s vision of justice. It follows then that 
the legal regime would be based on a relation similar to those found in the horizontal cooperation 
model but with legal design features that have country specific attributes. For instance, the legal 
regime would reflect a “mixed” or “hybrid” composition with the incorporation of international 
laws and national laws along with international and national prosecutors, judges, and lawyers in 
the practical design of the statutes creating such courts. The seat of hybrid regimes would be 




Yugoslavia and Rwanda where the ad hoc tribunals are located at The Hague and Arusha, 
Tanzania, respectively. 
 Similar to the other legal regime coming out of the horizontal cooperation model, namely 
the ICC, the legal basis for the establishment of the hybrid court is consensual-“their legal status, 
applicable law, composition and organizational structure had to be negotiated and agreed upon 
between the parties [state and the international drafters]”.228  Unlike the ICC, hybrid court legal 
regime designs vary across cases.  Rather than states determining at the aggregate level how 
justice should be pursed in one single legal model, each country determines how justice is 
pursued in the negotiation process between individual states and diplomats and lawyers of the 
UN Secretariat. In other words, such negotiation processes do not lend themselves to the creation 
of a single UN court model, instead hybrid models are subject to the political biases of a specific 
government and the UN Secretariat, which lead to different legal choices on questions of 
jurisdiction, organizational structure, and composition of the hybrid tribunal.229   
 As of today, there have been four different types of hybrid courts (i.e. in Sierra Leone, 
East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia). These courts emerged in the aftermath of war and as such 
are designed with the intent to bring those most responsible for past war crimes to account. Since 
peace has already been achieved in these cases, the ultimate goal is that of justice. This thesis is 
primarily concerned with courts that emerge during ongoing conflict and the outcome of peace, 
as such examining the diversity of the mixed jurisdiction of the various hybrid courts is not in its 
purview.230 It suffices to focus on one hybrid court and determine how certain design features 
reflect the ideas of both the state sovereignty and the human rights models. I will do so by 
comparing and contrasting it with the other types of legal regimes that have emerged, namely the 




ICTY and the ICC and has made significant strides in achievement of justice with the 
prosecution of the former head of state of Liberia, Charles Taylor,231 I consider the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (hereinafter SCSL or the court).   
 
4.1 Salient Features of the Hybrid Court for Sierra Leone 
 
 While the regimes coming from the human rights perspective were designed with 
extensive legal powers and jurisdictions to ensure that the global goal of prosecuting the most 
complicit perpetrators no matter what the costs locally, the court designed to address the 
atrocities in Sierra Leone paled in comparison. In attempting to focus purely on the internal 
dimensions of the war, drafters of the statute creating the SCSL, ironically neglected to consider 
several dimensions of the war and as a consequence of this oversight, the statute creating the 
SCSL was endowed with limited powers and jurisdictions. The myopic approach is due in part to 
state proclivities to refrain from allowing provisions in the statute that compromised sovereign 
integrity during the negotiation process coupled with the lack of political will on the part of the 
international drafters creating the court to deal with such matters at the international level.232 At 
first glance, these two positions seem to be aligned; states are likely to accept the limitations 
imposed by the international drafters especially since designing a court model with provisions 
that address a more global concern is often antithetical to pure state sovereign concerns. But the 
laws that govern the internal dimension of conflicts are not as far reaching as those that are 
designed to address the international dimensions of a conflict, and as such the ability of the 
SCSL to apprehend and bring those perpetrators to account for some of the egregious atrocities 




4.1.1 The Role of the State  
 After a brutal and devastating civil war that crippled the judicial apparatus of Sierra 
Leone, the government of Sierra Leone requested the creation of an international court that 
would assist them in not only refurbishing the judicial system but  would also try the individuals 
most responsible for violating international crimes during the civil war in Sierra Leone. In 
response, the Security Council created the SCSL in 2002.233 The Statute creating the SCSL is a 
result of an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and is 
therefore a ‘treaty-based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition’.  
 Unlike the vertical cooperation model, where the court has superior authority over the 
state, the SCSL does not have such standing since the court emerged as a result of a treaty based 
agreement. It does, however, have some remnants of regimes coming out of the vertical 
cooperation model in the provisions that maintain that the statute of the SCSL enjoys primacy 
over national courts. Moreover, the court can issue binding orders on the Government of Sierra 
Leone (see the Statute Article 8 and the Agreement Art.17). This means that national courts and 
other authorities are duty bound to cooperate with the SCSL to collect evidence, summon 
witnesses, and bring witnesses to the court.  
 Similar to the Rome Statue creating the ICC, however, there are no provisions specifying 
what recourse the SCSL has in the event that national authorities fail to cooperate. Like the ICC, 
the SCSL has no means of enforcing the obligations of cooperation. While it will agree to 
cooperate with the court in principle, the government will not agree to provisions that subject it 





4.1.2 Powers and Jurisdictions afforded to the SCSL 
 Other striking feature of the statute creating the SCSL is that it neglects the international 
dimension of the war in Sierra Leone. Unlike the war in the former Yugoslavia, which was 
classified as both internal and international armed conflict, the war in Sierra Leone was 
considered an internal armed conflict only. Despite evidence suggesting that the war commenced 
as an international war with the invasion of Liberian forces into Sierra Leone territory in 1991 
(see the Truth and Reconciliation Report), the drafters of the statute decided to design the court 
so it could address only the internal dimension of the war.234 Thus, some of the salient 
differences between the design features of the ICTY statute and the SCSL statute are: 1) limited 
temporal jurisdiction, 2) limited subject matter jurisdiction, and the 3) lack of UNSC Chapter VII 
powers. 
 In the statute creating the ICTY, the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal marks, 1 January 
1991, the day that is generally accepted that the war in the former Yugoslavia started. Instead, 
while it was generally accepted the war in Sierra Leone commenced in 1991, the selection date 
chosen for the SCSL is 30 November 1996.235  At this point, the war in Sierra Leone was 
primarily internal with government forces in the throes of violent rebel insurrection carried out 
by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). While there is evidence that international crimes 
including grave breaches were committed from 1991 to 1993, the SCSL cannot account for these 
crimes since its jurisdiction is restricted to events that took place after 1996.236  
 By limiting the temporal jurisdiction to account for the internal dimension of the war 
only, the drafters of the court consequently limited the subject matter jurisdiction of the statute 




conflict. Thus, the applicable laws are: crimes against humanity, Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II, other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, and certain crimes that fall under Sierra Leone law. This limitation is striking for both legal 
and political reasons. 1) Legally: the Rome Statute creating the ICC did attempt to go beyond the 
laws governing internal armed conflict when it included other war crimes as violations of 
internal armed conflict. The SCSL statute does not include other war crimes with the same 
extensive list of violations as the Rome Statute. Moreover, the grave breach provision, which 
upholds the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, obligates all states to prosecute international 
crimes by either prosecuting the accused or extraditing the accused to a concerned state, does not 
apply since such crimes can be committed only in international wars. 2) Politically: despite these 
legal limitations, the former President of Liberia was indicted, apprehended, prosecuted, found 
guilty, and was recently (30 May 2012) sentenced to fifty years in prison for 11 counts of adding 
and abetting war crimes in Sierra Leone. 
 Neglect of the international dimension of the war also led to the UNSC to decide not to 
provide the court with Chapter VII powers. While the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a 
threat to international peace and security in the region, the Security Council did not mention that 
in creating the SCSL it was ‘acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter’ as it did in the 
resolution creating the ICTY. Because of this decision, member states of the UN are not 
obligated to cooperate with the SCSL. In other words, third states do not have to abide by any 
request of the SCSL such as arresting or surrendering indicted criminals.237 To illustrate, after 
unsealing the indictment of Taylor, then sitting head of state of Liberia, on 7 March 2003, the 
indictment was publically announced on the 4 June 2003, while Taylor was at a meeting in 




resigned from office and was given asylum in Nigeria.238 It was only after significant political 
pressure from the United States that Nigeria extradited Taylor to the SCSL on 29 March 2006. 
Thus, while justice was indeed served with the indictment, apprehension, and eventual 
prosecution of Charles Taylor, it was not due to the design of the hybrid court per se, which had 
clear stipulations that could have precluded Taylor’s prosecution (lack of Chapter VII powers, 
limited temporal and subject matter jurisdiction). Instead, the apprehension and prosecution of 
Taylor occurred due to political pressure and assistance from third states (namely the United 
States and Nigeria).  
 
4.2 Preliminary evaluation of hybrid legal regime’s ability of achieving peace 
and justice 
 
 If we were to conceive of an ideological spectrum, where at one end we place the 
principle of state sovereignty and at the other end the principle of human rights/cosmopolitan 
rights, a hybrid model is a model that would fall somewhere in between these two principles. 
Recall from the previous section that the original intent of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
was to reconcile the principle of SS and HR in one legal entity. Ideally, the design of this regime 
would give equal weight to both principles of HR and SS. Yet, as we have seen, the actual design 
of the Rome Statute creating the ICC shifted more toward the SS side of the spectrum.  
 In principle, one can design a hybrid model that is closer to HR or SS. This choice would 
have practical implications on how the court is legally designed; in other words,  a hybrid model 
that is more in line with HR would have legal powers and jurisdictions more in line with 




line with the SS. The closer the hybrid model(s) is to HR the more the issues that were discussed 
above concerning the HR regimes ability of achieving peace and/or justice would apply. 
Similarly, the closer the hybrid model(s) is to SS, the more the observations made above about 
SS regimes ability to achieve peace and justice would apply. 
With regards to country specific hybrid court models, where each hybrid model falls 
within the spectrum will depend on several factors such as, the interests of whoever is in power 
at the end of the conflict: the incumbent government, an interim government led by the United 
Nations (i.e. East Timor and Kosovo), or the insurgent group turned government;  the strategic 
position of the state in question, or in other words, whether the state poses a threat to 
international peace and security; and, how the war ended: decisive victory or negotiated 
settlement, etc. 
 
5. Domestic Tort Litigation (DTL) Regime 
 
Applied to the international setting, the views of the DTL regime are in line with 
consequentialist concerns, which call for settling political accounts before dealing with concerns 
of justice. Scholars in this camp maintain that violations of international crimes should be 
prosecuted, but do not believe that international custom or convention impose on states a duty to 
prosecute individuals at the price of compromising national stability.239 Since we are working 
under the rubric of the logic of consequences, none of the cooperation models governing state 
and international court relations apply here. In the DTL regime, the court is neither a “supra-state 
entity” nor an “instrument” used for states to secure their interests. The court is merely a device 




parties have to have the ability to solicit the court in the event that they fail to agree. In Chapter 
III, we saw that in order for the DTL international legal regime to work, both the state and the 
insurgent group have to be regarded as equals under the law. This implies two things: 1) both the 
state and the insurgent group can call the court to intervene when either one or both commit 
international crimes and 2) if the court should intervene, both the state and the insurgent group 
will be prosecuted and penalized in a way which is commensurate to the crimes committed. 
Thus, in the DTL it is under the threat of court proceedings that settlements are concluded: 
parties agree to make concessions to each other because their interests are best served by 
avoiding the court. The main role of the court is that of determining the bargaining possibilities 
for the opposing rational parties, as parties would agree on any outcome which improves on the 
expected judgment rendered by the court.   
The recognition that under the DTL the court’s essential role is that of affecting the 
parties bargaining range suggests that courts could be designed in order to achieve “the best” 
possible bargaining range for the warring parties. For instance, if the desired outcome is the 
immediate cessation of hostilities, one would like to be in a situation where conflicting parties 
might find a mutually beneficial agreement. Since the existence of these agreements (points in 
the bargaining range) depends on the courts’ design, one will choose a design (if any) that will 
change the parties incentives from fighting to negotiating for peace. 
5.1The Modus Operandi of DTL 
 
Usually, parties in a domestic civil dispute have the same legal rights. In particular they 
have the same right of calling for the intervention of the court. A necessary condition for the 




would be granted symmetric status with respect to an international court.  By virtue of this 
symmetry, the DTL model has the potential of addressing all the problems stemming from the 
asymmetries of the SS model.  
 
5.2. Peace vs. Justice 
 
 Popular view holds that under the DTL peace is traded for justice, and this is usually seen 
as a drawback of the DTL.240 I am now going to carefully examine this point by 1) considering 
what exactly happens when parties are given the opportunity to negotiate for peace and 2) 
evaluating whether the peace that is obtained comes at the expense of justice. When parties 
negotiate for peace, we have two possibilities: either they reach an agreement or they do not. If 
no agreement is reached there are, in turn, two possible scenarios under the DTL: 1) nobody 
wants to call the court or 2) somebody calls the court. In the first scenario, war continues, 
nobody is held accountable, and there is neither peace nor justice. This outcome is certainly 
problematic. Any serious attempt of extending the reach of the DTL to deal with the 
management of civil wars must incorporate features that avoid this scenario. 
 A straightforward solution to this problem would be to set a date and stipulate that an HR 
court will intervene if parties fail to negotiate for peace by that date. In fact, this provision 
generates per se an incentive for the parties to bargain and avoid the court’s intervention. More 
generally, any system that generates incentives for parties to call the court after negotiations’ 
failure will do (for instance, the first to call the court gets some form of clemency, etc.). In 




court is powerful enough not to let the war continue indefinitely but weak enough not to undo the 
potential gains from bargaining. 
 In the second scenario, the court’s intervention is avoided with the parties making 
concessions to one another. In this case, perpetrators are not given a “free ride,” but instead, their 
“punishment” consists in transferring part of their wealth to the victims of their crimes.241 By 
definition (since the parties have reached an agreement), this compensation is preferred by the 
victim to the perpetrators being punished by the court.  
It is possible that the international community may not deem the compensation 
commensurate with the gravity of the crimes. This would simply mean, however, that the 
“preferences” of the international community differ from those of the party in question (which is 
“revealed” by the very fact that this party has accepted the deal). In fact, this is one of the 
distinguishing features of the DTL model, which--once in place--puts weight only on the 
preferences of the party’s involved in a dispute, and not on those of third parties.  
In sum, the real issue is not whether peace is traded for justice. It is really about which 
preferences, those of the victims or those of the international community should prevail. Once 
this choice is made, the type of court design and level of punishment rendered will follow as a 
consequence. 
 
5.3. Justice and Peace 
 
 A criticism of the DTL regime comes from the idea of Akhavan (1995), who suggested 




process. In Akhavan’s view, the chance of war tomorrow depends on today’s level of 
accountability.242 In other words, the less you prosecute perpetrators today the more the chance 
of war tomorrow increases. According to this view, some of the benefits of the DTL regime are 
temporary. By reducing/eliminating prosecutions, the DTL regimes would probably lead to 
ending the war sooner, but only at the price of a higher chance of a resurgence of war. 
 In my view, when correctly understood, Akhavan’s observation is not really a criticism of 
DTL. Rather, it highlights an important relation between sanctions and chance of future 
hostilities,243 which must always be taken into account in order to correctly determine the 
combatants’ incentives and their bargaining possibilities. Due consideration of such a relation is 
necessary to determine the optimal regime as well as the optimal level of punishment. This view 
is perfectly in line with consequentialist concerns. 
 As a general matter, Akhavan’s concern applies to any regime, and probably has more to 
do with the level and the type of punishment than with the regime itself. For instance, one could 
imagine a scenario where the HR regime is in place but the sanctions imposed on the perpetrators 
are insufficient to deter future hostilities. Paradoxically, in an admittedly ideal scenario, the DTL 
might be the regime that is less vulnerable to Akhavan’s point. In fact, if we suppose that the 
parties in a conflict would correctly assess the relation between sanctions and probability of 
resurgence of hostilities, then the parties would incorporate this in their request/demands at the 
bargaining table. If an agreement is reached, the concessions from one party to another (which 
are the “punishments” in the DTL) would then account for Akhavan’s concerns in a way that all 





5.4. Fairness under the DTL 
 
 As we have seen, the punishment of a perpetrator in the DTL consists of the concessions 
it has to make to its victims. In the application of the DTL, one would like to ensure that the 
more culpable the perpetrator the more concessions it would be willing to make at the bargaining 
table. In order to guarantee that this is indeed the case, it is then necessary to ensure that the 
more culpable the party is “the lower” its’ bargaining power. Recall that in the DTL, the main 
role of the court is that of determining the parties’ bargaining range (by determining the parties’ 
threat points), we can then conclude that this feature will be obtained by guaranteeing that the 
sanctions imposed by the court would be harsher the more heinous and numerous the crimes.  
 
5.5 An Illustration of de facto DTL at work: Second Phase of war in the Former 
Yugoslavia 
 
Earlier it was argued that with the creation of the ICTY, the logic of appropriateness 
prevailed. An international court was established to redress violations of international criminal 
law during the war in the former Yugoslavia by prosecuting those most responsible for 
perpetrating these crimes. While it was perceived that this approach would satisfy the goals of 
justice, practically, it hindered prospects of achieving any form of peace. As D’Amato observed, 
given the modus operandi of the ICTY, a peace agreement would ensue only if secret talks/deals 
were made on the side. As such, the US delegation did just that; by abrogating from the HR 
system and adopting a de facto DTL, it was able to create incentives for warring combatants to 




Since the ICTY had indicted war criminals Karadzic and Mladic for war crimes, the US 
refused to bargain with them, bringing Milosevic to the forefront as primary negotiator. 
Milosevic insisted that the indicted men were necessary to make peace, and if excluded from the 
negotiations they would cause more havoc and continue to fight.244 When the preliminary peace 
talks began, Milosevic secretly arranged for the American delegation, led by Ambassador 
Holbrooke, to meet with Mladic and Karadzic. According to Bass, on September 14, in Pale, 
Karadzic and Mladic signed an American paper pledging to end the siege of Sarajevo, and 
“[u]nbeknowest to the public, the Americans held one more meeting with Karadzic,” in 
Belgrade.245 There, Milosevic told the American team that Karadzic would be part of the 
negotiations. The American team agreed as long as Karadzic did not lead the Serbian delegation.  
Aside from the secret talks to get the Bosnian Serbs to sign the cease-fire, the US had to 
make additional assurances to shield them from prosecution in order to entice them to sign the 
actual peace agreement. A month before the Dayton Peace talks (October 1995), the Pentagon 
and the “reluctant” State Department agreed that NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR),246 
which was to be deployed to implement the peace agreement, would not be responsible for 
arresting war criminals.247 At the actual Dayton talks the Americans employed Pentagon 
language: “IFOR would not arrest war criminals, but it would have the authority to do so”.248 In 
other words, if IFOR troops happened to come upon war criminals during their peacekeeping 
effort, then it would arrest the criminals, but it would not actively search for the men on the 
Hague’s list.249 In practice, IFOR embarked upon a policy of avoidance.250    
The war crimes issue was not allowed to even surface in the talks for fear that Milosevic 
would never accept it. Bosnian President Izetbegovic wanted and suggested that Bosnian Serbs 




following: 1) arresting and extraditing of war criminals, 2) imposing of automatic sanctions in 
case of noncompliance, and 3) vetting of war criminals from police, military, and office 
holders.251 US Secretary of Defense, William Perry dissuaded Izetbegovic from pursuing this 
course. As a consequence, Bosnians were specifically told not to mention war criminals. 
Moreover, Britain and France did not want sanctions over war criminals.252  Despite the fact that 
Bosnia had made significant military and territorial gains towards the end of the war during the 
October offensive and that it bore the brunt the war, none of the terms that it requested were 
granted. While the Dayton Accords did create a Bosnian state with internationally recognized 
borders, it was still divided in two parts: the Federation of Bosnia and the Republika Srpska; 
each with its own autonomy and army.253 The Dayton Accords also included provisions with 
special arrangements for refugees and displaced persons (a particularly acute problem for the 
Bosnians). The only provision that partially met the Bosnian terms was the stipulation that 
denied war criminals the right to hold public office or engage in public life. 
William and Scharf correctly observed about the Dayton Accords that “…the emphasis 
on a peace deal required the active undermining of the application of the norm of justice during 
the negotiations…”254 The American delegation recognized that the presence of an HR based 
system such as the ICTY thwarted any possibility of attaining peace, and hence adopted a DTL 
like system, whereby parties would not be prosecuted if a peaceful agreement was reached. Later 







“It is not our place to interfere. Have faith in their abilities to solve their problems on their own.” 
          The Traveller 




Optimal Court Design: A Comparative Analysis 
 
 In Chapter II, I formalized the war/bargaining game both in the static case and in the 
dynamic one. I also gave an example showing how a court can alter the strategic problem the 
combatants face. While admittedly rudimentary, the example successfully highlighted an 
important feature:  a court may alter the profitability of negotiating relative to going to war. This 
observation calls for further investigation into the role a court may play in a conflict situation as 
well as for an examination of the effectiveness of different court designs. This study is the 
subject matter of the present chapter. 
 In Chapter III, I reviewed the different legal views of state sovereignty, human rights and 
cosmopolitan rights, and domestic tort litigation. In Chapter IV, I showed how these different 
views translated into different court designs and analyzed the role the court played in the civil 
wars of the former Yugoslavia, Uganda, and Sierra Leone. All of these developments come 
together in the present chapter. By using the war/bargaining game of Chapter II, I show how the 
different court designs of Chapter III and IV give rise to different strategic situations, hence 
games, faced by combatants. This provides the basis for a comparative analysis of the 




structural conditions and combatants’ beliefs, one would formalize the game corresponding to a 
given court design and determine the equilibrium outcomes of the game. Then one would 
compare the outcomes achievable under the various “permissible” designs, and determine in this 
way, the best design relative to the desired objective (i.e. achieving peace). I illustrate this 
procedure in detail in Section 4 of this chapter by means of a numerical example. I would like to 
stress, however, that the example in Section 4 does, in fact, much more than showcase the 
procedure of comparing, for given structural conditions and combatants beliefs, the effectiveness 
of different court designs. The numerical specifications have been chosen in line with the 
findings in the literature on civil wars, and the example is evidently “robust” (that is, small 
perturbations in the structural conditions and in the combatants’ beliefs would produce 
“essentially the same” equilibrium). Thus, within the simplifications discussed in Chapter II, the 
example of Section 4 can be viewed as a description of a “typical” civil war. For this “typical” 
civil war, I explicitly compare the equilibrium outcomes under the regimes of Anarchy, Human 
Rights/Cosmopolitan Rights, and Domestic Tort Litigation (the analysis of State Sovereignty is 
implicitly contained in that of other regimes), and show that the Domestic Tort Litigation regime 
outperforms the other regimes in terms of its ability of leading the combatants to negotiate for 
peace. The example of Section 4 can be viewed as a result that lends formal support to the thesis 
put forward by D’Amato during the Yugoslavian war as discussed in Chapter IV (yet, as shown 
in Section 4.4 and further discussed in Section 4.5, D’Amato’s argument does require some 
substantial modification). 
This chapter unfolds as follows: I start off with a review of the formal model of civil wars 
in Section 1. Before I model the courts under different legal regimes, I briefly recap the features 




rights/cosmopolitan rights, and the domestic tort litigation in Section 2. I list the assumptions for 
modeling in Section 3. In Section 4, I show how to compare different regimes. As I said above, I 
do so by using a numerical example, because I believe that this results in a clearer and more 
immediate explanation, but the procedure is fully general. I then comment on the reasons why 
the domestic tort litigation outperforms other regimes and, once more, tie this explanation to the 
literature on bargaining failure in civil wars.  
 
1. Legal regimes and the war/bargaining problem 
 
As we have seen in Chapter II, the problems combatants face at a given point in time can be 
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                                                           A “big block” 
 
The full specification of the war/bargaining game, that is the one that factors in the temporal 















coming to an end either when negotiations are successful or when one defeats the other. What 
happens at a given time in a “big block” affects the next “big block”.  That is, the acts that take 
place in each “big block”, such as negotiation proposals, negotiation settlements, acts of war etc., 
involve transfers of resources, destruction of resources, information gathering and, hence, 
induces combatants to update their beliefs’. Thus, the underlying structural conditions as well as 
the players’ beliefs change as we transition from one block to the next. Moreover, as observed in 
Chapter II, this transition may not be deterministic as the transition to the new big block may 
also depend on factors that are not under the players’ control (players consider this occurrence a 
random event). In addition, there is asymmetric information both within each block and the 
transition to the future block. In principle, the complete analysis of the dynamic war/bargaining 
game would consist of two parts: (a) the determination of the outcomes of a “big block” as a 
function of the underlying structural conditions and players’ beliefs; and (b) to the determination 
of the evolution over time of the structural conditions and beliefs. As noted in Chapter II, the full 
analysis of this dynamic game of incomplete information poses formidable challenges even 
under very strong assumptions, and is, at any rate, beyond the scope of this thesis.  
As stated throughout the thesis, my goal is instead that of bringing to light an aspect that 
has been, surprisingly, neglected in the formal literature: the role of the legal regime in 
determining the problem faced by conflicting parties. The recognition of this role leads to an 
implication of utmost relevance: legal regimes can be designed so as to generate the right 
incentives for conflicting parties to negotiate rather than go to war. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will show how this can be done. I will focus on a point in time (a “big block”) and will 
show how, given certain structural conditions and beliefs, certain regimes might be able to 




2. Conflict and courts in civil wars 
 
In this section, I will briefly recap the main characteristic features of civil wars, legal 
regimes, and associated courts. I will also highlight the main assumptions under which my 
subsequent analysis will be performed. For a more extensive discussion on this topic, I refer the 
reader to Chapter II. 
 
2.1 The basic game 
 
 The actors involved in a civil war are the government, G, and one or more rebel groups. 
For simplicity, I assume that there  is only one of these groups and will denote it by R. G and R 
fight to seize control of the territory, resources, and assets of their country. The set of decisions 
available to G and R as well as the potential outcomes associated with these decisions are 
modeled as a game. It is convenient to think of such a game as being constituted by two 
interrelated parts, W and B, each a game in and of itself. The first part, W, is a war game. The 
players in the game, W, are G and R. The actions available to them correspond to the possible 
ways each player has of fighting the war. In general, one might have to consider a large number 
of actions. Practically, however, a course description of these options, “fighting conventionally” 
and “fighting unconventionally”, would do for the present purposes. The payoffs associated with 
the players’ choices are determined by the underlying structural conditions of the war. 
 The second part, B, is the bargaining game. The players are still G and R and the actions 
available to them consist of possible proposals that they can make about the division of the pie. 




is possible, and allowed in the model, that the two parties value the pie differently. The key 
observation is that the war game and the bargaining game are interrelated, that is the players’ 
decision in one game depends on the possible outcomes in the “other” game. In fact, an 
important ingredient of the bargaining game B is the specification of what happens if the players 
fail to agree, that is the specification of the players’ outside option. In actual situations, when G 
and R fail to agree at the negotiation table, one of the options available to them is to go to war. 
Formally, this corresponds to the players “exiting” the bargaining game and “entering” the war 
game. Thus, the players outside options in the bargaining game B correspond to the players’ 
expected outcomes in the war game W. 
Both games, W and B, are games with incomplete information. In game W, each player 
has private information about its own military capabilities and resolve, and can make only an 
imperfect assessment about the other player’s capabilities and resolve. It is possible that players 
entertain views that are at odds with each other. For instance, each player might believe that it is 
going to win the war. 
 In the bargaining game B, there are two sources of private information. The first stems 
from each party having private information about its own assets and resolve. This matters in the 
bargaining process as it determines the concessions that each party has the potential to make. The 
second source of private information comes from the war game W, as this game determines the 
players’ outside options in game B. Since W is itself a game with private information, it then 




produces the feature that the players’ evaluation of their outside options might be at odds with 
each other and, in fact, their sum might even exceed the size of the pie (see Section 4). 
 Following the literature in Game Theory, I will model the players’ private information by 
means of the notion of “type”. Also, for the sake of clarity in analysis and exposition, I make the 
drastic simplification that each player can be of only one of two types: weak or strong. I will use 
the notation Rw, which means that the rebels are of a weak type, while Rs indicated the strong 
types (the notations Gw and Gs have similar meaning). The reader should think of these types as 
military types, that is, as a summary description of the players’ military capability. Each player 
knows its own type, but in general, has only partial information about the other players’ type. 
Following the literature on Bayesian games, this partial information is described by means of a 
probability on the other players’ type (for instance, “R is weak and believes that G is weak with 
probability 0.4”).  
 
2.2 Courts under Different Legal Regimes 
 
 The key observation for modeling courts in civil wars is that the presence of a court 
alters, with respect to a situation of (international) anarchy, both the options available to warring 
parties as well as the potential outcomes that might obtain. Formally, the introduction of a court 
appears as a device that alters both games W and B. It does so, by modifying both the actions 
available and the players’ payoffs of those games. 
 In particular, by altering the players’ payoffs, a court may alter the relative profitability of 




the introduction of a court may induce warring parties to bargain for peace. Practically, the 
courts ability to induce negotiations is limited by factors of various natures: political, historical, 
geographical, military, etc. In the case of civil wars, since the international community is 
typically more powerful than the state where the war is taking place, the factors of geographical 
or military nature are usually of second order concern. Thus, it makes sense to focus on factors 
of a political/ideological/ historical nature. The constraints emerging from these factors are 
encoded, de jure or de facto, in international treaties/statutes and in international law, and 
eventually produce different court designs. This is a crucial factor, whose importance was 
revealed in the cases studied in Chapter IV: that is, the court’s ability to successfully induce 
negotiations depends significantly on its design. This observation makes a (formal) comparative 
study of alternative legal regimes and associated court designs all the more pressing. What 
makes this study possible is the following observation: starting with the games W and B under 
anarchy, the modifications produced by the court are different under different regimes. Thus, 
generally speaking different legal systems produce different incentives for parties to commit 
crimes, to bargain to avoid the involvement of the court, and to bargain for a durable peace.  
2.2.1 Courts under State Sovereignty (SS) 
Before modeling courts under different legal regimes, a brief recap of the main features 
of the different legal regimes is in order. In Chapter III, I looked at the principle of state 
sovereignty and saw how this concept became operational as a legal regime in Chapter IV. The 
main feature of a legal regime based on this principle is an asymmetry: under this regime, only 
the state has the right to call the court. Practically, this implies that the state will not call the 
court in the event that it violates the law and the rebels cannot call the court to hold the state 




prosecute would be highly dependent on the state’s collaboration. This translates into the feature 
that when G does violate the law, the court is unlikely to prosecute G as was seen in the case of 
Uganda and the ICC in Chapter IV. This is yet another asymmetry associated with the SS 
regime: the court is likely to sanction the same violations committed by both G and R on 
different scales by showing more leniencies toward G (even impunity i.e. Uganda) than for R. 
Some of the potential drawbacks of this legal regime are easily inferred: 1) it may exacerbate the 
problem of committing humanitarian and human rights violations (G has no incentive to cease 
committing atrocities when the court has agreed to refrain from prosecuting it); 2) it may 
dramatically reduce the value of bargaining (G has no incentive to bargain with R when it can 
either get rid of R militarily, and/or in the event it cannot fight or defeat R directly, it can call the 
court to prosecute R if R committed crimes). 
2.2.2 Courts under Human Rights/Cosmopolitan Rights (HR/CR) 
 In Chapter III, I studied the principles of human rights and cosmopolitan rights and saw 
how they became operational through the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Chapter IV. The main feature of a court based on the HR/CR principle is 
that the court can automatically intervene upon any infraction of the law. Neither party is needed 
to solicit the court. Moreover, once the court intervenes, all parties will be prosecuted if they 
have committed crimes. In this sense, there is symmetry between parties because both violations 
of R and G are sanctioned on the same scale. In other words, justice will be meted equally to 
both parties yet commensurate to the crimes committed. 
 In the cosmopolitan rights model, everybody, including civilians and individuals not 




approximation, for all practical purposes, this can be considered the same as the court 
automatically intervening upon violations of the law, and as such the two regimes, HR/CR, can 
be modeled as one. The potential drawbacks of this regime are not as evident as those of SS and, 
in fact, half of the formal analysis in this chapter is devoted to unveiling them. As we shall see, 
this regime is largely ineffective in addressing those issues that, according to the literature on 
bargaining for peace during civil war, prevent parties from successful negotiation.  Also, this 
regime might generate a rather perverse effect: as expected punishment (which might be very 
harsh and costly, i.e. Charles Taylor) might outweigh any potential gains from bargaining, “all-
out war” may result as the only optimal option. We saw an instance of this in Chapter IV when 
studying the war in the former Yugoslavia. The leaders needed for negotiations, were the very 
leaders slated to be sanctioned by the court. The United States understood that parties would 
have no incentive to bargain for peace with prosecutions pending. Thus, it advocated an 
abrogation of the law to entice warring parties to the negotiating table.  
2.2.3 Courts under the Domestic Tort Litigation (DTL) 
 A necessary condition for the DTL to be effective in the international setting is that G and 
R would be granted symmetric status with respect to an international court. In particular, G and 
R must have the same right to call the court, and if one party does call the court, all players 
including the one that called the court, will be punished if they have committed crimes. As we 
shall see, this regime has the potential of successfully addressing the drawbacks associated with 
other regimes. Firstly, and perhaps rather unexpectedly, we will see that this regime favors 
information transmission. That is, information transmission is less costly under this regime than 
under other regimes. Thus, this regime has the potential of reducing the “informational 




(possibly the most important), for bargaining failure. Secondly, this regime is capable of 
preserving all the potential gains from negotiation, thus keeping the value of bargaining 
relatively high. Finally, being inherently symmetric, this regime is not subject (unlike SS) to all 
those drawbacks stemming from the asymmetric treatment of the conflicting parties. 
 
2.3 Court’s design and the timing of its introduction 
 
 When analyzing the impact of different legal regimes, it is crucial to determine at what 
stage of the conflict a court is introduced. To see why this is important, let us consider a situation 
where a court is introduced only after international crimes have been committed. In such a 
scenario, the value of bargaining is higher for both parties under the DTL regime than it is under 
the HR/CR. This is so because under the DTL regime if players reach an agreement, then no 
court is called, and no sanction is imposed on the players for the crimes already committed. In 
contrast, under the HR/CR regime the players would be punished for the crimes committed 
independently of their willingness to bargain. It is possible, however, to envision scenarios where 
these conclusions about the relative performance of different regimes might be reversed; for 
instance, by considering a situation where a court is already in place before the onset of the war. 
 
3. Modeling Civil Wars: Characterizing Assumptions 
 
In this section, I am going to briefly review the set of empirical regularities identified by the 




the purposes of this section, it is important to highlight and illustrate how these findings translate 
into formal assumptions about the games W and B above. 
1) Rebels (R) are at a military disadvantage relative to government (G) forces and will, 
therefore, fight indirect, unconventional wars. Formally, this translates into the feature 
that (all other things being equal) R’s payoffs for engaging in direct battle are lower than 
R’s payoffs for resorting to indirect battle.255 
2) Though G is at a military advantage, it is unlikely to engage in direct battle with R. As 
such, it will be unable to garner information on R strength, capabilities, and resolve.256  
Formally, this corresponds to the feature that G has only partial information about R’s 
military capabilities. Moreover, G may obtain more information by engaging R in direct 
battle than by resorting to indirect methods of warfare. 
3) G is more likely to resort to unlawful methods of warfare to defeat R257 instead of 
negotiating with R. Formally, given its lack of information about R’s military 
capabilities, G’s expected payoff for fighting unconventionally is higher than both the 
payoffs achievable through conventional warfare and the payoff achievable from 
negotiating. 
4) Both parties are unaware of each other’s strength and resolve. They are likely to 
overestimate their own strength and underestimate that of their opponents.258 Formally, 
the sum of the parties’ outside options in the bargaining game exceeds (at least at the 
onset of the war; i.e., before additional information is gathered) the size of the pie. 




4. Relative Performance of different Regimes: A Comparative 
Analysis 
 
I am now going to study the relative performance of the various regimes in terms of their 
ability to induce parties to negotiate for peace. Two features of my approach should be stressed 
once more. The first feature is that I consider the problem at a given point in time and ask 
whether or not there is a regime that might induce parties to negotiate at that point. The choice 
of focusing on a given point in time is motivated by two sets of factors: 1) As discussed in 
Chapter II, the study of a dynamic game poses formidable challenges even at the level of a 
simple example, and hence, it cannot be tackled in this thesis. More importantly, I did not want 
to mix the study of different court designs with the complications arising from the dynamic 
game. 2) To the best of my knowledge, this is the first research project that formalizes the notion 
of legal regimes in the context of civil wars and studies their relative performance. As a 
consequence, I thought it best to showcase the issues pertaining to the formalization of legal 
regimes in their clearest and most basic form. 
Schematically, my analysis focuses on the study of a given “big block”, as identified by the 
conflict’s underlying structural conditions and the players’ beliefs. Each legal regime determines 
a different “big block” as some of the structural properties of the corresponding games (actors, 
payoffs) depend on the regime. I will study the equilibrium outcomes of the games 


















                              Figure 5.2 
                                                           A “big block” 
Its specifications depend on the regime in place. 
 
 The second feature is that I illustrate my approach and findings by means of a numerical 
example. I have chosen to do so for the following reasons. As stated in the previous section, the 
findings of the literature on violence and bargaining for peace during civil war take the form of 
qualitative restrictions on the players’ payoffs and beliefs in the games W and B appearing in the 
“big block”. A study of the games W and B for arbitrary payoffs and beliefs satisfying those 
restrictions would certainly be possible, but, in my opinion, would not be particularly 
enlightening. In fact, it is easy to convince oneself that the restrictions identified in the list are 
sufficiently strong that any numerical example satisfying those restrictions can be considered a 













the advantage of delivering sharper results which are, at the same time, representative of the 
general situation. 
 Stated more formally, it is easily seen that the example that I present, besides satisfying 
the constraints identified by the literature, is robust to both perturbations in the payoffs and 
beliefs. The latter observation is especially important in view of the extreme assumptions which I 
make, again for the sake of delivering a clear result, on the players’ beliefs. I should also point 
out that my example displays the additional assumption that “fighting unconventionally” is a 
dominant strategy under international anarchy. As already discussed in Chapter II, Section 2.1.2, 
while the assumption considerably simplifies the determination of the equilibrium, all of the 
conclusions obtained in this section would go through under the weaker assumption that fighting 
unconventionally is a dominant strategy only for R and that fighting unconventionally is a “best 
response” for G to R fighting unconventionally. In this form, the assumption is simply one of the 
regularities found in the literature and, thus, entails no loss in generality. 
 
4.1 A Basic War/Bargaining game in the context of Civil War 
 
 This is a 2-player game. The players are G (the government) and R (the rebels). In the 
bargaining game B, G and R bargain over a pie worth 100 in total. The actions available to each 
player in game B consist of the possible proposals of how to split the pie. If they fail to agree, 
then they will enter the war game W. W is a game with incomplete information. Each player is 
of one of two possible types: Weak or Strong. That is, G has two possible types, {GW, GS}, and 




(βu) or fight unconventionally (αc). I assume that international crimes are committed when 
fighting unconventionally. The players’ payoffs are determined according to the tables below, 
where R is the column player and G the row player: 
 








 αc βu 
αc 20,15 -10, 55 
βu 45, 0 30, 20 
 
  
 αc βu 
αc 0, 35 -40,75 
βu 20,20 5, 65 
 
    
GS 
 
 αc βu 
αc 60,0 10, 30 
βu 95, -20 80,15 
 
  
 αc βu 
αc 30,20 0,40 






As mentioned above, the payoffs specifications encode the simplifying yet unnecessary 
assumption that fighting unconventionally is a dominant strategy for both players independently 
of the other player’s type. To complete the description of the war game, one has to specify the 
players’ actual types as well as their beliefs about the other player’s type. I am going to assume 
that both players are strong, G= GS and R= RS. Moreover, I am going to assume that G thinks 
that R is weak with probability  ∈ 0,1 and strong with probability 1-y, while R thinks that G 
is weak with probability  ∈ 0,1	and that G is strong with the complementary probability 1-x. 
Practically one should think of both x and y, the probability that one player assigns to the other 
being weak, as being close to 1. The assumption that players are quite off the mark in assessing 
their opponent’s strength is motivated by the literature’s findings reported in Section 3 (Section 
3, item 4)). As said above, the equilibrium outcomes of the war game constitute the outside 
options of the bargaining game, which is a also a game of incomplete information. 
 
4.2 The basic game in a situation of anarchy 
 
To begin, let us suppose that there is no court in the picture. According to the assumptions, if 
the players decide to go to war, G believes that it is in one of the two games in the bottom row of 
the table: precisely, in the lower left game with probability y and in the lower right game with 
probability 1-y. Moreover, G knows that in such a case, R would choose βu (=fight 
unconventionally) since this is the dominant strategy for R. G would then best respond by 
choosing βu (in fact, this is a dominant strategy for G as well). Hence, the expected value for G 
from going to war is given by 





  Since the pie is worth 100, it follows that the highest concession that G is willing to make 
at the bargaining table is 
 100 - (20+60y) = 80 - 60y 
 
 Practically, for y close to 1, one should think of this number as being approximately 20. 
Similarly if the parties decide to go to war, R would know that it is in one of the two games in 
the right column of the table (since R knows that it is strong). In either one of those games, both 
R and G are going to play βu, which makes it easy to compute R’s value from going to war. This 
value is 
65x	 +	(1 − x)45	 = 	45	 + 	20x 
 
Hence, R is willing to bargain rather than go to war if it can get something greater than 45 + 20x 
(practically, one should think of this number as being close to 65 as we think of the probability x 
as being close to 1). 
We conclude that for negotiations to take place it must be the case that R’s minimal 
possible request has to be lower than G’s highest possible concession, a condition that now reads 
as 45 + 20x ≤ 80 – 60y or equivalently  y ≤  – 

x. The set of values of y and x for which the 
inequality is satisfied gives us those beliefs for which a bargaining range exists. These are 
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                               Bargaining Range 
 
From the diagram, we also see that when x and y are relatively high (for instance both close to 
1), which is in line with our assumptions, there is no bargaining range. We then conclude that 
when these beliefs fall in the range identified in the literature on bargaining for peace during civil 
war, then no bargaining is possible, and parties will choose to go to war in our game.  






4.3 Introducing a temporal aspect   
 
 I am now going to enrich the description by introducing a temporal aspect. This is 
important because it not only enhances how realistic the model is but also allows me to account 
for an important phenomenon: information transmission. I already noted in Chapter II, that the 
recognition that conflicts occur over time implies that any concession or any act of war that 
realizes leads the parties to update their beliefs about each other’s type. Needless to say, this 
process of updating information is of utmost importance since the presence of asymmetric 
information is one of the most prominent causes of bargaining failures pointed out in the 
literature. 
 From now on, I will endow R with a new action, which I label “strike,” and the timing of 
the game should be thought of as follows. Let to be the date under consideration, that is the date 
at which our analysis begins. At this date, the underlying structural conditions and the players’ 
beliefs are given and fully described by the war/bargaining game. At date to, we begin with a 
round of negotiations. If this is successful, we are done. If this is unsuccessful, R may decide to 
strike or not strike. After this decision, we move to the new date t1. At t1, we have two 
possibilities: either R did not strike at to, in which case the game at t1 is the same as to; or R did 
strike in which case both payoffs in the game at t1 and the players beliefs are different as a 










                         Figure 5.4 
                                                        Game Tree 
 
Again it is important to record that the games in the boxes on the left branch are different from 
the games in the box on the right branch because R’s strike produces both a change in the 
payoffs and a change in the beliefs. 
 To complete the description of the game, I have to specify how R’s strike changes the 
payoffs and the beliefs. With regard to the payoffs, I will keep things as simple as possible, and 
simply assume that R bears a cost of 10 if it strikes. For future reference, I do assume, however, 











description by assuming that R’s strike alters, for instance, the “size of the pie” by causing 
damage to G, but this would not change the substance of the analysis. More importantly, these 
embellishments might divert our attention away from what is more important: information 
transmission and how the players update their beliefs. I model this process as follows. Let S 
denote R’s action “strike” and ¬ the action “not strike”. I assume that G has a prior probability 
over the set of pairs  
{(Rw,S), (Rw, ¬), (Rs, S), (Rs,	¬)} 
Thus, 
(, ) =  
is the prior probability that G assigns to R being weak and deciding to strike. The probabilities 
P(Rw,	¬) = y2, P(Rs,S) = y3 and P(Rs,	¬) = 1 −  −  −  have a similar meaning. 
Accordingly, the prior probability that G assigns to R being weak is given by 
() = (, ) + (, ¬) =  +  
 
By setting y1+y2= y, we obtain the probabilities specified in 4.2, and that analysis applies. After R 
decides to strike or to not strike, G updates his beliefs on R being weak or strong on the basis of 
this information. G does so by using Bayes rule. Precisely, G’s posterior probabilities are given 
by 
 
(|) = 	  ! !" # ;   ($|) =
 #





(|¬) = 	  %& !& #; 	($|¬) = 	
& !& %& #
& !& #  
Notice, that by choosing y2 sufficiently close to 1, y1 sufficiently close to 0 (possibly 0) and y3 
positive but sufficiently close to 0, we have the features that: (a) at the beginning (prior 
probability), G is “almost certain” that R is weak, in accordance with Section 4.2; (b) if R strikes, 
G becomes “certain” or “almost certain” that R is strong; finally, (c) if R does not strike, G is 
“almost certain” that R is weak (that the war/bargaining game in t1 is essentially the same as the 
war/bargaining game in t0). In what follows, I assume that y1=0. Thus, if R strikes, G becomes 
certain that R is strong. In view of the previous discussion, this is “harmless” and simplifies the 
determination of the equilibria. 
4.3.1 Pre-emptive Strike 
The above description lends itself to a two-fold interpretation. One possibility is that our 
analysis is taking place at an arbitrary date t, which indicates that the war has been fought for 
several periods, or in other words, it is ongoing. In such a case, what I labeled “strike” should be 
interpreted as an ordinary act of war which, at that point in time, induces the revision of beliefs. 
Another interpretation is that our analysis is taking place before any act of war is committed. In 
such a case, what I labeled “strike” can be interpreted as a “pre-emptive strike”.  In the literature 
on bargaining and war, such a “strike” is usually interpreted a “costly signal,”259 and I will give 
the same interpretation below. At any rate, the formal analysis of the two situations is exactly the 
same.  




I assume that R incurs a cost of 10 for striking; everything else is unchanged. I also 
assume that war crimes are committed during the strike, but this will be significant only in the 
next section. The process of updating beliefs following R’s choice to strike or not strike was 
described above. In order to examine the outcomes of this game, the first step is to determine 
whether or not R will strike. 
A. If R does not strike, then G believes that R is weak with probability  %& !& #	and that it is 
strong with the complementary probability. For high values of y2 and x, the situation is 
exactly like that studied in section 4.2; there is no bargaining range, parties go to war, R 
gets 45 and G gets 20. Notice, however that the players expected payoffs are  
 

1 −  −  	80	 +	'1 −

1 − 	 − ( 	20 = 20	 + 60

1 −  −  
and 
65 + (1 − )	45 = 45	 + 20 
 
for G and R, respectively. For high values of   and x, the numbers are close to 80 and 
65, respectively. 
B. If R does strike, then G changes its mind about R; now G knows that R is strong and is 
willing to concede up to 80. Any concession lower than 80 makes G better off than going 
to war. The minimal request that R (after having stuck) would make at the bargaining 






45 + 20	 ≤ 65	 * 80 
 
and we conclude that there is a bargaining range. Graphically, the set of admissible 
beliefs after R strikes consist of the segment [0,1] on the horizontal line because G is 
certain that R is strong (the probability y that R is weak is 0) 
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Figure 5.5 
Admissible beliefs and bargaining range after R’s strike 
 
Any point in the segment represents beliefs for which bargaining is possible. In this situation, 
there are plenty of equilibria where the parties successfully bargain. To see this, notice that when 
R strikes, G is certainly willing to concede 55: G knows that R is strong; by going to war G 
would get at most 20 (hence, willing to concede up to 80). On its end, R is willing to agree to this 
concession. By striking first, and then rejecting G’s offer and going to war, R can only get  
 
−10 + 45 + 20 
which is always less than or equal to 55.  




Conditionally on R having struck, G is never willing to concede more than 55 because G 
knows that under no circumstance can R achieve more than this amount. The exact determination 
of all possible equilibrium concessions of G in the subgame determined by R’s strike depends on 
the value of x, the probability that R assigns to G being weak. In fact, R is not willing to accept 
any concession lower than 
45 + 20 − 10 
As x varies in [0,1], this value varies in the interval [35,55]. Knowing x, however, is not 
sufficient to determine the equilibrium concession, except in the case were x =1. If x =1, the 
minimum that R is willing to accept is 55, which is also the maximum that G is willing to 
concede (in any best–response play). In such a case, we conclude that the sequence of moves (R 
strikes, G offers 55, R accepts) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this sequence. In all other 
cases, that is for x < 1, knowledge of x is not sufficient to determine the equilibrium. In fact, we 
should add assumptions on how players update their beliefs about each other’s type following 
offers and counter-offers at the negotiation table. To see this, suppose for instance that x = 0, that 
is R thinks that G is strong. Thus, it would be profitable for R to accept any offer greater or equal 
to 35. Suppose, however, that R wants to play “hard ball” to induce G to make a higher 
concession. For instance, R might turn down an offer of 47 in order to convince G that it really 
thinks that G is weak, and therefore, it is not willing to accept anything below 55 (even if this is 
not true). In such a case, how would G react to R’s behavior? Would G give in and make a 
higher offer or would G try to play “hard ball” itself?  
While all of these scenarios are certainly interesting, they are only tangential to the main 




analysis, the main point is that for all x’s there is a Nash Equilibrium of the subgame determined 
by R’s strike, where the parties agree to bargain rather than go to war. Be that as it may, the 
highest achievable value for R (independently of x) in the subgame determined by its choice of 
striking is 55. We conclude that R will certainly decide not to strike if the following condition is 
satisfied 
45 + 20 ≥ 55 
that is 
 ≥ 12 
Since this is in line with the literature, we should focus on high values of x; we are going to 
assume that this condition is satisfied. We can summarize our findings by means of the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1: In the equilibrium of the game under anarchy, R elects not to strike. Both parties 
decide to go to war and crimes are committed. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I am going to assume that x=1. This is in line with the 
empirical findings and has the virtue of greatly simplifying the determination of equilibria (i.e. 
the determination of the equilibria in the subgame above). To consider high values of x rather 











4.4. Introducing a court 
 
We are now going to study how the introduction of the court changes the results we have 
obtained thus far. The introduction of the court might allow players an additional action (“call 
the court”) and potentially (depending on the legal regime and the players’ actions) reduces the 
payoff that a player might achieve by using the action βu (fight unconventionally) as well as the 
payoff that R can achieve by striking (as international crimes are committed by R when 
striking.).  I am going to specify the costs that the court imposes on the players for committing 
international crimes as follows. The court imposes a penalty (=cost) of 40 on R for striking. It 
imposes an additional penalty of 10 on each party for using action βu if this follows a strike from 
R. It imposes a penalty of 20 on each party for using action βu if no strike from R takes place.260 
I stress that these are only potential costs. They become actual costs only when the court is 
allowed to intervene, which is going to depend on the legal regime in place. In order to complete 
the description of the game, I must specify which players have the options of calling the court, 















Costs imposed by a court for committing international crimes 
 
 
4.4.1 The Domestic Tort Litigation Model (DTL): Equilibrium Analysis 
 
 In the domestic tort litigation model (DTL), the court can only intervene if one of the 
parties requests its intervention. Both players have the option of calling the court if international 
crimes have been committed. If one party calls the court, all players, including the one that called 
the court, will be punished if they have committed crimes. The main finding of this subsection is 
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Proposition 2: Under the DTL, there exists a Nash Equilibrium of the war/bargaining game with 
the following features. R strikes and commits international crimes; G and R successfully 
negotiate; no party calls the court. 
 
In order to prove proposition 2, we have to consider several scenarios. The first step 
consists in determining whether or not 1) R strikes or 2) R does not strike. Next, if R strikes, we 
have to determine if (1a) G calls the court or (1b) G does not call the court. For each case, we 
will then have to determine whether or not one or both players decide to go to war. Finally, if in 
case (1b) players decide to settle, we will have to determine whether or not G would renege on 
the agreement, and call the court to intervene. 
To begin, let us suppose that R does not strike. Then, as seen in Section 4.3, G updates its 
beliefs and thinks that R is weak with probability ỹ =  %& !	& #  (recall, however, that we assume 
that  = 0, that is R strikes G becomes certain that R is strong, thus R is weak with probability 
ỹ = 
 %
& #). The analysis of the previous section applies, and G is willing to concede up to 80-60ỹ. 
Practically, we should be thinking of ỹ as being close to 1 and, consequently, the maximum G is 
willing to concede as being close to 20. For what concerns R, recall that we have been supposing 
that x=1, that is R is sure that G is weak. Thus, the value for R of going to war is 65, if G does 
not call the court, while it is 45 if G does call the court (65 (expected value from war) – 20 
(penalty imposed by the court)).   
 We conclude that the worst case scenario for R is that it would get 45 from war. It 
follows then that R would ask for at least 45 at the bargaining table, while G would want to give 
up at most 80-60ỹ. The no bargaining condition is then 
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Figure 5.7 




Since we have been thinking of ỹ as being close to 1, we then conclude that no bargaining is 
possible and that both parties will go to war. In this scenario (i) nobody calls the court; (ii) R’s 
expected payoff is 65, while it realized payoff is 45; (iii) G’s expected payoff is 80	ỹ + 20(1-	ỹ), 
(which, under our assumption is nearly 80), while its realized payoff is 20. 
 Next let us consider the scenario where R strikes. We want to find out whether or not G 
will choose to sit at the bargaining table. We are going to do so by comparing three payoffs for 
G: (i) the payoff that G achieves by not negotiating, not calling the court, and by going to war; 
(ii) the payoff that G achieves by not negotiating and calling the court; (iii) the payoff that G 
achieves by negotiating and not calling the court.  Regarding the first payoff, we know that after 
R strikes, G updates its beliefs and becomes certain that R’s strong. Thus, G’s expected value 





Next, suppose that G refuses to negotiate and instead calls the court. What is R going to 
do? If R does not do anything, R gets -50 (– 40 (penalty from the court) -10 (cost of strike)). If R 
goes to war, R expected payoff is 15 (65 expected gain from going war; x=1) -10 (cost of strike) 
– 40 (penalty from court)). So, obviously R would choose to go to war. In such a case, G will 
have to go to war, and G will get a payoff of 10 (20 (gain from war) -10 (penalty from court)). In 
sum, conditional on R having struck, the value for G of not negotiating and calling the court is 
10.  
Finally, let us examine G’s decision of not calling the court and sitting at the bargaining 
table. The following observation is crucial: since, by striking, R has committed punishable 
crimes, G can credibly threaten to call the court. In this way, G can effectively lower R’s 
demands at the bargaining table. Formally, this means that the value for R of leaving the 
negotiations (rejecting G’s offer) is given by the payoffs achievable in the war game minus the 
penalty imposed by the court. Just like before, this value is 15 = 65-10-40. Thus, any offer 
greater than 15 that G makes to R would be acceptable. R, on its end, can threaten to go to war, 
and by doing so would lower G’s payoff down to 20 (again, this payoff could go down to 10 if R 
calls the court, but this threat is not credible). Hence, any offer higher than 20 that R makes to G 
would be deemed acceptable. In sum, if G decides not to call the court and bargain, then there 
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Beliefs and bargaining possibilities after R strikes 
 
  
By negotiating and committing to not call the court, G can guarantee itself a payoff of at least 20, 
that is at least as high as the highest payoff produced by the two strategies we previously 
examined. In fact, G can achieve strictly more than 20. For instance, let us consider the division 
of the pie (proposed after R strikes), 25 for G and 75 for R. The total payoffs are as follows: R 
gets 65 (-10 (strike) + 75 (negotiations)) which is equal to 65, the maximum expected value of 
not striking pre-emptively and going to war, thus, R weakly prefers striking and making the deal 
of (75 for R, 25 for G) to not striking and going to war. G gets 25 which is more than 20, the 
value of not negotiating. The split is in fact an equilibrium outcome of the game. The strategy 
profile reported in the table below constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the game which generates 
exactly this split. 
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 Rebels: Strategy A Government: Strategy B 
1 Strike  
2  Offer 75 to R 
3 Accepts any offer ≥75; rejects any 
offer <75 and goes to war 
 
4  Does not call the court if R accepts; goes to war if 
R rejects 
5 Does not call the court if G does not 




If R follows strategy A and G follows strategy B, then R gets 65 and G gets 25. 
 
Claim: The pair of strategies (A,B) is a NE. In order to prove this claim, we have to show that 
given that G plays B, R cannot improve its payoff by playing a strategy different from A. 
 
R could switch to 1) “not striking” or 2) “calling the court” or 3) “using a different 
bargaining strategy” or 4) all three. We have already noticed that the maximum expected payoff 
that R can achieve by “not striking” is 65 (whether R calls the court or not). Thus, R weakly 
prefers Strategy A to any strategy involving “not striking”. Next, given that R strikes, by calling 
the court R would only lower its payoff. With respect to a different bargaining strategy, 
following an offer, R can adopt a threshold strategy or a non-threshold strategy. A threshold 
strategy is identified by a single number: any offer above this number is accepted and any offer 
below this number is rejected. Thus, the set of all possible offers is divided into two regions with 
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                                                                                  Figure 5.9 
                                                                Example of a threshold strategy 
 
In a non-threshold strategy, this is not true. We can find both a point in the rejection region that 
is higher than a point in the accept region and a point in the acceptance region that is higher than 
a point in the rejection region. 
 
Accept     Reject          Accept          Reject         Accept 
  
                                                                Figure 5.10 
                                                                Example of a non-threshold strategy 
 
We begin by observing that clearly a non-threshold strategy is always weakly dominated 
by a threshold strategy. From this it follows that if we find a non-threshold strategy that does 
better than Strategy A, then there exists a threshold strategy that does better than Strategy A. 
Next, let us consider a threshold strategy with a threshold lower than 75. If R deviates from the 
proposed strategy by switching to such a strategy, then R would still accept the offer of 75 that G 




that this type of deviation is not profitable. Let us consider, now, a threshold strategy that is 
higher than 75. If R deviates by switching to such a strategy, then R would reject the offer of 75 
that G offers it. In such a case, G will go to war and so will R, and R will get 15 (65 (expected 
gain from war, x=1) – 10 (cost of strike) – 10 (penalty from court)), if the court is called, and 55 
(65(expected gain from war, x=1) – 10 (cost of strike)), if the court is not called. Thus R will get 
55 at best instead of 65 that it gets in the proposed profile. We conclude that this type of 
deviation is not profitable for either party and that Strategy A for R is a best response to G’s 
Strategy B.   
Next, let us examine G’s situation. Clearly it is not profitable for G to offer R more than 
75. If G offers less than 75, then R goes to war, and we have already seen that in such a case G 
would get at most 20 (whether a court is called or not). Thus, this deviation is not profitable. 
Next G could call the court after R accepts. But, in such a case R would go to war. As we know, 
G would make at most 20 (in fact 10, since G itself has called the court). Again this deviation is 
not profitable. We conclude that the proposed profile is a Nash Equilibrium. We stress that in 
this equilibrium, international crimes are committed during the strike, negotiations take place, 



























































4.4.2 The Human Rights Model (HR) 
 
 In the HR model the court automatically intervenes when international crimes are 
committed. It does not need the authorization from any of the players involved in the war, and 
the players know that they will face prosecution even if they decide to negotiate for peace. The 
main finding of this subsection is contained in the following proposition. 
 
 Proposition 3: Under the HR, there exists no Nash Equilibrium of the war/bargaining game 
where the parties successfully negotiate. 
 
In other words, the situation is dramatically different under HR: bargaining will never take place; 
parties always elect to go to war and crimes are always committed (and of course, the court will 
intervene). 
 In order to prove Proposition 3, just like before, we begin by determining whether or not 
R strikes in the equilibrium of the game. If R does not strike, the situation is the same as in the 
DTL model with the only difference that now the court will definitely impose a penalty of -20 on 
both for going to war. R’s expected value for going to war is 45 = 65 (from war; x=1) – 20 (court 
penalty), (while it’s realized value would be, in fact, 25). G’s expected value from going to war 
is 80ỹ + (1-	ỹ) 20 – 20=60	ỹ. The no bargaining condition is  
 






12 * 	ỹ 
 
Again, for ỹ	sufficiently close to 1, no bargaining will take place, and both will elect to go to 
war.  
If R strikes, there are two possibilities: G may or may not go to war. If G goes to war, 
then R’s expected value (x=1) is 15 (-10 (cost of strike) + 65 (from war) – 40 (court penalty)) 
and G gets 10 (20 (from war) – 10 (court penalty)). If instead G decides to negotiate, then the 
highest concession that G is willing to make at the bargaining table would be 90 (since by going 
to war G would get 10). Hence, if R strikes, then it can get at most 90 from bargaining. Thus, in 
the best case scenario, R will end up with a payoff of 40 (-10 (strike) + 90 (negotiation) - 40 
(court penalty)). We see, then, that for R the value of not striking and going to war (which is 45, 
as seen above) is higher than the value of striking (which is at most 40). In sum, under the HR 
model, in any Nash Equilibrium of the game R does not strike, no information is transmitted, 
there is no bargaining range (no room for negotiation), both parties go to war and international 
crimes are committed by both parties. 
 
4.5 Information transmission under alternative regimes: Reshaping D’Amato’s 
thesis 
  
 We have seen that the equilibrium outcomes of the war/bargaining game may be 
dramatically different under different regimes: under our assumptions, peace obtains under the 
DTL but may not be achieved under HR. Anthony D’Amato (Chapter IV, Section 5) foresaw this 




system erases the potential gains from bargaining. While D’Amato’s insight is remarkable, his 
explanation is incomplete. As we shall see, it somehow confuses an effect (the lack of bargaining 
possibilities) with its cause.  
 The key for understanding why and how the DTL may outperform the HR system is 
information transmission. To see this, we need to go back to the basics and precisely to the 
findings of the literature on bargaining for peace during civil wars. According to that literature, 
one of the main causes of bargaining failure in civil wars is the asymmetry in the parties’ 
information and the consequent incorrect assessment of the terms achievable from war. The DTL 
system operates successfully in mitigating this problem and this is precisely what leads the 
parties to bargain successfully. The details of how this mechanism works become clear when we 
re-trace the steps of our formal analysis. 
 Under both regimes, the parties start out with the same incorrect beliefs about each 
other’s strength and resolve. As a consequence, they incorrectly evaluate the potential gains from 
war, which results in a lack of a bargaining range. Following this situation, what happens under 
the DTL is that one party (R) strikes. Whatever the intent of this party, the “strike” is de facto a 
(costly) signal that this party sends to the other. The other party, then uses this signal to revise its 
beliefs about the opponent’s strength and resolve, and by doing so can better assess the potential 
gains or losses from war. In turn, this results into a willingness of making concessions at the 
bargaining table, which leads to the emergence of a bargaining range. In sum, peace is 
achievable under the DTL because information is transmitted, beliefs are revised and, as a 





Under the HR system, when a party strikes it will be punished by the court. Effectively 
the punishment works as an additional cost imposed on the act of sending a signal. As in the 
analysis above, it may be the case that the punishment makes the signal so costly that it is not 
worth sending. Even if the signal were to generate the most favorable bargaining possibilities for 
the party sending it, those potential gains are outweighed by the cost imposed by the court. Thus, 
signals are not sent, beliefs are not revised in the right direction, the incorrect assessments of 
parties’ strength stand, and, consequently, the existence of bargaining possibilities is not 
perceived. 
 
4.6 Revisiting and Reinterpreting the Yugoslavian War:  The Blake-Amarante 
Effect  
 
 In Chapter IV section 2.2.1, I claimed that D’Amato’s predictions did come to pass; that 
is, for any peace negotiation to ensue, UN officials (in this case the US) had to abrogate from the 
HR system because it failed to create incentives for parties to negotiate for peace with 
prosecutions pending. In the previous section (4.5), I argued that while D’Amato’s insight is 
indeed remarkable, he somehow confuses the effect (the lack of bargaining possibilities) with its 
cause (HR system’s ability to preclude information transmission). In this section, I will complete 
D’Amato’s explanation and argue that a de facto DTL was in operation during the second phase 
of the war in Yugoslavia, when the US (who acted as an enforcer) intervened to form an alliance 
between the Croats and the Bosnians in 1994. We see that the formation of the alliance and the 
strike where the Croats and Muslims retook Krajina and twenty percent of Bosnia261 can be 
thought of as an illustration of the Blake-Amarante effect: with the US in the picture acting as a 




Serbs, the Serbs were forced to change their beliefs and recognized that they were in a militarily 
weak position, and hence they were willing to negotiate for peace. 
 In 1994, the US actively intervened and used force to open up a bargaining space during 
the war in the former Yugoslavia. It did so by 1) convincing the Croats to agree to allow the 
Bosnians to be fully armed; 2) drawing up a peace agreement between the Croats and Bosnians; 
and 3) creating the Croat- Muslim Federation.262 The US not only created the Federation but also 
provided it with equipment and Bosnian and Croat troops were trained by “an American military 
consulting firm comprised primarily of retired American military officers”.263 
 As illustrated in Chapter IV, all attempts at peace settlement during the first phase of war 
(prior to the Croat-Muslim Federation) failed miserably due to Serb military strength, 
recalcitrance and noncooperation, and impending prosecutions from the ICTY (See Chapter IV 
case study of Yugoslavia). At the second phase of the war, the alliance proved to be a catalyst for 
peace for two reasons. First, it led to the end of hostilities between the Croats and Bosnians. 
Second, it created a stronger military opponent against the Serbs. It is important to note that 
while the alliance was created to oppose the Serbs, it was not created to decisively overcome 
them, but instead was created to get them to the bargaining table. Lord Owen writes that 
President Tudjman of Croatia acknowledged that the alliance was not directed against the Serbs, 
but was for peace.264  
 The Croation-Muslim alliance launched “Operation-Storm” on 4 August 1995. According 
to William and Scharf: “The combined Croatian/Bosnian military action met with significant 
success in that it cleared Serbian forces from the Krajina region and threatened the remaining 
Serbian forces in Eastern Slavonia…The advance also cleared Serbian forces from much of 




Croatian and Bosnians may well have been able to defeat the Serbian forces and thereby reunify 
Bosnia…the US forced the Croatians and Bosnians to bring their offensive to a halt on 12 
October 1995”.265 After the Croat-Muslim counter offensive and NATO air bombing, the Serbs 
agreed to a number of conditions that they had failed to agree to during the first phase of war. 
The conditions entailed: “removing heavy weapons from the ‘weapons exclusion zone’ around 
Sarajevo, refraining from attacking UN-declared safe areas, and granting full freedom of 
movement to UN personnel, including free use of Sarjevo’s airport”.266 More importantly, the 
Serbs were ready to negotiate for peace. 
 It is interesting to note that atrocities were committed against Croat-Serbs during the 
offensive. Human Rights Watch reports that 116 civilians were killed during the offensive and 
200,000 were displaced.267 According to an article, “No Verdicts in Croatia Over Operation 
Storm,” issued by Balkan Transitional Justice 28 November 2012, “Croatian NGOs have noted 
several times that no one has yet been convicted in Croatia for war crimes connected to 
Operation Storm. It is widely accepted that there was a policy of impunity concerning war crimes 
committed during Operation Storm”.268 This suggests that the United States may have convinced 
the Croats and Bosnians to unite under the condition that they would not be prosecuted for 
crimes committed during the offensive, in order to open up a bargaining space. Again, we see the 
DTL at work here, with the US as the enforcer: the US backed strike allowed a signal to be sent 
that would have been too costly to send under the HR, a bargaining space did indeed open up 
after Operation Storm, (Dayton negotiations commenced in November 1995), and after almost 
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Conclusions and Future Research 
 
On March 14, 2012, the International Criminal Court rendered a guilty verdict to Thomas 
Lubanga, an African warlord from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for crimes against 
humanity during the civil war in the DRC. On April 26, 2012, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
prosecuted the former head of state of Liberia, Charles Taylor, for war crimes perpetrated during 
civil war in Sierra Leone. International criminal tribunals have become a new force to be dealt 
with; warlords and, in particular, heads of state are no longer spared or protected by international 
law for violating international humanitarian law and human rights law.  
Shortly after Lubanga’s sentence, Ian Paisley, a member of the British Parliament from 
Northern Ireland and former peace negotiator during the Northern Ireland peace process, wrote a 
telling article in the New York Times.269 While lauding the achievements of international justice 
by the ICC, he also criticized it for its inability to be an instrument for delivering peace as it was 
originally designed to do. In fact, despite the indictment, apprehension, and prosecution of 
Lubanga, the DRC is still in the midst of civil war. Paisley observed that had the ICC existed 
during the Northern Ireland peace process or when the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission began its work, not only the ICC would have been called to intervene and prosecute 
those accused of violence but also would have driven old enemies further apart and stifled any 
possibility of achieving peace. This observation speaks to the general problem of my research: 
Can peace and justice be attained simultaneously; and more specifically, how can we design 
international criminal tribunals to create incentives for warring combatants to negotiate for peace 




I tackled this problem by starting from the basic question: Why do negotiations fail during 
civil wars? The literature on peace and security studies has identified several causes for this 
failure: asymmetric information, problem of credible commitment, and issue indivisibility. From 
this, I could then re-formulate my question by asking how to design a court that could 
mitigate/remove the causes of bargaining failure. 
In my thesis, I started off by formalizing the situation of conflict: this consists of two 
interdependent games, a War Game and a Bargaining Game, whose specifications incorporate 
the distinguishing features of civil wars: the nature of the actors involved, the way they fight, the 
type of government, the strength of the rebel group, the international constraints, etc. A novelty 
of my approach consists of the observation that the full specification of these games (i.e., action 
available, payoffs, etc.) depends on the legal regime in place. By studying how the 
War/Bargaining game varies with the legal regime in place, I could then compare the different 
regimes with respect to their ability of achieving the goals of peace and/or justice. I applied these 
ideas to compare the relative performance of international criminal tribunals designed according 
to the principles of state sovereignty, human/cosmopolitan rights, and domestic tort litigation. I 
obtained a novel result: a careful choice of the legal regime might substantially reduce the 
problems associated with the presence of asymmetric information in civil wars. 
To my knowledge, the first to notice, in a specific case, that the choice of the legal regime 
might provide combatants with the right incentives to bargain for peace was international lawyer 
Anthony D’Amato (1994) during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia.270 When it was decided 
that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) would be created and 
would issue indictments for complicit leaders in tandem with peace talks, D’Amato (1994) 




the existing problems. D’ Amato recognized that the design of the ICTY, based as it was on the 
principles of human rights (HR), would have created an incentive problem as it did not provide 
incentives (even with the threat of punishment) for warring parties to cease hostilities. 
Practically, once leaders had been indicted, it was more profitable for those leaders to take their 
chances and keep fighting rather than agreeing to cease hostilities and subject themselves to 
punishment. Thus, D’Amato proposed to adopt a model based on principles of the domestic tort 
litigation (DTL), which is based on the notion that “exact justice” can be attained among 
individuals in conflicting situations without necessarily involving a court. Practically, if 
conflicting parties settle, courts would not intervene. Culpable parties would not be prosecuted 
once they settle. My thesis provides formal support to D’Amato’s idea, even though D’Amato’s 
argument has to be modified. The HR system fails not only because it erases potential gains from 
bargaining as D’Amato claimed, but mainly because it makes information transmission too 
costly.  In contrast, the DTL system allows parties to transmit information to each other in a way 
that is not too costly. In turn, this allows parties to correct their beliefs and unveil bargaining 
possibilities that had been undetected before the signaling took place. 
My thesis can be viewed as providing a formal setting where the performance of alternative 
legal regimes – such as the State Sovereignty (SS) model, the Human Rights (HR) model, the 
Cosmopolitan Rights (CR) model and the DTL model -- could be evaluated on the basis of their 
ability to alter combatants’ incentives from fighting to bargaining for peace. It does so by 
unveiling the formal link between the factors leading to bargaining failure and the 
legal/institutional regime in place. In this thesis, I have focused on a model that is both static and 
basic. I have done so in order to isolate the main novelties of my approach. Nonetheless, the 




substantial extensions; each of these extensions constitutes an avenue for future research. In what 
follows, I will list the ones that I intend to pursue in the near future.  
 
1. Multiple Players and the Public Interest Variant 
 
In this thesis, I have focused on cases where there are only two warring parties. One possible 
extension of the model consists in considering three or more parties. This extension not only 
increases the realism of the model, for in actuality there may be more than one rebel group, but 
also poses new questions and allows for new possibilities. This is especially true when the 
civilian population is introduced as a (third) player in the War/Bargaining game utilized in this 
thesis.271 
We have seen that the DTL model may create incentives for parties not only to bargain for 
peace but also to create self-enforcing peace agreements. The main issue that appears when 
considering three or more players is that two parties may settle at the expense of a third one (for 
instance, the civilian population). In this case, one would have to answer the question: what 
happens if some but not all parties settle with one another? Here, the possibility of designing 
entirely novel regimes, such as an intermediate regime between the models of DTL and of HR, 
appears.  
To see this, let us suppose that there are three players, A, B, and C; each player commits 
international crimes, and players A and B settle among themselves and agree not to call the 




extension of the DTL model, one has to consider what would happen in this situation. Among the 
conceivable designs, we could have: 
1. A design leaning toward the HR model, where player C calls the court and the court 
punishes everybody (This is not entirely an HR model because if C does not call the 
court, the court cannot intervene). 
2. A design leaning toward the DTL model, where the court cannot punish A and B for the 
crimes that they have committed against each other (since they settled) but only for 
crimes that they committed against C (and C for crimes committed against A and B). 
3. Intermediate between points 1 and 2: the court would still punish A and B for all the 
crimes (including the ones against each other) but apply a “discount,” or in other words 
show clemency toward A and B since they have settled inter se. Clemency may be 
granted to A and B by way of imposing a pecuniary sanction against them. An interesting 
issue would be how to use these proceedings. Among the various possibilities: 
a. Compensate victims 
b. Contribute to an “international victim’s fund,” where the proceedings could be used 
to benefit others not necessarily involved in the conflict at hand (for instance, victims 
of different conflicts).  
A case of special interest obtains when one of the players is the civilian population. The role 
of this player as well as its rights and potential outcomes depend heavily on the legal regime in 
place. In many regimes, the delicate problem of representation may emerge. For instance, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court could represent the civilian population but the international public interest and the civilian 




There, segments of the civilian population voiced a desire for the end of violence at the expense 
of justice, but international law dictated that the crimes inflicted on civilians be redressed. Adam 
Branch captures these sentiments well when he wrote of the ICC intervention in Ugandan civil 
war and said, “With nearly the entire rural population of Acholiland displaced into internment 
camps, many of them starving to death, the question of what justice means is secondary to, and 
in fact irrelevant in the face of, the overwhelming need for the war to end and for the Acholi to 
go home. To talk about justice as being realized through the capture of five men and to spend 
millions of dollars and a massive international effort on capturing them in the midst of a 
humanitarian disaster of this scale, especially when there is no guarantee that they will be 
captured or that their capture will bring peace, is myopic and morally indefensible.”272 In such a 
case, does the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC or the UNSC duty to prosecute such crimes override 
the rights/desires of the civilians? Following these observations, one should probably distinguish 
the case where the interests of the Chief Prosecutor or UNSC are aligned with the civilian 
population from those where the interests are at odds. Most likely, the outcomes would be very 
different. 
 
2. Time and Dynamics: Dynamic Jurisdiction 
 
Given any specification of the structural conditions of the war, my thesis provides a setting 
which, in principle, allows one to determine the optimal design of the criminal tribunal. By 
optimal design of international criminal tribunals, I mean that the design will create incentives 
for combatants to bargain for peace and/or stop ongoing violence or prevent violence. Recent 




because the asymmetry in the information is different at different stages of the conflict. For 
instance, the players’ relative strength may be more difficult to assess at the onset of war than 
toward the end of war. This suggests that the optimal design of the court depends on the stage of 
the war. In general, the relation between the stage of the war and the court’s optimal design is 
ambiguous as it is possible to conceive of situations where, while the asymmetry in the 
information is reduced, it is not possible to create incentives for parties to bargain for peace. An 
example of this sort is given by Morelli, Estaban, and Rohner who find that the length of a 
conflict increases polarization and as such smaller groups are more likely to lose and are more 
susceptible to being eliminated by groups with more consolidated power i.e. government.273 In 
situations like this, the conditions for the rebels to achieve legal status are usually not met (see 
Chapter III, Section 3.4) and the HR regime may be the only solution for creating incentives for 
the government to negotiate with the rebels and prevent mass killing.  
While the extension of my model to a dynamic setting poses formidable theoretical problems 
(mainly in the dimension of determining equilibrium outcomes), this extension is likely to 
deliver new and important insights. The conceptual part of this extension is not difficult, and, in 
fact, I sketched the full dynamic model in Chapter II. When doing so, I introduced the idea of 
dynamic jurisdiction, which certainly deserves a thorough inquiry. In a nutshell, the idea of 
dynamic jurisdiction hinges upon the recognition that time might be necessary for the desired 
changes to take place, and tries to incorporate this observation in the determination of the 
optimal regime. Notice that this might imply that the optimal regime may vary with the stage 
and/or the parameters of the war/bargaining game as it is illustrated by the example below. Some 
caution is needed, nonetheless. At each stage, the war/bargaining game contains characteristics 




dependence of the optimal regime on the stage of the game must be expressed either in terms of 
the game’s estimates available to the international community or in terms of characteristics that 
are observable. In practice, this might be simpler than what it sounds.  
More specifically, we can consider the war/bargaining game at a given point in time and 
envision two alternative regimes: the HR and a hybrid DTL/HR. The latter regime works as 
follows: it is similar to the usual DTL but stipulates that if the amount of crimes committed from 
to onward reaches a certain level (measured in some way), then a court will automatically 
intervene. When the war/bargaining game fits the specifications of Chapter V, our previous 
analysis allows us to conclude that the HR regime would lead to war. In contrast, by analogy 
with our analysis in Chapter V, we can imagine that the game under the hybrid DTL/HR model 
would allow players to engage in subsequent periods in strikes/counterstrikes, or skirmishes, that 
could potentially continue until the threshold set by the regime is reached.  We can think of these 
skirmishes as costly signals. It is conceivable that after a certain time these skirmishes will 
convey a sufficient amount of information, and on the basis of this information, parties will settle 
before the threshold is reached. Notice that in this example the jurisdiction is a function of the 
stage game through the observable “level of crimes committed”. In fact, we should be thinking 
of the proposed hybrid DTL/HR regime not as a single regime but rather as a family of DTL/HR 
regimes parametrized by the threshold “level of crimes” (that is, each level of crimes determines 
exactly one such a regime by stipulating that the HR system applies if that level is reached and 
the regime is otherwise DTL; conversely, each hybrid DTL/HR is uniquely associated to exactly 
one threshold). When thought of in this way, the threshold (hence, the regime) becomes an object 
of choice by the international community, which would then be optimally determined. A system 









Throughout the thesis, I have assumed that international courts can impose significant costs 
on combatants and that the court’s threats of doing so are always credible.274 While international 
courts have made significant strides in certain cases,275 historical experience shows that these 
assumptions cannot always be maintained. The problem of credibility of threats is certainly a 
difficult one276, and my thesis does not solve it. I believe, however, that my project can 
contribute to this area in at least two respects. My thesis has produced statements of the sort 
“threats are effective in leading to peace in a certain regime, say DTL, and not effective in 
another regime, say HR”. In this way, one contributes also to the credibility problem by 
narrowing down the class of threats that one has to consider in each regime. Once a regime is 
fixed, and one knows that a certain threat will not be effective; there is no reason of inquiring 
into its credibility.   
The idea expressed in this thesis may contribute to the credibility problem in another 
dimension as well. In fact, just like different institutional/legal regimes may have a different 
impact on the problem of asymmetric information, the same may be true for the credibility 
problem. For a simple example, one could envision a situation where, in a regime of state 
sovereignty, a certain threat to punish the government requires the collaboration of the 




determination of which threats are credible may depend on the legal regime in place, and the 
study could, in principle, be pursued in the same spirit as the one presented in this thesis. More 
generally, toward this determination, one should consider not only the legal regime but also the 
type of government in place and their objectives (i.e. may want to join political and economic 
institutions like the European Union), the strategic position of the state in question (i.e. whether 
the state poses a threat to international peace and security), and the type and number of rebel 
group(s) in the war.277 
 
4. Miscellaneous Extensions 
 
There are a number of extensions that I intend to pursue that require further investigation 
into what I label “the underlying structural conditions of war”. As remarked several times, a 
number of relevant factors are collected under this heading. A notable one is the type of 
government in place at the time of war (i.e. bureaucratically weak or strong, democratic or non-
democratic), and how this type effects the outcomes. Furthermore, the recognition that in a 
dynamic setting the type of government may change as a consequence of the war and/or the 
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